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Does the source of Non-Government Organization (NGO) funding affect how effective these 
groups may be in achieving their goals?  Some organizations and scholars argue that accepting 
funds from governments and other political entities reduces their autonomy and makes it more 
difficult for them to operate in politically sensitive areas. In contrast, other groups happily accept 
funds from these governmental sources.  This project examines the efficacy of humanitarian 
NGOs as a function of their funding sources, with a particular focus on civil conflict. I argue that 
due to differences in the incentives and ability of private and public donors to hold NGOs 
accountable for their activities, organizations which receive funding primarily from private 
donors are less accountable than are organizations which receive funds primarily from public 
donors. Due to these differences in accountability, I further argue that publicly funded NGOs 
should be more effective in achieving their goals than privately funded organizations. This 
argument is tested using an original dataset on the activities of three of the most prominent 
humanitarian NGOs for the period from 2004-2007, and finds that publicly funded organizations 
do in fact exhibit greater levels of aid effectiveness than privately funded organizations. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that aid from privately funded organizations may in fact 
make crises worse, rather than improving them. The results of this study have implications not 
only for scholars interested in aid efficacy organizations and scholars, but most importantly for 
the individuals whom they seek to assist, whose lives and welfare critically depend on effective 
and efficient assistance.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
On January 7th, 2010, a massive earthquake struck the Caribbean island nation of Haiti. At 7.0 on 
the Richter scale, it was the strongest earthquake in that region in at least 200 years1, and the 
consequences were devastating. According to the World Health Organization, over 200,000 
individuals were killed, and thousands more injured. Compounding the losses was the fact that 
much of the country’s infrastructure, including critical public services and hospitals, were also 
destroyed.2 
As has happened with great frequency following highly publicized natural disasters to 
this scale, the global community immediately sprang into action. In the 15 days following the 
earthquake, private donors pledged more than $528 million to 40 US non-profit groups alone, 
outpacing aid that was given in response to the Asian tsunami ($163 million in nine days) and 
9/11 ($239 million in 10 days). In fact, the rate of Haitian response was second only to the aid 
effort that followed the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, in which Americans gave more than 
$580 million in eight days.3 Though these figures represent a significant amount of funding, they 
were but one piece of a much larger puzzle. By some estimates, once all the private and public 
                                                 
1 National Geographic News January 13, 2010. “Haiti Earthquake ‘Strange’, Strongest in 200 Years”. 
Available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/01/100113-haiti-earthquake-red-cross/ Accessed March 
31, 2012. 
2 World Health Organization. January 2011. “Haiti earthquake: one year on.” Available at 
http://www.who.int/hac/crises/hti/highlights/january2011/en/index.html.  Accessed March 31, 2012. 
3 The Chronicle of Philanthropy. January 27, 2010. “Donations to Help Haiti Exceed $528-Million, 
Chronicle Tally Finds.” Available at http://philanthropy.com/article/Donations-to-Aid-Haiti-Exce/63756/. Accessed 
March 31, 2012. 
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donations were accounted for, a total of approximately $4.5 billion was committed or contributed 
to Haitian relief, with approximately $1.5 billion coming from private donors and $3 billion 
coming from public sources.4 
Yet despite the tremendous response by donors and aid groups, Haiti continues to face 
significant problems more than two years after the quake. Over 550,000 people, or almost one-
third of those displaced by the disaster, still live in temporary settlements. Only about half of the 
debris from quake has been removed, and in October 2010 an additional public health crisis 
erupted in the form of a cholera outbreak that affected as many as 514,000 individuals.5 The 
continuing crisis in Haiti, which persists despite the commitment of so many funds and the 
efforts of thousands of humanitarian organizations, seems in many ways to parallel another 
perceived tragedy in the world of international aid. Easterly (2006) calls it a “tragedy” that 
trillions of dollars in development assistance has seemingly spurred so little significant progress 
in improving the living standards of millions living in poverty. This tragedy of humanitarian aid 
has led to a significant question about its ability to deliver relief, and led many to ask “is 
humanitarian aid effective”? 
The answer to this question may appear at first blush to be obvious. The distribution of 
food to individuals facing famine, or the provision of medical services to those best by disease or 
injury, would on its face seem to be inherently beneficial. One complicating factor in assessing 
humanitarian aid’s effectiveness is the lack of a standard metric by which to measure success. 
Are the ongoing issues in Haiti representative of a failure of humanitarian aid? What would Haiti 
look like without the assistance of humanitarian organizations – the counterfactual scenario, 
                                                 
4 David Roodman. January 12, 2011. “Haiti Earthquake Relief Facts.” Available at 
http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2011/01/haiti-earthquake-aid-facts.php.  Accessed March 31, 2012. 
5 CBC News. January 5, 2012. “Special Report | Haiti earthquake.” Available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/01/05/f-haiti-topix.html.  Accessed March 31, 2012. 
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difficult to observe once aid is already in place but perhaps the most accurate way to assess its 
benefit or cost.  
It is the possibility of costs beyond the simple need for funding that may be surprising to 
many who believe that humanitarian action, due to its nature and purpose, is inherently 
beneficial. The experience in Haiti, however, is simply one episode in a long line of 
humanitarian crises in which aid scholars and practitioners have been forced to question whether 
aid is not only ineffective, but may actually in some instances cause more harm than benefit. 
Humanitarian aid has been a contentious issue in international politics almost since the 
dawn of the humanitarian movement. Two of the most influential figures in that movement, 
Florence Nightingale and Henry Dunant, founder of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, had very different opinions on its appropriateness, with Dunant advocating for aid at all 
costs and Nightingale arguing that “voluntary efforts, which reduced the expense faced by war 
ministries, merely made it easier for governments to engage in wars more often and for longer” 
(Polman 2010, 3-4) This debate has also taken on a renewed salience in the last few years. On 
March 4, 2010, the BBC aired a documentary by their World Service’s Africa editor, Martin 
Plaut, which indicated that up to 95% of the approximately $100 million  raised by 1985’s Band 
Aid for the purposes of humanitarian relief in Ethiopia was actually used by domestic military 
groups to purchase arms and continue their military efforts. This report prompted a vociferous 
response from Band Aid’s organizer, Bob Geldof, as well as several charitable organizations.6  
Though the BBC stood by its reporting, it ultimately issued an apology to Geldof for giving the 
impression that that it was Band Aid funds that were diverted. However, it also maintained the 
main thrust of the report, noting that “that there was evidence from a number of sources that the 
                                                 
6 BBC. March 7, 2010. “BBC holds firm over Ethiopia famine funds report.” Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/mar/07/bbc-holds-firm-ethiopia-famine-funds.  Accessed August 17, 2011. 
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TPLF had diverted money intended for famine relief and that some of this was spent on 
weapons”.7 This was but one of an increasing chorus of inquiries and criticisms targeted at 
humanitarian efforts, and which has given rise to questions about the effectiveness of 
humanitarian aid. 
1.1 HUMANITARIAN AID AND DONOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ARGUMENT 
IN BRIEF 
The issue of the effectiveness of humanitarian aid is at the heart of this dissertation. I argue that 
humanitarian aid from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may be effective, but its ability 
to improve the lives of those it seeks to help is impacted by the source of the organization’s 
funding. Aid from organizations which receive the majority of their funds from public sources, 
such as states and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) should be more effective than aid 
from groups which receive their funds predominantly from private sources.  
I argue that this discrepancy is attributable to differences in the way in which 
humanitarian NGOs are held accountable by their donors. In this argument, humanitarian 
activities convey two sets of benefits upon recipients. The first are private benefits, such as the 
provision of food and medical assistance, which are enjoyed only by those individuals who are 
direct beneficiaries of the aid. These direct benefits should positively impact the health of 
recipients by addressing many of the threats affecting their welfare. The second set of benefits, 
by contrast, is public in nature – they affect all members of a recipient population, whether they 
                                                 
7 BBC. November 4, 2010. “BBC apologizes to Geldof for Band Aid slur.” 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/8035539/BBC-apologises-to-Bob-Geldof-for-Band-Aid-slur.html.  
Accessed August 17, 2011. 
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receive direct benefits or not. These public effects of humanitarian aid may be conceptualized as 
negative externalities associated with aid activities. Drawing on the literature on humanitarian 
aid, I highlight a number of ways in which aid organizations may negatively affect crises via 
these type of negative externalities and argue that the true measure of a humanitarian 
intervention should be evaluated using the net of the direct private benefits plus the indirect 
public costs. 
  The possibility that these aid activities may negatively impact those they seek to assist 
provides the foundation for the necessity of accountability. One of the ways in which the 
possibly detrimental effect of humanitarian efforts on crises could be reduced is by aid donors 
holding NGOs accountable for their actions and forcing them to alter their behavior to reduce 
activities which lead to deleterious outcomes. However, I argue that there will be variations in 
donors’ ability to hold NGOs accountable. 
Private donors face obstacles in their ability to effectively hold the NGOs to which they 
donate accountable. These donors likely have little incentive to actively monitor the activities of 
NGOs once the donation has been made, in part because the donor receives private benefits with 
their donation which may satisfy their motivation for giving and negate the need for further 
action. Private donors also are hampered in their ability to monitor NGOs on a number of fronts, 
including the ability to obtain the information necessary to assess what activities NGOs are 
conducting in the crisis zone (which frequently occurs far from where the donor is located) and 
the ability to accurately interpret the information even if it is obtained. Finally, private donors 
will be limited in their ability to sanction NGOS who they feel are not performing adequately. 
While these donors can sanction NGOs by threatening to withhold future funds (Grant and 
Keohane 2005), private donors are constrained in this ability due to the collective action problem 
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(Olson 1965). The large number of private donors to any NGO means that the ability of any 
single donor to change an NGO’s behavior by withholding future donations is limited by the 
high number of additional donors. The only way these donors can thus punish the NGO in any 
significant way is by banding together to collectively withhold funds. Due to fact that the ability 
of groups to engage in this collective action decreases as group size increases, however, this is 
difficult for private donors to do. These impediments to monitoring and sanctioning of NGOs by 
private donors means that the ability of the donors to hold NGOs accountable should be low, and 
thus the ability of these donors to reduce the presence of negative externalities associated with 
aid activities by sanctioning particular groups is similarly low.  
Public donors, in contrast to private donors, enjoy greater abilities to not only monitor but 
also sanction NGOs which should also increase their ability to hold these NGOs accountable. 
Intra-governmental competition for resources means that aid dollars that are donated to NGO 
agents by states are highly contested, providing an incentive for states to make sure that the 
funds are used effectively or risk losing the funds to other purposes. States also possess the 
means by which to independently gather information about NGO activities and the institutional 
expertise necessary to assess the impact the NGOs are having upon the recipients as well as the 
operational environment. The field offices of groups such as the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and their contacts with other organizations such as the World Bank allow 
for observation of NGO activities in the field, resources beyond the grasp of many private 
donors. USAID also has institutional expertise in program evaluation which can assist them in 
assessing whether particular activities may be beneficial, and also whether there may be possible 
externalities which could detract from the aid program’s ability to improve recipient welfare. 
Finally, states are also privileged in their ability to sanction NGOs relative to private donors. The 
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large sums that public entities give to NGOs, oftentimes orders of magnitude larger than private 
donations, increases the potential penalty to NGOs should any individual state threaten to 
withhold future funds, providing a significant incentive to change behavior. The smaller pool of 
state donors relative to private donors will also allow them to more easily overcome the 
collective action problem to collectively sanction NGOs whose efforts may be found to be 
detrimental to aid recipients or otherwise improve their activities. 
In sum, the enhanced ability of public donors to hold NGOs accountable for both the 
direct and indirect effects of aid should allow for publically funded NGOs to outperform 
privately funded organizations by increasing efficiency and minimizing the negative externalities 
which detract from aid effectiveness, enhancing the beneficial aspects and increasing aid 
effectiveness overall. 
1.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The argument is presented in five sections. Chapter 2.0 discusses the existing literatures on 
humanitarian and development aid. After covering the current critiques of humanitarian aid, I 
show how many of these questions may be addressed by including some of the approaches and 
results found in the development aid literature. I also outline how this project expands existing 
theory to introduce my argument regarding donor heterogeneity and variance in NGO 
accountability, as well as the benefits of testing this and other arguments of humanitarian aid 
effectiveness in a qualitative manner. 
Chapter 3.0 presents the theory relating aid effectiveness to the accountability each 
organization faces relative to its donors. The chapter begins by discussing various factors which 
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may impact the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, including a way by which we may 
conceptualize of evaluating aid effectiveness and the role NGO neutrality and independence may 
have in changing an organization’s effectiveness. The focus then turns to creating a framework 
of NGO accountability and highlights the ways in which this differs for privately and publicly 
financed organizations. The key distinction comes down to the monitoring and sanctioning 
capability of each type of donor; private donors are argued to face low incentives to monitor the 
organizations to which they donate, and also face steep obstacles to their ability to effectively 
monitor their activities and effectively sanction groups which are found to be underperforming. 
Public donors, by contrast, have a greater incentive as well as increased capability to monitor the 
organizations to which they donate, and a more pronounced ability to sanction poorly performing 
organizations. Due to these differences, I present a number of hypotheses which relate to the 
predicted ability of publicly financed aid to better assist recipients of humanitarian aid than aid 
from privately funded organizations. 
These hypotheses are tested in Chapter 4.0 . Using an original dataset on three of the 
largest humanitarian aid organizations – the International Red Cross, Oxfam International, and 
Médecins sans Frontières – for the period from 2004-2007, I evaluate the relative effectiveness 
of each type of organization using econometric estimations of aid on measures of public health 
such as life expectancy. The findings suggest support for the hypotheses: aid from the publicly 
funded organization, here represented by the International Red Cross, does appear to be more 
effective in improving public health than aid from the privately funded Oxfam International and 
Médecins sans Frontières. Somewhat surprisingly, aid from the latter two organizations actually 
appears to decrease public health, suggesting that the fears of some aid skeptics regarding aid’s 
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ability to harm recipients may be well-founded. These results prove robust to a number of 
alternative estimations, also discussed in this section. 
Chapter 5.0 presents the result of a survey aimed at assessing the behavior and beliefs of 
private donors relative to the groups to which they contribute. The results are largely supportive 
of the idea that private donors engage in little oversight, when measured as the amount of time 
engaged in doing research or their knowledge about the operations and effectiveness of their 
preferred organizations. Based on their reactions to a hypothetical scenario it appears that donors 
are willing to engage in sanctioning type behavior, but the lack of incentives and information are 
the key impediments keeping them from effectively keeping organizations accountable for their 
activities.  
The final section, Chapter 6.0 , summarizes the argument and reviews the findings. In this 
section I also provide a number of potential policy implications that these findings on NGO 
funding source and aid effectiveness may have for aid practitioners, including ways in which 
accountability may be increased and aid made more effective. I also offer a number of potential 
avenues for future research building upon the material presented here before concluding. 
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2.0  FOREIGN AID: BENEFIT OR HINDRANCE? 
As the pace and scope of globalization increases the prominence of NGOs as global 
actors, it places a premium on understanding the effect of these organizations on the international 
landscape, including the humanitarian organizations at the heart of this project. In the vanguard 
of this type of analysis have been questions regarding how NGOs impact the environments in 
which they operate and to whom, if at all, they are accountable for their actions. A chorus of 
voices has become prominent in questioning the activities, behaviors and motivations of 
humanitarian NGOs, including accusations that they may be ineffective at best, harmful at worst. 
However, questions of whether humanitarian NGOs are effective in delivering assistance and 
improving the lives of those they seek to serve have been of an implicit nature; the overt question 
has been about the process of aid delivery, rather than its impact. While intuitively better 
processes should yield better outcomes, it is not true that humanitarian aid is necessarily 
effective at improving lives simply because it is given to fulfill a humanitarian imperative. 
Overall, scholars and practitioners of humanitarian aid have been forced to recognize that while 
“humanitarians used to believe that only good consequences could follow from their good 
intentions, but this cheery and charitable outlook has yielded to the more sobering awareness that 
bad outcomes can, indeed, result from actions carried out by the pure of heart” (Barnett 2003, 
402). As has been seen from the literature on foreign economic assistance there are a multitude 
of conditions which can impact aid’s ability to generate its intended effect.  
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This dissertation builds upon this new awareness and the work that has already been done 
on humanitarian and development aid effectiveness with both theoretical and methodological 
contributions. Drawing on existing theories of how humanitarian aid may affect conflict, and 
also which factors – most specifically accountability – impact aid’s effectiveness, I argue that 
organizations which are most accountable should be those whose aid operations are most 
effective. Furthermore, increased accountability should also reduce the presence of undesirable 
externalities of aid which may in fact make crises worse. However, I also argue, as an extension 
to existing theory, that not all NGOs face the same level of accountability, but that accountability 
should vary according to whether their donors are public (such as governments) or private 
(individuals). Empirically the dissertation applies many of the quantitative methods utilized in 
the study of development aid to assess the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and assess the 
assertion that aid effectiveness should vary by donor type. This quantitative analysis is a 
departure from the standard methodology of studying humanitarian assistance, which has been 
predominantly qualitative. 
To build the argument, the chapter first examines the contemporary discussion on 
humanitarian aid, including the incentives governing NGO behavior and their theorized impacts 
on the areas in which they work. The following section presents the analogous literature on 
development aid to show various ways in which aid’s effectiveness has been debated, while the 
final section combines the preceding sections and provides a discussion of how they relate to the 
central argument of the dissertation. 
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2.1 EXAMINATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN AID 
The increased awareness of possibly negative outcomes associated with humanitarian aid 
has elicited criticism along two general lines. The first examines the incentives that motivate 
humanitarian NGOs and the manner in which they respond to crises. The second looks at the 
way in which these operations affect the crises in which the NGOs are operating, including 
possible means by which those operations could in fact exacerbate conflicts or disasters. 
Those who are critical of the manner in which NGOs, both humanitarian and 
developmental, respond to crises tend to argue that NGOs pursue their institutional interests in 
matters such as image and fundraising rather than actually acting based on the needs of 
threatened populations. Hancock (1989) argues that many in the field of development and relief 
actually use their causes for personal gain; they increase their wealth and prestige by attending 
conferences in internationally desirable locations and drawing large salaries while nominally 
addressing the actual needs of the poor. He critically calls these types of actors “lords of 
poverty”. This is similar to the criticism Polman (2010) offers when she labels humanitarian 
efforts as “crisis caravans”, a “caravanasary of humanitarian aid organizations [which] treks, 
apparently by common agreement, from one humanitarian territory to the next” (12). The 
motivating factor for these organizations, she argues, goes beyond a humanitarian imperative. 
Rather, these organizations catch “contract fever”, in which they privilege the acquisition of new 
contracts above nearly all else. These contracts are obtained in part through cozy relationships 
with the media and the inflation of statistics regarding the size of the needy population and 
distortion of other key facts, and may occur even in cases where the organizations are aware that 
their efforts may hurt more than they help.  
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These organizational incentives for humanitarian organizations to emphasize the needs of 
the recipients, perhaps even to the point where they mislead donors, has led to donors’ increasing 
unwillingness to implicitly trust aid organizations. Smillie and Minear (2004) suggest that this 
skepticism comes about due to the fact that “many of those assessing needs are the ones who 
submit project proposals and spend the money, and this is thought to constitute a conflict of 
interest. NGOs, it is said, might exaggerate the number of people in need because their 
institutional survival depends on donations and grants: the more the merrier” (204). The problem 
is severe enough that Mukesh Kapila, former UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the 
Sudan, has said that “of all the major worldwide public endeavors, the financing of the global 
humanitarian system is the most primitive, based on little rationality and even less 
accountability” (203).8 
Financial incentives mean that NGOs go to locations which should bring the most 
publicity and may also expand their operations to cover areas not traditionally within their 
purview in order to obtain funding. As with any other organization, the constant need for funds is 
a strong motivator: “Few NGOs have ever seen a contract they didn’t like, or a problem they 
didn’t believe they could solve. The first priority of an NGO, like any bureaucracy, is its own 
survival” (Maren 1997, 278). 
Taken together, this often cynical view of the incentives and goals of NGOs would 
suggest that their initial priority is not in fact the need of the recipients but instead the NGO’s 
ability to earn funds and engage in operations. Under this framework the individual need is 
simply a vehicle for NGO self-preservation and enrichment. There are contrary perspectives, and 
Büthe,Major, and de Mello e Souze (Forthcoming), in one of the first empirical examinations of 
                                                 
8 It is interesting that Smillie and Minear, who provide the quote, go on later to argue that the problem is 
not due to too little accountability, but the wrong types of accountability and to the wrong people. 
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NGO activities, do find that aid is distributed primarily in response to recipient needs.9 However, 
the cynical perspective is well entrenched in the literature, and it is likely that the debate over 
NGO motivations and responses will continue to be debated well into the future. 
A similar debate has been ongoing regarding the actual effects of humanitarian aid on 
recipient populations. In one of the most public examples of this debate, during the Rwandan 
conflict Médecins sans Frontières’ (MSF) France feared that they were providing medical 
treatment to genocidaires who would then return to killing, prompting the organization to 
withdraw lest it become unwittingly complicit in the genocide. This episode prompted questions 
of “what humanitarian aid represents, and at what point it loses its sense and becomes a technical 
function in the service of evil” (Terry 2002, 2). These concerns are part of a larger 
“Humanitarian Dilemma”, a debate between the moral imperative of humanitarian organizations 
to provide aid to those in need and the potential for this aid to result in negative externalities and 
unintended consequences (Väyrynen 1999). 
There have been numerous arguments made as to how aid may have indirect negative 
consequences on humanitarian crises, particularly (but not limited to) during civil conflicts.10 
Luttwak argues that humanitarian action by NGOs unequivocally interferes with the natural 
processes of war and exacerbates conflict  by creating “refugee nations” and inserting material 
aid that may supply active combatants (1999, 43-4).  Humanitarian assistance may also free 
resources that would otherwise be used for non-combat purposes in a substitution effect for 
                                                 
9 Their study is however limited to development organizations and encompasses only one year of 
operations. 
10 It should be noted that there are also competing arguments as to how aid may in fact indirectly reduce the 
severity or duration of humanitarian crises, in addition to its presumed direct effect of improving the welfare of 
those affected by the crisis. 
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either rebels or governments, allowing these groups to use the resources to instead support their 
war efforts (See as an example Anderson 1999a; Goodhand 2000).   
Aid or its benefits may also be directly transferred from humanitarian agencies to 
combatants in the form of rents or payment for services.  In the chaotic environment of a conflict 
zone, aid organizations may end up becoming dependent on local military forces for protection 
or access, a fact which can be leveraged by the belligerents for support (Le Billon 2000; 
MacFarlane 2001).  Aid generally tends to be highly visible and predictable as well (Slim 2004, 
12), thus leaving it subject to coercive action on the part of the combatants. In situations such as 
the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan, aid was routinely manipulated and subject to corruption and 
political favoritism.  As an example, up to 40% of food aid from cross-border programs was 
given directly to rebels in the form of “taxation” (Goodhand 2002, 842-3).  This is different than 
aid from governments, which Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 437) argue is “difficult for a rebel 
organization to capture during a conflict,” (italics theirs) as most goes directly to government 
coffers and projects.  The notable exception is food aid, which rebels can capture by threatening 
distribution channels. 
Assistance can also be indirectly transferred from aid agencies to combatants through 
civilian populations, where it may be collected as taxes or confiscated outright.  Civilians in 
territory held by rebels, including those opposed to the rebel cause, may be reluctant to publicize 
such operations to aid agencies for fear of reprisals (Kalyvas 2006), creating situations in which 
agencies possibly have little control or specific knowledge regarding where these transfers are 
taking place.  Insurgents or rebels also use their ability to blend into the population for strategic 
purposes (DeMars 1995, 4), making it difficult to distinguish legitimate civilian economic actors 
from those supporting or actively engaged in the war (Goodhand 2000, 61).  This also may be a 
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consideration in refugee camps, which Terry (2002) argues can unwittingly give safe haven to or 
provide services for disguised combatants. 
Aid can also affect the incentives for settling a conflict.  Individuals who profit from the 
conflict, such as employees of foreign groups working in the conflict zone, or those receiving 
rents who face a loss of income with peace, have an economic incentive to continue fighting 
(MacFarlane 2001, 15; Goodhand 2000). It may also be used by rebel elites to motivate 
combatants to continue fighting by making continued conflict more profitable than peace (Regan 
and Norton 2005; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003).   
The presence of humanitarian aid may also extend conflict by affecting the likelihood 
that a conflict will reach what Zartman describes as a “hurting stalemate” (1995).  According to 
Zartman, governments and rebels may be more likely to negotiate a settlement to conflict when 
they have reached a stalemate that inflicts costs on both parties, making a negotiated outcome 
preferable to the status quo.  If humanitarian intervention alters the amount or degree of suffering 
experienced by one or both sides, it may alter the actors’ relative valuations of the status quo and 
make a negotiated peace less attractive.  
The infusion of assistance also has the ability to potentially exacerbate underlying social 
tensions if it is perceived to be biased in the manner in which it is distributed or causes conflict 
over its distribution or other resources.  Hyndman (2009) found that tsunami aid in Aceh, 
Indonesia, ignited tensions between those who were victims of the tsunami and those who had 
suffered from the longstanding civil conflict. Tsunami victims were characterized by some as 
‘the lucky ones’ in light of the fact that post-conflict reintegration aid was only 2.5% of the total 
aid allocated for tsunami relief (94). Aid may also legitimize actors or processes directly 
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involved in the conflict, making them or their cause appear to be worthwhile and increasing 
supporting (Anderson 1999a; Le Billon 2000; MacFarlane 2001; Goodhand 2002).  
Not all believe that aid makes crises worse. There are also arguments that it could 
perhaps have beneficial consequences. Borton (1998) argues that although some diversion of aid 
to the combatants can occur any effects that may result are minimal.  MacFarlane echoes this 
opinion, arguing that the viewpoint that aid can sustain or exacerbate conflict is “overblown” 
(2001, viii), and highlights another perspective which he terms “conflict transformation”, 
arguing that aid can help bring about peace (63-4).  Keen (1998, 320), also argues that aid can 
shorten or prevent conflict, particularly “where it relieves a subsistence crisis that is encouraging 
people to take up arms in pursuit of sustenance”. Others have argued that economic 
compensation to warring parties can help bring about peace and cease-fire agreements, as 
reportedly was the case with some factions in Burma (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003). 
Overall the findings on the aid’s effect on crises are mixed. Some militaries have taken 
measures to avoid supplying their enemies under the belief that such actions will exacerbate the 
fighting.11  Goodhand (2002, 842) argues that NGO activity in Afghanistan helped exacerbate 
and sustain the conflict, while Vayrynen argues that assistance appears to have sustained and 
prolonged crises in Kampuchea, Sudan, Liberia, and the Great Lakes region of Africa (1999, 
184).  Conversely, DeMars argues that although humanitarian action had a role in influencing the 
course of the Ethiopian conflict of the late 1970’s, it neither prolonged nor resolved it (1995, 2). 
                                                 
11 As an example, British forces in Malaya distributed cooked rather than raw rice rations so that they had 
to be consumed immediately and could not be distributed to the fighters hiding within the jungle (After smart 
weapons, smart soldiers  2007).  During World War I, the Entente powers were afraid that aid provided to civilians 
in Belgium and Germany by the Belgian Relief Commission might in fact be diverted to the German military 
(MacFarlane 2001, 1). 
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Finally, Keen (1994, 204) has pointed to “Operation Lifeline” in Sudan as one example of aid 
actually having a beneficial effect upon conflict.  
Perhaps more striking than the fact that there is no clear consensus on whether or not aid 
is bad for crises is the fact that this question has assumed such prominence over the question of 
whether aid is actually effective. Roberts and Hofmann (2004) suggested that despite numerous 
efforts at increasing technical competence and accountability in the humanitarian sphere, 
“knowledge of the impact of humanitarian interventions in alleviating and suffering and 
ultimately reducing mortality in the health and other sectors remains limited”.  
Questions of aid’s effectiveness are not merely limited to its direct intended effect: to 
improve the health and well-being of those threatened by crisis. The debate on how aid affects 
environments more broadly is a question of the unintended consequences of aid. Both types of 
effects, however, are relatively understudied, particularly from a quantitative perspective. One 
such effort was undertaken by Seybolt (2007), who used large scale quantitative analysis to 
assess the effectiveness of humanitarian military interventions and found that under particular 
conditions these types of efforts could be beneficial for recipients. These types of quantitative 
analyses are useful in determining broad trends and are the standard method of assessing aid’s 
efficacy in the literature on development aid, which can be a useful analogue for studying the 
effectiveness of humanitarian aid. It may be enlightening not only in its methodological 
contribution, but also in the ways aid’s efficacy has been altered by circumstances and the 
diversity of findings on whether aid is in fact effective or not. The next section therefore presents 
a brief discussion of the literature on development aid and the ways in which aid’s effectiveness 
has been addressed and analyzed. 
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2.2 FINDINGS ON FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT AID 
Studies on foreign development assistance can broadly be categorized as belonging to one of two 
groups: what determines aid distributions, and is aid effective at generating economic growth 
within the recipient country? These categories are not mutually exclusive, and a number of 
studies have drawn on both to construct theoretical arguments regarding aid’s effectiveness (or 
lack thereof), but these tend to be the two dominant themes within the literature. 
Likely the most frequently cited piece in the area of determinants of aid allocation is the 
work by Alesina and Dollar (2000), who find variation in aid patterns which can be explained by 
varying donor motivations for giving aid. Roughly, the Nordic states are classified as giving for 
the most altruistic reasons, countries with strong colonial histories such as Britain and France 
tend to give to their former colonies, and other states such as the U.S. give for strategic reasons 
such as currying political favor or military access. This heterogeneity in donor allocation is 
reinforced by Collier and Dollar (2002), who argue that current aid does not fully realize its 
potential for poverty reduction due to distortions in aid giving patterns, advocating instead for 
aid giving along a “poverty-efficient” distribution model. The size of aid projects has also been 
found to be related to the bureaucratic structure of the donor; donors with more fragmented 
administrative structures tend to give smaller aid packages on a project level (Kilby 2011). 
The findings on aid effectiveness, which have traditionally consisted of large-n 
quantitative analyses of the statistical relationship between aid and economic growth, have been 
what may charitably be described as a mixed bag. Studies such as Boone (1996) found that aid 
did not help the poor or increase investment, but could contribute to a growth in government. 
This finding was later challenged by others, including Hansen and Tarp (2001), who found that 
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aid could in fact induce economic growth, though the estimated effect was sensitive to model 
specifications and the role of investment. 
A number of studies fall somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. Aid may be 
effective, but it needn’t always be effective. Some of the mixed results likely came about due to 
what appears to be a highly conditional relationship between aid and growth: there is evidence 
that aid is “conditionally effective. There are circumstances in which it reduces poverty…and 
circumstances in which it assists policy reform. In the past, much aid was less effective than it 
could have been because its allocation did not heed these circumstances” (Collier and Dollar 
2004, italics in original). 
If the effect of aid is truly dependent on mitigating conditions, which factors can make 
aid more or less effective? Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that the types of economic policies 
utilized by the recipient country can affect aid’s ability to generate growth. Countries which 
implement pro-growth monetary and fiscal policies seem to realize increased economic growth 
when receiving development assistance, but countries with poor policy environments do not see 
these benefits. 
Aid conditionality is another factor which may impact on aid efficacy. Though 
conditionality has been criticized on some grounds for failing to induce actual policy changes 
(and in some cases causing a decrease in social expenditures, according to some critics) there is 
potential that conditionality which merely stipulates that specific targets must be met while 
leaving actual policy changes to the recipient governments might actually be more effective than 
forced policy changes from abroad (Collier et al. 1997). Svensson (2003) recommends a similar 
type of reform for aid conditionality, in which aid allocations would occur after economic 
 21 
reforms and based on actual performance, overcoming a strong bias in donor countries to 
distribute aid even when conditionality has not been met. 
Donor incentives may also impact conditionality’s ability to translate aid into growth by 
decreasing the recipient’s a priori belief about the donor’s willingness to actual enforce aid 
conditions. Bearce and Tirone (2010) argue that donor incentives to give aid during the Cold 
War was high, since in many cases donors were giving for purposes other than facilitating 
economic growth, and recipients therefore had little reason to implement structural reforms. 
When these donor incentives decreased following the end of the Cold War, recipients took donor 
threats of aid conditionality enforcement more seriously, leading to their finding that aid in this 
period actually generated economic growth while aid given during the Cold War did not, on 
average. 
Time may also be a factor affecting the relationship between aid and growth. One 
explanation for why so many studies find a weak link between aid and growth may be that aid’s 
effect may be staggered over time. Dividing aid into segments that should have short term 
effects, long term effects, and no effect on growth (such as humanitarian aid) Clemens, Radelet 
and Bhavnani (2004) are able to identify a strong relationship between aid and growth in the 
short term, an effect other studies may be missing by pooling all three types. 
The question of whether or not aid is fungible has also been argued to be a key factor in 
whether aid flows will translate into recipient economic growth. Pack and Pack (1993) find that 
aid is in fact fungible in their study of the Dominican Republic, arguing that this aid diversion 
from pro-growth expenditures reduces its ability to generate increases in GDP.12 This permissive 
view of aid fungibility is echoed by Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998), who also find that 
                                                 
12 It is notable that this finding is in opposition to an earlier study of Indonesia done by the same authors, 
Pack and Pack (1990) where they argue that aid is not fungible. 
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recipients are able to divert aid given for economic growth to other purposes. Bermeo (2011) 
contests this understanding of aid fungibility, suggesting that in fact donors can enforce some 
degree of aid conditionality and its not simply another source of non-tax revenue which can be 
used for nearly any purpose, as has been suggested by scholars such as Morrison (2009). 
Even these studies which posit aid conditionality are not without their detractors. For 
example, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) run a cross-sectional analysis of aid effectiveness and 
find that even after accounting for endogeneity “there is no robust positive relationship between 
aid and growth”, even with respect to factors such as time horizons, types of aid and its purposes, 
who gives it or whether it’s given to countries with good or bad institutions (18). 
There has also been a rather public debate anchored in competing books from prominent 
aid scholars, each of whom acknowledged that in many ways aid had failed to foster 
development but offered markedly different ways of making it more effective. Sachs (2005) 
offered a development path centered on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) that he 
helped construct at the United Nations. This would entail a multifaceted approach targeting 
issues from public health to infrastructure while also entailing a massive increase in the size of 
aid flows from the developed to developing nations to overcome the lack of capital which kept 
the latter set of countries from experiencing economic growth. Easterly (2006) responded to 
Sachs’ approach, which he characterized as “top down”, with a development process more 
focused on facilitating entrepreneurship in recipient countries, which he called “bottom up”. The 
proper role for aid in Easterly’s framework was not for it to be administered by international 
organizations, but for it to support individuals in these countries as they sought to address the 
needs of their communities, from which economic growth would then take place.  Finally, 
Collier (2007) entered the arena with an approach that somewhat straddled those advocated by 
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his two predecessors. Aid was not effective, in his estimation, because of various “traps”, such as 
bad governance and civil conflict, which aid by itself could not overcome. The key, then, to 
fostering development was to utilize other types of policies, including military interventions, in 
combination with aid to help increase its ability to stimulate growth. 
Though in many of these studies of aid’s effectiveness the picture is frequently bleak 
from the perspective of aid’s ability to induce growth (or at least highly conditional), the findings 
do not suggest that aid actually makes bad situations worse. Put another way, the alternative 
hypothesis against which the aid is being measured is that aid has no statistically discernible 
effect. The worst outcome is that aid is simply ineffective, and that there is a massive opportunity 
cost and financial waste to spending aid without improving the lives of those in poverty. 
There  rather benign model of aid giving is changing, however, with a burgeoning body 
of work arguing that rather than simply being inefficient, like humanitarian aid the worst case 
scenario for development aid may be that it makes countries worse off. Moyo (2009) entered the 
debate between Sachs, Easterly and Collier to argue that aid was in fact making Africa worse off, 
rather than better. She argues that aid creates dependence and other disruptions leading to 
decreased economic performance among aid recipients, declaring the aid to be “dead”.  Others 
have gone even further. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009a, 2009b; 2010) have a series of 
articles examining the effects of foreign aid on regime change and democratization in the 
recipient country, in line with an earlier working paper by Smith (2006) where he argues that aid 
can in fact even be “pernicious”. Drawing on selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) 
they argue that leaders can utilize foreign aid to remain in office by using aid for purposes other 
than economic growth, such as paying off potential rebel groups or allies and thwarting 
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democratic reforms. In some cases this may even be undertaken with the full knowledge of the 
donor country. 
There have been other possible externalities associated with aid, although these have 
been painted in a more positive light. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) found that although aid has no 
direct impact upon civil conflict onset, it may reduce the likelihood of experiencing a civil war if 
it can increase domestic economic growth and reduce dependence on primary commodities. 
Savun and Tirone (2012) find a more direct causal linkage between development assistance, 
arguing that aid can help recipient governments weather exogenous economic shocks that might 
otherwise precipitate a civil conflict.  
The variety in the findings on whether aid is or is not in fact effective, and the scope 
conditions which can affect its ability to fulfill its goals, reinforces that it should not simply be 
assumed that humanitarian aid always improves the welfare of recipients. This assumption has 
been challenged theoretically, but there is generally a dearth of empirical evidence assessing its 
validity, a void which is addressed by the dissertation. The theoretical and empirical means by 
which it does so are the focus of the next section.  
2.3 THE RELEVANCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID             
TO THE STUDY OF HUMANITARIAN AID EFFECTIVENESS 
Many of the criticisms of foreign aid discussed in this chapter have a few common 
elements. The first is that many of the suggested deficiencies in the humanitarian network could 
be addressed by increased accountability. Indeed, a current lack of accountability is highlighted 
as a primary concern among many scholars. The second issue is that while there has been much 
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theorizing on the possible effects of aid, there is little empirical evidence showing what effects 
aid actually engenders in crisis situation.  
The argument presented here addresses the issue of accountability and effectiveness by 
applying some of the lessons from the literature on development assistance. As seen from the 
work of Bearce and Tirone (2010), when donors are willing to enforce accountability – in their 
work accountability comes in the form of aid conditionality – aid is effective in achieving its 
goals. When donors are lax in holding recipients accountable, then aid shows little beneficial 
effect. This logic should also apply to humanitarian organizations – when donors to international 
NGOs hold the organizations to which they donate accountable for how funds are used, those 
funds should be used more effectively than if the donors fail to exercise oversight. This argument 
comports with the logic proposed by Grant and Keohane (2005) who argue that one of the groups 
which can hold NGOs accountable are donors. The emphasis on donor accountability in 
humanitarian action is also increased due to the fact that “the field of humanitarian intervention 
is not overseen by any regulatory body, neither certification nor licensure is required to practice, 
and there is no formal system of evaluation of either individual or organizational performance” 
(Waldman 2001, 589). In short, if donors don’t hold NGOs accountable, it’s not clear who else 
can. 
Greater accountability should also have the potential to reduce the negative externalities 
suggested by aid scholars. As an example, donors could prevent NGOs from engaging in direct 
aid transfers to rebels. In this manner, greater accountability seems like a beneficial proposition 
on a number of fronts. What is unique about the theory presented here is that it extends these 
logics to examine what factors influence donors’ willingness and ability to hold NGOs 
accountable. The donors in Bearce and Tirone (2010) were a largely homogenous group: state 
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donors of bilateral economic development aid.13 The world of humanitarian aid donors is, by 
contrast, a highly diverse group, running the gamut from private individuals to nation states and 
everything in between. I argue that given such disparate actors there should be significant 
differences in their ability to hold NGOs accountable, for reasons and by methods detailed in 
Chapter 3.0 . In so doing, I combine a number of existing literatures while also advancing the 
theoretical understanding to include considerations of donor variation and how that may affect 
aid efficacy through differences in accountability. 
The second primary contribution of this project is empirically oriented. As discussed 
previously, scholars and practitioners have shown great concern for the possibility that 
humanitarian aid may in fact have as great a propensity to make countries worse off as it does to 
improve their situation. There are numerous arguments suggesting means by which aid can in 
fact make crises such as civil wars worse, in direct opposition to the intentions of those 
organizations delivering aid and services. These arguments have also drawn on case study 
analyses to find situations in which the proposed mechanism appears to have been observed in 
the relevant circumstances. The final determination about whether aid systematically makes 
situations worse appears uncertain, however, with numerous competing positions on whether aid 
is a net good or bad for recipients in crisis. 
This is where the studies of foreign aid broadly can help address this fundamental 
question of humanitarian aid. The question of whether foreign aid makes crises worse is 
inherently a question of overall trends, and not isolated instances. That aid has possibly on 
certain occasions contributed to the deterioration of particular crises seems likely based on the 
existing literature done in this area. What is not clear is whether these are isolated instances or 
                                                 
13 Not all states are the same, of course, but in many ways they share many more similarities than 
differences, particularly when compared to individuals and other NGOs as discussed later in Chapter 3.0 . 
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representations of a broader overall trend, a determination which can be best assessed by looking 
at humanitarian aid more broadly in a similar type of analyses as has been undertaken with 
development aid.  Much of the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between aid and crisis 
may be due to the qualitative nature of the analysis. Overall, the fact that most of the findings 
have been inductively formed means that “conclusions regarding the impact must be 
tentative…the analysis is not one of strict cause and effect but instead lies in the realm of 
plausibility and informed argument” (MacFarlane 2001, 13).  One must address the question of 
the counterfactual: “whether the local actions fueling the crisis would have been abandoned or 
modified earlier if only limited humanitarian assistance, or none, had been available to its 
victims” (Väyrynen 1999, 179). This is the primary benefit of the quantitative analysis; by 
comparing cases where aid was dispensed with cases sharing similar characteristics, the 
econometric estimations can get in part to the this question of the counterfactual to determine 
trends and determine how aid impacted recipient welfare. 
It also allows for the examination of the question which has seemingly (and surprisingly) 
been neglected in much of the humanitarian aid literature: is humanitarian aid effective? The 
existing studies looking at whether or not aid is bad for crises is tangentially related to this 
question since it would presumably detract from aid’s efficacy if it did extend conflicts or 
transfer resources to rebel groups. It is still possible under even these pessimistic scenarios that 
aid may be effective in increasing welfare despite these occurrences, however. The question is 
therefore not whether aid can make things worse, but rather does aid do more harm than good? 
Humanitarian aid practitioners and donors may be willing to accept some negative externalities if 
on the whole their efforts improve the lives of those they assist. If these negative effects 
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overwhelm the positive benefit conferred by aid, however, then that would be a serious blow to 
the humanitarian network overall. 
Like many of the theories of development aid effectiveness, this dissertation also assumes 
that aid’s effect will likely be impacted by particular conditioning factors, including the interests 
and motivations of aid donors derived from the theoretical discussion. I argue that humanitarian 
aid from NGOs can be effective, but that this effect will be differ depending on whether the 
NGO derives its funds from public or private sources. Exactly why this distinction matters, and 
the means by which I identify exactly how to understand what it means for aid to be effective, 
are the basis of Chapter 3.0 .  
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3.0  A THEORY OF DONOR COMPOSITION, NGO POLITICS                                            
AND HUMANITARIAN EFFECTIVENESS 
Given the diversity in the literature on aid generally and humanitarian NGOs more directly, the 
question of whether the efforts of humanitarian organizations are effective is still open. In 
addressing this question, I argue that humanitarian aid can in fact be effective, but as with other 
types of foreign assistance, the effectiveness of humanitarian aid may be conditional on different 
factors. Specifically, I argue that NGOs which receive funds primarily from private donors face 
lower levels of accountability to their donors than do NGOs which receive funds from and work 
with states. This decreased accountability means that the negative externalities associated with 
humanitarian action are more pronounced for privately funded organizations, and therefore their 
aid efforts are less effective than those of their publicly funded counterparts. Furthermore, 
publicly funded NGOs enjoy additional benefits through their association with states which also 
makes them more effective. This is in opposition to the position adopted by NGOs; rather than 
increasing their effectiveness and ability to deliver services, independence from state funding 
should decrease the success of their programs. 
This argument is developed through the following sections. First, I discuss the various 
ways in which NGO effectiveness can be conceptualized, and argue that the most appropriate 
metrics are those which measure general social welfare, including direct and indirect effects of 
aid. Second, I discuss how the principles guiding humanitarian activities may work to make aid 
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less effective, particularly since they can affect the manner and to degree to which these 
organizations are held accountable. Third, I provide a working concept of donor-NGO 
accountability analyze the incentives, preferences and ability of each type of actor relative to the 
accountability process. The fourth section summarizes the argument and provides hypotheses 
derived from the theory, concluding the chapter.   
3.1 FACTORS IMPACTING NGO EFFECTIVENESS 
There has been a spirited debate among practitioners and scholars of humanitarian action about 
the effectiveness of such undertakings. Beginning primarily with the genocide in Rwanda, and 
reinforced by subsequent perceived failures in Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Afghanistan, among others, there has been a question about why the international community 
failed “to protect the victims, to respond effectively to their needs and to navigate the political 
challenges involved” (Davis 2007, 1). Such introspection contains echoes of the criticism of 
development aid put forth by Easterly (2006), who calls the fact that the West has spent $2.3 
trillion on foreign aid over a period of 50 years and is yet still unable to get basic necessities such 
as cheap medicines and mosquito netting to those most in need a “tragedy” (4) . The question 
facing humanitarians in the wake of these failures can be seen as a similar tragedy: how and why 
had the international community failed, despite the efforts of so many dedicated professionals 
and volunteers and the expenditure of massive amount of resources? Before we can understand 
the determining factors into why humanitarian interventions may succeed or fail, it is important 
to conceptualize of how to differentiate between the two. While it may seem to be obvious at 
first blush, the question of how to measure and understand NGO effectiveness is thornier than it 
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may seem initially. This section provides a theoretical framework which can be used to assess 
the effectiveness of NGO interventions, and also discusses the impacts of direct and indirect 
effects of humanitarian aid, as well as the effect that NGO legitimacy may have on the 
organizations’ efforts. 
3.1.1 Conceptualizing NGO Effectiveness: Direct and Indirect Effects 
Humanitarian NGOs seek to protect and provide relief, such as access to food and 
medical attention, to individuals facing existential threats like civil conflicts or natural disasters. 
The most obvious way to measure effectiveness might seem then to be a simple count of how 
many individuals were assisted by the organization. Save the Children International’s Annual 
Review for 2008, for example, states that since 2005 they have “worked to give children affect 
by conflict a good education. We have improved the quality of education for more than 10 
million children. We have also helped more than 1 million children enroll in school, and will 
continue working to reach our goal of getting 3 million children into the classroom” 
(International Save the Children Alliance 2009, 6). Others draw attention to individuals, allowing 
you to “sponsor” that person with a donation. For example, World Vision International has 
profiles of children in need of support, allowing you to sponsor them for $35 per month.14 This 
type of reporting has an intuitive appeal; the numbers are easy for the aid organization to collect 
and report, and easy for donors to interpret. 
However, this type of reporting does not necessarily convey any information about how 
effectively these individuals were assisted. How, if at all, were their educations improved? The 
                                                 
14 http://donate.worldvision.org/OA_HTML/xxwv2DoChildSearch_B.jsp?.  Accessed August 17, 2011. 
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provision of services does not necessarily mean that those services had a positive impact. This 
can also be true when the services are medical in nature. Simply reporting the number of 
individuals treated does not convey whether their health was improved. Studies of new medical 
treatments are not concerned with how many individuals receive the treatment, but how well 
those who were treated responded. Treating large numbers of people with ineffective drugs will 
do little to improve their overall health, though it would make an organization which merely 
reported the breadth of services seem highly competent. 
A more useful measure of effectiveness would therefore include information on 
outcomes, rather than merely the quantity of treatment delivered. How did individuals respond to 
treatment, and at what cost was that treatment delivered? For example, aid agencies can evaluate 
how their patients responded to certain medications or immunizations, or how many individuals 
were still suffering from malnutrition following the establishment of a food delivery program. 
Various practices could be evaluated based on success rates and costs, with those programs that 
were both more effective and less expensive being judged to be the most effective.  
Though the informational requirements of this approach are steeper, the basic concept is 
still relatively straightforward, on par with the evaluation of many different types of programs. 
What outcome, Y, came about as a result of input X? As an example, Project Hope has run 
numerous programs around the world aimed at promoting the use of oral rehydration therapy 
(ORT) as a means of reducing deaths from diarrhea. Following workshops aimed at instructing 
local health providers in the proper use of ORT, the workshop organizers assessed how well the 
participants incorporated the material presented by traveling to the remote health clinics and 
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observing whether the necessary facilities had been established, and speaking with local 
residents.15 
This approach measures the direct effect of aid provision: the improvement (or lack 
thereof) of those individuals receiving treatment. Such a process conveys information about the 
effectiveness of particular techniques or practices, and in a controlled experiment where other 
factors which may affect the outcome are controlled for this is a suitable approach.  It may not be 
appropriate, however, if there are possible externalities from the treatment which may affect not 
only those individuals receiving the treatment, but also those who are excluded from it. 
In the case of humanitarian aid, there are likely numerous externalities which could 
impact the true effect of aid. Positive impacts of aid could be reinforced throughout the entire 
population by providing timely treatment of communicable diseases, preventing them from 
spreading to a larger portion of the population. Toole and Waldman (1990) point to these types 
of diseases as some of the main sources of mortality among refugees and displaced populations: 
“measles, diarrheal diseases, and acute respiratory tract infections…accounted for 50% to 95% 
of all recorded refugee deaths during the emergency phases in Thailand, Somalia, Sudan and 
Malawi” (3298). Other communicable diseases are also present, though less lethal. Highlighting 
the role aid can play, the mortality rate from Cholera in a camp in Somalia in 1985 was 25%, 
largely due to “insufficient and inadequately trained staff”; the mortality rate was only 2.4%, by 
contrast, in seven nearby camps where better trained community health workers were present 
(Toole and Waldman 1990, 3298). If the analysis of aid’s role was limited to the individuals who 
received individual vaccinations it is likely that the broader community benefits of containing or 
otherwise avoiding having a localized outbreak of a communicable disease turning into an 
                                                 
15 This information was conveyed to me during a personal discussion with a physician associated with the 
Project Hope effort and numerous other public health initiatives in the developing world. 
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epidemic would be missed. Under this scenario the true impact of aid would be underestimated, 
downplaying its beneficial aspects.  
Given the many ways in which humanitarian aid is theorized (though not yet definitively 
empirically proven) to affect conflicts in Chapter 2.0 , it is also possible that similar but negative 
societal impacts may exist as an outgrowth of aid provision.  These potentially negative 
consequences must also be accounted for when assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian 
action because one of the founding principles of medicine is primum non nocere, or “first, do no 
harm”.16 If the intervention is effective in improving the welfare of a limited population but 
induces detrimental consequences for others, it may by a pyrrhic victory. In light of these highly 
plausible competing externalities which can upwardly or downwardly bias estimations of the 
effect of aid if limited to only individuals receiving treatment, I argue that the proper metric by 
which aid effectiveness should be evaluated is one which encompasses the welfare of the entire 
population, and not simply those who are the direct beneficiaries of the aid efforts. Such a metric 
will allow for an accounting of the direct and indirect costs and benefits of the aid activities in a 
way that the other two proposed measures do not.  
The importance of accounting for both types of effects can be seen in Figure 3-1. 
                                                 
16 Cognizant of this concern, Mary Alderson (1999b), a prominent aid practitioner and analyst, used it in 
the title of her book discussing how aid might unwittingly support conflicts.  
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3-1 Direct and Indirect Effects of Humanitarian Aid 
Humanitarian assistance, as represented in the figure, can be conceptualized of as a 
private good; it is both rivalrous (meaning that consumption by one individual reduces the 
amount of aid available for consumption by others) and excludable (benefits bestowed upon one 
individual need not be available to all individuals). This private good may be thought of as the 
“direct benefit” of aid enjoyed by those who are actual aid recipients, represented by the upper 
arrow in Figure 3-1. Assuming that individuals who receive aid do in fact benefit from its 
provision, then it follows that this relationship is positive. 
It is the question of the “indirect benefits” that complicates the analysis. What is the 
effect of humanitarian activities on those who are not aid recipients? Are there aid externalities, 
and are these externalities negative or positive? These externalities can be conceptualized of as 
public goods – they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, so all individuals in a population are 
affected relatively equally. This would be the case, for example, if aid provision in fact extended 
the duration of a conflict or worsened its intensity, each of which could have detrimental effects 
on public health. It is known from studies such as Ghoborah, Huth and Russett (2003), Li and 
Wen (2005), and Iqbal (2010) that crises like civil conflicts worsen public health, which also 
makes sense from an intuitive perspective. The question of the relevance of the indirect benefits 
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therefore comes down to the relationship between humanitarian aid and crisis itself. If 
humanitarian aid does in fact worsen crises, as has been theorized by others, then it could 
exacerbate the negative effects that the crisis has upon public health, a detrimental effect visited 
upon the entire population. This may serve to offset and even counteract the positive benefits of 
aid enjoyed by the individuals who receive aid directly.  
To use an example, suppose one was looking at changes in life expectancy in a country 
receiving humanitarian aid following a natural disaster, and hypothetically the increase in life 
expectancy enjoyed by aid recipients was equal to 1 and the negative effect of the crisis upon 
public health was equal to a decrease in life expectancy equal to half a year. If one were only to 
look at aid’s effect on its direct beneficiaries, the intervention could be judged a success in that it 
increased like expectancy. However, from a social welfare perspective the overall result could be 
negative, particularly if only a small portion of the population were actual aid recipients, as the 
society as a whole would see its life expectancy decrease while only a few benefited from an 
increase. 
Given these dynamics, it seems clear that a true understanding of the effectiveness of 
humanitarian aid must incorporate a view of the general societal welfare, and not simply that of 
those individuals who directly benefit from the aid itself. This in fact mirrors, somewhat 
intuitively, the logic motivating the criticism of prior aid failures at the beginning of this section. 
Humanitarian aid is not argued to have failed because it did not yield a single benefit for any 
individual; it would defy logic to believe that in every case there was no individual or group 
whose lives and security were not positively impacted by aid. However, aid is still argued to 
have failed because in totality the benefit to the population was negligible. It is the same 
situation with development aid; Easterly argues that development aid has failed not because one 
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cannot find singular instances (and possibly millions of them, over the long history of 
development aid flows) where aid improved economic well-being, but because it has not 
improved the welfare of the majority. Reflective of this concept, the effectiveness of 
development aid is measured predominantly using aggregated measures of economic well-being 
in the form of national growth rates. From the argument presented here it seems logical that the 
effectiveness of humanitarian aid should also be measured using aggregated statistics. 
Yet this is not the norm when it comes to humanitarian action. Though as discussed 
before humanitarianism as a whole is occasionally evaluated based on collective outcomes, 
individual agencies largely make arguments about their effectiveness based on measurement 
methods such as the amount of resources expended or number of individuals served. Why does 
this disjuncture exist? I argue it exists due to the incentives facing NGOs from their donors, but 
that these incentives are not uniform. There is a difference in the way that public donors, such as 
states, hold NGOs accountable for their actions, and the way that private donors hold NGOs 
responsible. These and other incentives facing NGOs will affect their behavior and, by extension, 
their effectiveness. It is these dynamics which are the focus of the following sections. 
3.1.2 NGO Legitimacy, Neutrality, and Effectiveness 
One clear set of factors which have a direct relationship between aid and outcome is the 
sincerity and intent of the organization. Unfortunately it is not the case that all humanitarian 
NGOs are earnest in their efforts; though in theory organized around a principle of assistance, it 
is not unheard of to find that “inefficiency, opportunism and even corruption does occur among 
such agencies which have often been given ‘soft’ money by donors and monopoly privileges by 
the state” (Brett 1993, 271). Indeed, some NGOs may be formed for interests of a more personal 
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nature rather than for truly social and altruistic purposes. Many of these organizations have been 
given the derisive moniker of “MONGO”, or “My Own NGO”.17 
Assuming that the NGO is operating in good faith, it is possible that some aid 
effectiveness may differ as a result of differences in technical expertise, operational capacity, or 
access to resources. Some organizations may simply be better than others, for myriad reasons. 
NGOs argue that legitimacy is one tool in their arsenal which assists them in their efforts.  
What determines NGO legitimacy? Frequently NGOs derive legitimacy from their principles and 
voluntary nature (Edwards and Hulme 1996, 966-967). For humanitarian organizations, there are 
four principles which serve a primary role: 
humanity, which posits the conviction that all people have equal dignity by virtue of their membership in 
humanity, impartiality, which directs their assistance is provided based solely on need, without 
discrimination among recipients, neutrality, which stipulates that humanitarian organizations must refrain 
from taking part in hostilities or taking actions that advantage one side of the conflict over another, and 
independence, which is necessary to ensure that humanitarian action only serves the interests of war 
victims, and not political, religious or other agendas (de Torrente 2004, 4) 
 
While these principles help define humanitarian action theoretically, they also serve an 
additional purpose as “operational tools” which can assist organizations in essential tasks, such 
as gaining access to threatened populations by obtaining the agreement of local warring parties 
as well as the trust of the populations themselves (5). Gaining the acquiescence of the local 
parties is an essential component because aid organizations are subjected to high risk when 
entering conflict zones, lacking the ability to defend themselves militarily.  Therefore, their 
safety and ability to deliver services is dependent upon the cooperation of the government and 
                                                 
17 Not all MONGOs are vanity projects or simply vehicles for self-promotion; some may be undertaken by 
individuals who are dissatisfied with existing organizations or programs and believe than they can do better (Polman 
2010) 
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local groups. Unfortunately, subscribing to neutrality and independence is not sufficient to 
always ensure the safety of aid workers. The website of the Charity and Security Network lists 
28 incidents in 2010 in which aid workers were abducted and/or killed while engaging in 
humanitarian relief efforts.18 This includes the deaths of 10 members of the organization 
International Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. They were killed by the Taliban, who accused 
the group of ‘spying for the Americans’ as well as ‘preaching Christianity’.19 Governments may 
also use their ability to limit the access of aid agencies as a political tool, as Médecins sans 
Frontières’ argues happened when they were expelled from Sudan. MSF argues that this was 
retaliation for the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar Al-
Bashir and happened despite their “binding and publicly communicated policy to refrain from 
any cooperation with the aforementioned Court, a policy based on the recognition that 
humanitarian activities must remain independent from political and judicial pressure”. Their 
conclusion was that “today more than ever, it seems that we must relentlessly explain the 
principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence that guide our choices as a humanitarian 
organization” (2010, 5). 
Even the International Red Cross, explicitly named as a type of “impartial humanitarian 
organization” and granted particular privileges within the Geneva Conventions, the primary 
documents of International Human Rights law, does not always receive full access to threatened 
populations. Instead, their access may be conditioned in part on the government’s determination 
of whether or not they would be found to be in violation of the conventions or other applicable 
laws (Jo and Thomson 2009).  
                                                 
18 Available at http://www.charityandsecurity.org/background/Aid_Workers_Killed_Abducted_2010. 
Accessed July 10, 2011.  
19 CBC News. August 7, 2010. “10 aid workers killed in Afgahnistan.” Available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/08/07/aid-workers-killed-afghanistan.html. Accessed July 10, 2011.  
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One of the ways in which these organizations attempt to maximize their legitimacy is by 
attempting to subscribe to the principle of neutrality, highlighted above as one of the 
foundational elements of humanitarian action. I argue that for these organizations, neutrality may 
be a double-edged sword. It may increase their legitimacy, but it may also work against their 
effectiveness. This is due to the fact that neutrality, in its purest form, dictates that NGOs cannot 
discriminate between perpetrators and victims in cases where civil violence is endemic. For 
instance, Marion Harroff-Tavel of the ICRC argues that “distinguishing between the ‘innocent’ 
and the ‘guilty’ would be unworkable as it would require humanitarian organizations to presume 
guilt in advance of any judicial process. The ICRC is not a tribunal and its delegates are not 
judges. Furthermore, the organisation’s role is precisely to protect those people on whom states 
or groups may seek to take revenge” (2003, 4). While this position may be normatively and 
medically justifiable, it can have severe repercussions on the larger dynamics of the conflict as 
organizations can potentially become unwilling accomplices of various domestic groups engaged 
in violence.  
Neutrality may also be a principle that is unobtainable in practice. The suggested 
mechanisms by which humanitarian aid can impact the larger operational environment of a crisis 
discussed in Chapter 2.0  can operate through a number of diverse channels, including political, 
economic, and social processes. However, each derives from the fact that humanitarian crises are 
a complex web of these diverse factors, and each can have an effect on, and be affected by, the 
presence of humanitarian actors and assistance. This means that despite their best intentions and 
principles, each humanitarian intervention is as much a political, economic and social 
intervention as it is a medical intervention. The neutrality doctrine, however, largely forces aid 
organizations to disregard these other dynamics by putting them out of the purview of the 
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mission, hamstringing the organization’s ability to mitigate the effects they have on these 
additional channels. 
Disregarding these effects can severely constrain an organization’s ability to assess the 
broader effects of its efforts, particularly since there is no such thing as an apolitical crisis; even 
those crises which apparently have their roots in geological factors have been argued to have 
political elements. Famines, for example, have been shown by Sen (1981) to have their roots in 
political and economic factors. It is the policies of the Mugabe regime, and not geological causes 
such as drought, which have resulted in famines in Zimbabwe, once known as the “breadbasket 
of Africa”.20 
Despite the problematic nature of neutrality discussed here, NGOs still place it at a 
premium. How do they seek to manage and increase it in the face of threats? That is the focus of 
the next section. 
3.2 NGO INDEPENDENCE AND DONOR COMPOSITION 
As outlined in section 3.1.2, NGOs have theoretical and practical reasons to zealously defend 
their legitimacy and neutrality. While these can be functional tools which enhance NGOs’ ability 
to deliver services, they can also possibly detract from the effectiveness of humanitarian action 
by increasing the negative externalities associated with humanitarian aid.  
In order to maintain their neutrality, some organizations have argued that they must also 
maintain their independence, particularly from associating with states. From the perspective of 
                                                 
20 New York Times. August 7, 2007. “Zimbabwe’s Man-Made famine.” Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/07/opinion/zimbabwe-s-man-made-famine.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.  
Accessed August 22, 2011. 
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these NGOs, accepting funds from or other otherwise working with states can be threats to their 
neutrality and independence. States can infringe on NGO operations in a number of ways. First, 
the degree to which NGOs accept funds from or otherwise interact with states can threaten their 
perceived neutrality and potentially subject NGOs to politicization by state donors (Barnett 
2009). If these organizations are seen as being politically affiliated with particular states, it could 
be used to deny them entry to particular crises or make them targets once present. 
Affiliation or cooperation with states could also reduce the operational autonomy and 
independence that NGOs argue are critical to their success. NGOs fear becoming overly 
bureaucratized, maintaining that it would reduce their ability to respond effectively to changing 
conditions in the field. This makes affiliations with state donors problematic, since such 
relationships generally require an increasing level of reporting standards and information that 
make bureaucratization more likely (Edwards and Hulme 1996). Furthermore, NGOs also 
believe that they would lose an essential element of what makes them unique – and effective –if 
they become too enmeshed with the state. When NGOs simply become service providers 
competing amongst themselves for contracts from the state, “NGOs can no longer choose who to 
work for or what to provide – NGO discretion is absent” (Davis 2007, 7). MSF makes this 
argument in their 2009 annual report by stating that “the continued contribution of millions by 
people around the world who support MSF financially is key to our ability to bring medical 
assistance to those who need it urgently, and for keeping interference from political, military or 
economic agendas at bay.” (6). 
For organizations which maintain the position that state affiliation or funding reduces the 
political neutrality of an organization, or otherwise constrains its autonomy, maintaining 
independence from states is a boon to operational success and a general benefit. What isn’t 
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recognized are the costs of this independence; that is, what are NGOs giving up in their efforts to 
maintain distance from state donors or collaborators?  
I argue that one such cost is realized in the form of NGO accountability. Private donors 
are functionally quite different than public donors, and this difference should lead private donors 
to hold NGOs much less accountable for performance than their public counterparts, which 
should lead to decreased output effectiveness. Additionally, public entities can also bestow 
NGOs with operational advantages which can also increase effectiveness. The differences 
between private and public donors, and their impacts on NGO accountability and effectiveness, 
are addressed in the following sections. 
3.3 NGO ACCOUNTABILITY 
As a response to the concerns over the potential negative impacts of humanitarian action, there 
has been a call for increased accountability of NGOs and other aid providers. While as recently 
as 1996 NGO accountability was a relatively undeveloped area of research (Edwards and Hulme 
1996, 967), in the period since then it has become the new watchword for humanitarian action. 
Questions regarding the structure, desirability, and importance of accountability have 
proliferated in the academic literature, with few areas of consensus. Brett (1993) argues that 
NGO accountability is critical to ensuring that these organizations fulfill their appointed roles 
and serve the social interest. Davis (2007) argues that accountability, while important, is a 
procedural, rather than a moral issue, even though increased accountability would mean that aid 
actors “will no longer be able to abuse their power and exploit the people they are there to help, 
and that they will no longer act in the West as if they are champions of the poor and abused, 
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while behaving like uncaring paternalists on the ground” (1). Others argue that while a greater 
understanding of NGOs is important since “the general importance of non-profit organizations in 
humanitarian assistance is widely acknowledged, yet the actual impact of their work remains 
difficult to evaluate” (Bruderlein and Dakkak 2010, 3). 
NGO accountability could not only help curb potential abuses of power and reduce the 
negative externalities of aid, but also make aid efforts more effective, as some have argued has 
been the case with development aid. Easterly (2006) argues that one of the reasons development 
aid has not been as effective as it could – or should – be is a general lack of accountability from 
international donors to recipients in their local environments. Similarly, Bearce and Tirone 
(2010) have shown that development aid can in fact induce economic growth when aid donors 
can credibly threaten to hold recipients accountable for the manner in which aid is utilized, 
potentially punishing them by withholding future aid. When such threats are not credible, 
however, aid does not in fact increase growth. 
 Questions of accountability, like questions over effectiveness, require a definition of 
accountability. What does accountability mean in the world of humanitarian action? At its 
essence, the humanitarian system is one of principals and agents, where the donors serve in the 
role as principal and the NGOs are their agents. Within this system, we can understand 
accountability through the approach advanced by Edwards and Hulme (1996), who define it as 
“the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or 
authorities) and are held responsible for their actions” (967). This is consistent with the 
definition utilized by Grant and Keohane (2005): accountability occurs when “some actors have 
the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their 
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responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these 
responsibilities have not been met” (29). 
Functionally within the principal-agent framework of aid donors and humanitarian 
NGOs, this can be recognized as the donors’ ability to hold the NGOs responsible for their 
ability to increase the welfare of those individuals affected by a humanitarian crisis. This 
assumes that donors give to NGOs for the purposes of humanitarian relief, an assumption that 
will hold in certain cases but may not apply in others; as it will be argued below, this assumption 
may not explain the motivations of particular private donors. 
There are a number of ways in which donors can hold the NGOs accountable. Grant and 
Keohane (2005) propose that NGOs could be sanctioned either by donors’ ability to withhold 
funds through either “fiscal” or “market” accountability, by other NGOs through “peer” 
accountability, or in part by “reputational” accountability, where an organization’s concern over 
how it is publicly perceived can affect its behavior.  
However, these accountability mechanisms can only increase the effectiveness of NGO 
aid if the organizations are accountable for the quality of their output. If output is not the central 
concern of aid donors, or they lack the ability to truly discern what types of aid (or aid 
organizations) are effective, it is difficult to determine which factors contribute to or detract from 
the general welfare or which actors are responsible. As will be discussed in the following 
sections, of the many types of accountability mechanisms utilized in humanitarian aid, evaluation 
of actual outcomes is one of the least utilized. To understand why this is, I now turn to a 
discussion of the incentives, preferences and capabilities of NGOs, private donors, and public 
donors as it relates to the issue of accountability in the humanitarian principal-agent nexus. 
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3.3.1 NGO incentives and preferences regarding accountability 
Who holds NGOs accountable? There are three types of groups with whom NGOs interact who 
might be able to hold these organizations accountable: aid recipients, other NGOs, and NGO 
donors. As I will argue below, each group has different abilities to hold NGOs accountable. The 
differences between these groups in their innate ability to hold NGOs accountable are made 
increasingly relevant given the NGOs’ incentives to minimize their overall level of 
accountability. As is true of nearly all agents in the principal-agent framework, NGOs have an 
incentive to maintain maximum autonomy and minimize accountability (Brett 1993, 292). In 
each case, it appears that NGOs do exactly this with respect to the various actors who could 
serve to hold them accountable for their effectiveness. 
3.3.1.1 Aid recipients and other NGOs 
The first potential group which might hold NGO accountable are the beneficiaries of 
NGO aid programs, who interact directly with the agencies. As Brett (1993) argues, however, aid 
recipients are in a highly disadvantaged position vis-à-vis aid agencies and thus in a poor 
position to hold them accountable. Beneficiaries “come as supplicants rather than equals and 
have little information about the NGOs’ resources or actions. They are aware of the services that 
the agencies provide in their immediate areas, but not of the costs involved, the way decisions 
are arrived at or what is happening elsewhere” (292-293). 
Another group which could hold NGOs accountable is other NGOs. This falls under the 
concept of “peer accountability” discussed by Grant and Keohane (2005), where organizations 
serve to monitor and evaluate aspects of the operational performance of their peers and can 
reward effective action with cooperation, for example, or sanction poorly performing 
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organizations with isolation. As concern over the negative externalities of aid has increased, the 
number of organizations whose purpose is to improve accountability among NGOs has also 
increased. However, these organizations generally do not evaluate aid outcomes but other types 
of performance, such as the ratio of overhead expenses to program expenses for individual 
charities or how well organizations subscribe to humanitarian ideals. 
Charitynavigator.org is one such organization. It ranks charities based on a number of 
different criteria, such as program expenses, administrative expenses, fundraising expenses, and 
fundraising efficiency. They also claim to measure accountability and transparency, with the 
former defined as “an obligation or willingness by a charity to explain its actions to its 
stakeholders”, and the latter as “an obligation or willingness by a charity to publish and make 
available critical data about the organization”.21 However, the information they use comes from 
the organization’s website and 990 filings, which lists information such as board members, 
privacy policy, audited financial statements, whistleblower policy and CEO compensation.22 
Nowhere among the discussion of accountability, transparency, or the ranking of the charities 
does the ability of the organization to actually deliver meaningful and effective services come 
into play. Rather, accountability is related to process and management, not effectiveness. 
Another organization which purports to advance NGO accountability is the INGO 
Accountability Charter, which was founded in 2003. There are 23 members of the charter, 
including Oxfam International, World Vision International, Greenpeace, and Amnesty 
International. According to Jeremy Hobbs, Executive Director of Oxfam International, “The 
Charter is an important first step in demonstrating our accountability to our stakeholders. The 
reporting process provides an opportunity to evaluate our work and reaffirm our vision. It is a 
                                                 
21 http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=1093.  Accessed August 21, 2011. 
22 http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=1093.  Accessed August 21, 2011 
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flexible accountability tool that we can confidently recommend to our partners and allies 
regardless of their size or structure."23 Evaluation takes place via a report assessing compliance 
with the organization’s charter, adopted in 2005, which calls for identification of shared 
principles, policies and practices, enhancing transparency and accountability, and improving 
communication with stakeholders, as well as the performance and effectiveness of member 
organizations.24  
So what does the member report cover? From the Oxfam International Report for 2009-
2010, there are five general areas on which organizations are reviewed: Strategy and Analysis; 
Organizational Profile (which includes a brief breakdown of funding sources); Report 
Parameters; Governance, Commitments, and Engagement Governance; and Data on 
Performance.25 This final category includes areas such as self-reporting standards and processes 
of evaluation, as well as statements on how the organization integrates gender and diversity into 
its programs and the amount of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. Nowhere, however, is 
it clearly delineated how Oxfam is held accountable by its stakeholders, nor is any information 
which describes the actual progress of the organization in numeric terms which would describe 
exactly how and where funds were spent for the purposes of evaluating the efficiency of the 
programs provided. Rather, the bulk of the report focuses primarily on compliance with 
principles and the breakdown of funding rather than output and empirical results. When funds or 
locations are mentioned they are aggregated in such a way as to make determination of what was 
spent where and for what purpose impossible.  
                                                 
23 Available at http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/.  Accessed July 11, 2011. 
24 The full text of the charter is available at http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/INGO-Accountability-Charter.pdf.  Accessed July 11, 2011. 
25 The full report is available at http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/OI-
INGO-AC-GRI-Report-2009-10-Final.pdf.  Accessed July 11, 2011. 
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As a result of this structure, the organizational focus of the charter, which is meant to 
hold NGOs to account, seems to focus once again on an organization’s conformity with 
humanitarian principles and its reputation rather than its performance. Even if an outside actor 
were to download the vetted report from the organization’s website, it does not convey any 
information about how successful the aid efforts were, but rather information such as how well 
the organization complies with humanitarian principals or its CO2 emissions. 
Given that these organizations are the norm, rather than the exception, the great majority 
of peer accountability present in the world of NGOs appears to be accountability of process and 
not accountability over results. This leaves donors as the final potential effective source of NGO 
accountability. The question is whether they can be more effective in holding organizations 
accountable for their actions than aid recipients or other NGOs? 
3.3.1.2 NGO donors 
In theory, donors certainly have the capability to hold NGOs accountable for outcomes. If 
the donor finds the NGO is not fulfilling its mission, it can simply withhold future funds and 
force the NGO to reform or go out of business, a mechanism termed “fiscal accountability” by 
Grant and Keohane (2005). Depending on the number of donors, this could also assume the form 
of “market accountability”, where donors stop patronizing a certain organization just as they 
would a business, which has the same effect as withholding funds. 
The need for donor oversight of NGOs is driven in part by an imperfect alignment in their 
preferences. The common element between them is that they both have an interest in providing 
humanitarian assistance and improving recipient welfare; that can be assumed in part by the 
principles of the NGO and its dedication to humanitarianism, and the fact that the donor chose to 
give to a humanitarian organization amid any number of competing alternatives. Since the donor 
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gave to a humanitarian organization rather than an animal rights organization, for example, then 
there is some interest on the donor’s part in providing humanitarian assistance. 
The donor/NGO relationship is complicated, however, by a competing interest held by 
the NGOs which is institutional in nature.26 NGOs, as is common with other institutions, have 
strong interests in maintaining their operations and future solvency by acquiring funding to 
ensure that they can continue to provide services and, on the individual level, continue to have 
jobs. Some of these incentives were the subject of the criticisms of humanitarian organizations in 
Chapter 2.0 . Many of these criticisms argue that this need for funding detracts from NGOs’ 
overall mission by causing them to adopt strategies which are antithetical to their mission of 
delivering aid and in some cases causing them to purposefully mislead donors about the state of a 
crisis or their operations, decreasing accountability.   
NGOs adopt these strategies because the NGO marketplace is highly competitive, with 
many groups seeking funds and any number of potential alternatives for donors to choose from. 
For NGOs, this means that they have a structural incentive to avoid providing donors with any 
information which could reflect negatively on their performance, since doing so would generate 
a reduction in future donations. Each organization thus has a strong motivation to report only 
positive news and avoid anything that could reflect poorly on them. Linda Polman, a vocal critic 
of the “crisis caravan”, as she has deemed organizations which travel from one crisis to another, 
argues that the since there are so many organizations, it does not make sense for any one 
organization to withdraw even if it knows that it is contributing to negative externalities, since a 
competitor would simply step in. Furthermore, she argues that when MSF France left Rwanda, 
citing its concerns over contributing to the genocide, it was roundly castigated by other aid 
                                                 
26 Donors also possess their own set of personal preferences with regard to the issue of accountability, 
which are addressed in the following sections. 
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organizations, including other branches of MSF, for potentially jeopardizing future funding 
(2010, 37-38). 
This premium on funding not only leads organizations to avoid publicizing poor results, it 
actually can cause them to disregard the results themselves. In the words of one aid worker 
during the Rwandan crisis, “Most of us gave no thought at all to the ethics of our aid 
provision…much of the discussion between headquarters and the field focused on contracts [to 
implement donor projects]: securing them, maintaining them, and increasing them. The pressure 
was on: ‘Get more contracts!’ How many contracts did we have? When were they up? What 
were the chances that they would be renewed? Were there any competitors” (Polman 2010, 36). 
This omnipresent concern for the financial welfare of the project is echoed in the words of 
another individual with extensive NGO experience whom I interviewed, who said of his 
experiences that “I have to say that when you’re working in the NGO, what you are thinking 
about all the time is “where is the money going to come for this?’ …you’re constantly, just like a 
lawyer, thinking of how you’re spending every minute and whether you’ve got that ability to get 
paid for your salary. So you end up being highly focused on where the money’s coming from and 
intensely aware that there’s only so much money and the organization has very little to do 
outside its grants and contracts.” 
This fierce inter-NGO competition for donor funds, as well as the NGOs’ desire to 
maintain autonomy and reduce oversight, contributes to their desire to reduce the amount of 
negative information transmitted to donors about their performance. If they do report 
information, it tends to come in the form of the first two types of accountability discussed in 
section 3.1: a strict count of individuals helped or monies spent, or some nominal sense of how 
effective the effort was at assisting direct beneficiaries. As stated before, these have the benefit 
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of being easy to count and intuitive for donors to understand. Furthermore, these direct effects 
are highly observable; deliver food to a hungry individual or orthopedic services to someone 
with a broken leg and it’s easy to see the direct benefit that individual receives. What is less 
obvious, though no less important, are the potential negative effects which are spread out over a 
more diffuse population and difficult to observe, or if observed, attribute responsibility. 
Overall, however, NGOs are better off avoiding the question of output all together, and 
many do, at least in a quantifiable and transparent sense. Organizations instead cite the need for 
ever increasing amounts of aid in order to bolster donations, using figures which “may also be 
vastly exaggerated by the aid agencies in whose interests it is to collect money, food, and 
medicine” even though “massive amounts of relief aid are often delivered without any reliable 
information on the number of people affected by the crisis” (Väyrynen 1999, 174) . Similarly, 
Bruderlein and Dakkak (2010) argue that ‘organizations are not judged by the delivery of their 
services but by the extent of their growth and recognition in the public opinion – meaning money 
and resources’ (14). 
If recipients don’t publicize results to donors to earn funds, then how do they market 
themselves? What is the product that they “sell” to donors to convince them to contribute? Many 
organizations market themselves on the basis of their reputation. Since donors are not the direct 
beneficiaries of aid activities, they are not the consumers of aid; the product they do consume is 
information about the aid organization, although as I argue this often isn’t related to actual 
performance. In a crowded market with a multitude of NGOs, each clamoring for funds and 
publicizing the severity of crises and the need for immediate help in a manner which has led 
some to dub them “Lords of Poverty” (Hancock 1989), reputation can be a heuristic which time 
and resource constrained donors can utilize to determine to whom to allocate their funds. Those 
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organizations which have consistently over time been judged to have a good reputation gain 
market power relative to those whose reputations aren’t as pristine.  
To develop these reputations, though, aid organizations need not prove their 
effectiveness; in the words of an aid practitioner, ‘we are awful are monitoring and evaluation. 
We don’t have to prove anything. Saving children is good, and that’s enough. We live on 
reputation…” (Bruderlein and Dakkak 2010, 14). In lieu of information on actual results, donors 
instead rely on trust: institutions with better reputations are more likely to be trusted, due to the 
fact that 
Aid finance is donated and allocated by people who trust that the agency will use this money well. They 
trust that the agency is committed to the job, and will work to improve what they do within the limits of 
their capabilities. Hence, donors give money to projects that sound reasonable – that fit within their overall 
priorities, and are conducted by agents with track records and a reputation for genuine engagement (Davis 
2007, 10. Italics in original.) 
 
These reputations may be built on records of keeping overheard down and devoting more 
funds to operations, or being present at many crises, or any number of similar metrics – none, of 
which, however, are reflective of actual performance, since NGOs don’t generally report that 
information. NGOs also have extensive public relations departments (Polman 2010), which 
carefully craft the information which is transmitted and manage their reputations. Therefore, 
although reputation is one way that organizations can be held to account punishing poorly 
performing NGOs through negative changes to their reputation (Grant and Keohane 2005), their 
active management of their reputations make this difficult. Furthermore, there is a great deal of 
stability over time associated with reputations, as organizations that are judged to be successful 
in the public eye are in fact successful from the perspective of reputation and competitiveness, 
regardless of whether they are actually effective in the field. The difficulty in challenging 
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reputation, coupled with the overall weakness in general accountability over outcomes 
highlighted in this section, presents a substantial problem: “Although the public pays attention 
only intermittently, NGOs have to maintain their reputations…however, as NGOs become 
stronger, with credibility that is not easily shaken even as they make false or prejudicial claims, 
their lack of such mechanisms of accountability…becomes a more serious issue” (Grant and 
Keohane 2005, 38). 
NGOs’ institutional need for continued funding which can in some instances cause them 
to adopt strategies which potentially puts them at odds with the preference of their donors for 
effective aid delivery (or at least raises the specter that NGOs are possibly being duplicitous or 
less than honest). Donors must therefore be cautious in how much trust they place in the NGOs 
to which they donate. Competing interests generates the need for active monitoring and effective 
sanctioning, areas in which donors themselves may differ in their own interests and capabilities.  
Taken together, there is to be a severe lack of general accountability relative to NGOs. 
Recipients are in poor position to hold the organizations responsible, their peers hold them 
accountable for process but not their results, and the organizations have structural reasons to 
withhold negative information from their donors about their performance, making it difficult for 
donors to actually hold the organizations accountable for outcome. The key question for the issue 
of donor-NGO accountability then becomes how willing and capable the donors are in 
undertaking their own efforts to determine the effectiveness of the organizations to which they 
contribute, and how much capacity they have to actually sanction groups which are judged to be 
ineffective or even counter-productive. As I will argue, these factors differ between private and 
public donors, each of whom is the focus of the following two sections. 
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3.4 PRIVATE DONORS AND NGO ACCOUNTABILITY 
For the reasons discussed above, it is apparent that for donors to hold NGOs accountable they 
must be active and capable principles fully prepared to independently monitor the actions and 
effects of their agents, since their agents have strong interests in obfuscation. I argue that this is a 
great impediment to accountability when NGOs are funded primarily be private donors. In this 
case, accountability is reduced in three primary areas – the donors’ incentives to monitor the 
NGO and its effectiveness, donors’ ability to do so, and donors’ ability to sanction the NGO in 
cases where the NGO may not be fulfilling its mission to the donor’s satisfaction. Each of these 
elements will be discussed in the following sections. 
3.4.1 Private Donors’ Incentives to Monitor NGO Activities  
…a millionaire does not really care whether his money does good or not, provided he finds his 
conscience eased and his social status improved by giving it away… - George Bernard Shaw27 
 
Since it is costly for private donors to invest the time and energy necessary to monitor the 
effectiveness of the organization to which they donated funds, they must have an incentive to 
invest these resources. This incentive is dependent upon the commodity which the donor is 
“purchasing” with their donation; for instance, if donors give funds in order to facilitate the 
operations of the NGO, then they have an incentive to monitor the value of their purchase, in the 
form of the NGO’s output. This would be analogous to the traditional market-based exchange, 
                                                 
27 Quoted in Harbaugh (1998b, 271). 
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where the NGO is the supplier and the donor is the consumer. However, on its face the 
relationship between producer and consumer in the humanitarian NGO realm is not between 
NGO and donor, but NGO and recipient populations, who as argued above are poorly positioned 
to hold NGOs accountable. Therefore, the donor is not a consumer, but may be seen as 
surrogates for the beneficiaries (Brett 1993). 
The ability of private donors to act as surrogates for aid beneficiaries is linked to the 
interest donors have in the welfare of these populations. Given their role as donors it can be 
assumed that they are not indifferent to these welfare considerations, but is that their primary 
motivation for giving aid? Research on charitable donations would suggest it is not. 
Changing the paradigm from principal-agent back to producer-consumer, it can be argued 
that donors are in a sense customers of NGOs since they receive benefits from their donations. 
We can treat charitable donations as commodities that the donor is “purchasing” at a cost to 
themselves. These commodities also potentially have benefits which may be either public or 
private. The public benefit assumes that both the donor and the recipient of NGO activity (which 
in some cases may also be the donor themselves) gain some benefit from the charitable donation. 
The private benefit assumes that the donor receives some sort of compensation from the act of 
donating, independent of the actual benefit conferred to the recipient of the NGO’s activities 
(Vesterlund 2006). 
The model of aid giving as a public good is generally known as the altruistic model and 
was the initial theory of aid donation. The work of Olson (1965) led economists to begin to 
question the predictions of this classical model, particularly since, as a public good, theories of 
collective action would predict that charitable donations would be undersupplied. At the extreme, 
in fact, theory would suggest that donations would fall to zero as individuals acted as free-riders 
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and “in large economies virtually no one gives to the public good, hence making the Red Cross, 
the Salvation Army, and American Public Broadcasting logical impossibilities” (Andreoni 1990, 
465). Faced with this empirical repudiation of this result, Andreoni introduced models of 
“impure altruism”, wherein donors receive a private benefit from giving such as a “warm glow”, 
or feeling of self-satisfaction from making the donation, and demonstrated theoretically that this 
effect dominated altruistic giving and better explained the empirical landscape of charitable 
donations (1989, 1990). 28 
This finding that donors give primarily for private, rather than altruistic, motivations is 
supported by other findings in similar areas. Private benefits can be material, such as gifts or 
other membership benefits, or other opportunities that are only available with a donation to a 
particular group.  Many governments also give tax-breaks for charitable donations, and donations 
have been shown to be influenced by tax changes and changes in income (Vesterlund 2006). 
Beyond material rewards, donations may also bestow social benefits upon the donor. 
Harbaugh (1998b, 1998a) describes the “prestige” associated with donations that are publicized 
by a charity, and shows how donations increase when charities use categories of donations (such 
as “patron”) with clearly delineated amounts, an argument receiving support in an analysis of 
charitable donations of law school alumni. Rather than simply conveying a warm glow to donors, 
which he describes as an intrinsic benefit, the public nature of the donation – the prestige – has 
additional benefits, be they social or pragmatic, such as an opportunity to increase business 
                                                 
28 One extension of this is also the “crowding out” effect, in which donations by governments increase the 
supply of the public good. Under crowding out, altruistic donors reduce their donations as governments contribute 
more, while imperfect donors continue to make their donations in order to receive the private benefit. Therefore, one 
of the tests of the public versus private benefits attributes of charitable donations is the extent to which government 
donations reduce their private counterparts (Vesterlund 2006). 
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relationships. In a similar vein, Glazer and Konrad (1996) present evidence consistent with their 
argument that donations are made, in part, to publicize the wealth and status of the donor. 
Most interestingly for this analysis, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) test the argument that 
donations to international charities display elements of “joy-of-giving”, their term for imperfect 
altruism wherein the donor receives a personal benefit from the act of donating. They test this on 
a sample of 125 international relief and development agencies, of the type under analysis in this 
project, which allows them to maximize the likelihood that donors would not be direct 
beneficiaries of the efforts of the aid agency. They find strong evidence in favor of joy-of-giving, 
in that donations were largely unaffected by levels of government contributions and were robust 
to a variety of other factors, including the overhead and expenses of the organization. Their 
ultimate conclusion is that “altruistic motivations behind contributions to international relief and 
development are extremely weak at the margin” (449). 
The results of these studies, as well as others, led Vesterlund (2006) to conclude that 
“most empirical studies of survey or donation data find that on average the benefit appears to be 
private in nature” (568). Even her model, which relaxes some assumptions of the classical 
altruisc model and finds that high-profile or otherwise large donations actually generate 
additional donations – in opposition to a crowding out prediction and an alternative that would 
suggest more altruistic behavior – can also be seen as signaling elements of institutional quality. 
Assuming donors do care about output, large donations to particular organizations may be a way 
for donors to determine which organizations are worthy of receiving a donation, since every 
organization has an incentive to promote itself and thus the organizations themselves are of little 
value in conveying information about their own competencies. 
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Taken together, these results suggest that private donors may be poor surrogates for 
individuals involved in humanitarian crises abroad. When donors primarily give aid in order to 
capitalize on private benefits, they receive their benefits upfront and the benefits are themselves 
independent of the actual provision of aid. This means that private donors have little incentive to 
invest further time or money in pursuing information about the effectiveness of the aid 
organization, and similarly little incentive to withhold donations from aid organizations if they 
do determine that the aid is not being utilized as effectively as it possibly could be. Even the 
donors who are arguably the most altruistic are not in a position to act as surrogates; those 
individuals who bequeath donations to aid agencies upon their death may have the most altruistic 
motivations, given that they cannot expect to accrue any direct benefits to themselves. Since the 
donations occur after their death, however, the funds are effectively given without any donor 
oversight regarding the organization’s output. 
This means that organizations which receive funding primarily from private sources have 
relatively little de facto donor oversight as it relates to output. From an organizational 
perspective, therefore, it would be logical to expect that significant efforts would be devoted to 
the steps shown to increase donations, such as the use of tiered classifications of donors 
suggested by Harbaugh (1998b, 1998a), and also publicizing donations to allow donors to garner 
other prestige benefits such as signaling of income (Glazer and Konrad 1996) to attract other 
donors, using the donations as a sign of competence in a crowded NGO marketplace (Vesterlund 
2006). Indeed, the 2009 Annual Report for MSF U.S. lists 19 pages of donors, identifying the 
amount of the donation in categories up to and above $1 million, as the literature on charitable 
donations would suggest. 
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This donor preference for prestige dovetails nicely with the NGOs’ concern for their 
reputations discussed in the previous section. Donors should derive greater prestige and other 
satisfaction from donations to organizations that have respected reputations, whereas donations 
to organizations with questionable reputations would bestow few social benefits. This also 
conforms nicely with Vesterlund’s (2006) argument that donations follow large and public 
donations; if that is the sign of institutional quality, and donations to successful organizations 
convey prestige, then donors will follow the lead of other donors to capture potential network 
benefits. 
This quite effectively removes output from much, if any, consideration of the donor-NGO 
relationship; donors care about social prestige and other benefits and NGOs need donations. The 
NGOs therefore cultivate reputations based on humanitarian principles in order to induce more 
donations.  
This argument is pessimistic regarding the ability of donors to act effectively as 
surrogates for the recipients of NGO activities. Rather than maximizing the effectiveness of 
organizational output, donors seek to maximize their own utility from the social benefits 
conferred from their donations, and NGOs, knowing this, seek to maximize their reputations to 
increase donations. Nowhere in this equation is the maximization of the welfare of those affected 
by humanitarian crisis. 
However, this is again not to say that donors are entirely devoid of concern for how 
effectively their donations are being used to help individuals in need, and it is possible that a 
subset of donors may find it worthwhile to investigate the activities of the aid organization and 
possibly withhold aid, or donate to another competing organization, if those efforts are found to 
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be wanting. How these donors may be constrained in these efforts is the focus of the following 
two sections. 
3.4.2 Private Donors’ Ability to Monitor NGO Activities 
Private donors are severely constrained in their ability to independently monitor the actions of 
humanitarian NGOs, given that many of their operations occur overseas where the individual has 
no ability to personally observe the efforts of the organization. This is one of the reasons why 
trust is so important to the donor-NGO relationship; absent an ability to independently verify the 
effectiveness of the NGO, the donor has to rely on the NGO’s self-reporting of its activities and 
overall self-evaluation. This is problematic, since as discussed previously NGOs do not have an 
incentive to accurately report either their needs or outcomes, given the need for donations as well 
as the desire to avoid information that could potentially make them look as though they were not 
using funds effectively. The physical distance between donor and aid activities also means that 
there is “little verifiable information about its actual outcomes: those that finance humanitarian 
aid may be passionately concerned with human suffering, but they are a long way away from the 
crisis and cannot minutely follow the experiences of its victims, or imagine what they want” 
(Davis 2007, 10). Even the most altruistic donor, despite her best efforts, may not be able to 
determine how (or how effectively) her donation is actually being used in the field. 
If donors should be skeptical regarding the self-reporting of NGOs, what alternative 
sources of information might they utilize? The media is one potential alternative, but it is 
unlikely that the information they provide would be for sufficient for donor evaluations.  Some 
of this difficulty comes from the inherent chaos of a humanitarian crisis and perceived 
difficulties in determining what constitutes an appropriate measure of success and the challenge 
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of obtaining information on those indicators. If these efforts are undertaken they oftentimes take 
the form of qualitative evidence on whether or not participants found the efforts helpful 
(Bruderlein and Dakkak 2010). While such efforts are better than no effort at all, they cannot 
provide an overall perspective on the larger effects of the aid and whether or not it could have 
been used more effectively. Even if the media were to report on the crisis, it likely would be on 
the overall state of affairs rather than the effectiveness of any particular organization. As an 
example, National Public Radio’s (NPR) report “One Year Later, Little Progress in Haiti’s 
Rebuilding” interviews Jonathan Katz, an Associated Press Correspondent, who in speaking on 
the slow progress of recovery refers to “international groups”, rather than any specific agency or 
its actions.29 In a related story by NPR, “How Haiti’s Aid Money is Being Spent,” staffer Carrie 
Kahn reports that “There is a question about the accountability of [aid organizations]…the aid 
groups are accountable to their donors but you don’t really get detailed accounts of what they 
do”.30 Given that it’s not clear exactly what the aid organizations do, it’s highly questionable 
how accountable they really are to their donors. 
Media reports on the overall aid effort also convey little information about any one 
group, as each group can plausibly argue that while other organizations may be ineffective their 
efforts have been more beneficial. The opportunity for plausible deniability and the lack of a 
clear focus on any one organization by the media means that media reports, when available, are 
also of little assistance to donors in determining just how effective their preferred organization 
may or may not be in its response to the disaster. 
                                                 
29 National Public Radio.. One Year Later, Little Progress in Haiti’s Rebuilding. January 11, 2011. 
Available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=132863446&ps=rs.  Accessed July 13, 2011. 
30 National Public Radio. How Haiti’s Aid Money is Being Spent. January 8, 2011. Available at 
http://www.npr.org/2011/01/08/132760320/How-Haiti-s-Aid-Money-Is-Being-Spent?ps=rs.  Accessed July 13, 
2011. 
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There is also a symbiotic relationship between media and humanitarian NGOs which 
calls into question the media’s ability to impartially and accurately convey information about 
NGO operations. NGOs require media coverage to publicize the need for donations, while the 
media benefits from covering wide-spread disasters. The relationship and mutual benefits have 
evolved to such a point where journalists will actually fly with or participate in NGO missions, at 
the NGO’s expense, in order to better facilitate the goals of each entity (Polman 2010). 
Finally, even if all the relevant information were available to donors, they may not 
possess the technical expertise to accurately interpret and understand whether aid was actually 
effective or not. Mack (2002) argues that one of the reasons the academic community fails to 
connect with policy makers is that the latter are not versed in the statistical analyses utilized in 
the academic literature: “multivariate statistical analyses, while certainly relevant, are largely 
incomprehensible to the policy community…few if any policymakers have any idea what 
coefficients are, so even those who skip the technicalities in quantitatively  oriented academic 
articles may still not understand what the results mean” (516-17). It is unrealistic to assume that 
the general population would have much better ability to draw accurate conclusions from raw 
data. Certainly some individuals whose training or interests provide them with the necessary 
skill-set would be able to do so were the information available. However, this would be the 
exception to the rule, and most donors would have to rely on the judgment of professionals, 
though as Mack suggests, even the professionals’ reports may not be presented in a way which 
would allow donors to determine aid’s effects. 
Whether it be due to distance, the unreliability of self-reporting by NGOs, the lack of 
available media reports, or a donor’s inability to interpret and make sense of technical reports, 
donors oftentimes do not have the tools at their disposal to accurately monitor and assess the 
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efficacy of humanitarian aid. Donors who would strive to undertake such an endeavor would 
more often than not find themselves stymied. Assuming that they were sufficiently motivated to 
expend the effort to monitor the NGO, and also had the means to do so, there is one final hurdle 
that must be overcome for donors to be effective auditors of NGO effectiveness: donors must be 
able to effectively sanction the NGO if they find that the NGO is not fulfilling its mission. This 
is the focus of the next section. 
3.4.3 Private Donors’ Ability to Sanction NGOs 
How effectively can private donors sanction NGOs who they feel are not meeting their 
expectations? Or, to view it from an alternative perspective, how effectively can the principals 
exert control over their agents in the donor-NGO relationship? 
Grant and Keohane (2005) argue that donors can hold NGOs accountable through one of 
two possible mechanisms, each of which is dependent upon the number of donors. If the number 
of donors is limited, they can exercise “fiscal accountability”, where donors can withhold funds 
directly and penalize the NGO for poor performance. As the pool of donors grows, however, 
then the NGO is subject to “market accountability”, where donors are more like consumers in a 
perfectly competitive market. Under both scenarios, however, it is unlikely that private donors 
will be able to exert much control over NGOs. 
Many publicly funded NGOs draw on a large pool of donors, diminishing the impact of 
any individual donor. Formally, one could express the significance of an individual donor as  
i
n
D
D
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where Di represents the value of the individual donation, and Dn is the total value of all 
donations. Expressed simply, the importance of any individual donor is equal to the value of his 
donation as a percentage of all donations. As Di increases relative to Dn, the ability of an 
individual donor to punish the aid organization by withholding funds increases. However, as the 
number of donors increases, then even large donors become increasingly marginalized.  
As the number of donors increase, therefore, the only way for donors to rebuke the NGO 
via the loss of donations would be by engaging in a joint action coordinated among a significant 
portion of the donor base. However, as Olson (1965) shows, this type of collective action 
becomes increasingly difficult as the group size increases. This leads to the conclusion that 
collective action of this nature is most effective in small groups; however, it is not necessary 
unless the size of the donor base increases. Therefore, collective donor action is least effective in 
the situations in which it would be most necessary. 
As the pool of donors increases to a size where it resembles a competitive market, there is 
largely only one effective way by which the principals can withhold donations and coordinate 
their behavior. This mechanism is NGO reputation; if the NGO has a negative shock to its 
reputation, then donors will begin individually withholding their donations as a response, and the 
end result will be a large-scale reduction in NGO donations. However, even this isn’t inviolable, 
since reputations can persist over time, and NGOs with solid reputations may even be beyond 
reproach by this mechanism (Grant and Keohane 2005, 38). 
When the number of donors is large, therefore, the ability of any individual donor to hold 
NGOs to account through the power of the purse is limited, if non-existent. What if there was an 
organization which relied principally on a few key donors? That is, what if the 19 pages of 
donors to MSF U.S. was the exception, not the rule? Even under this scenario, individual private 
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donors face limits on their ability to hold NGOs accountable. Though the number of donors is 
smaller, there is still of pool of alternative funds from which the NGO can draw: other NGOs. 
Many of the larger NGOs, such as MSF and Oxfam, have both horizontal and vertical 
intra-organization linkages with an international section and other national sections. Oxfam, for 
instance, has its International Secretariat, located in the United Kingdom, as well as 14 national 
affiliates in America, Australia, Belgium, Canada (and another section in Québec), France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, India, Spain, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and the 
Netherlands, plus an observer organization in Japan. These sections also exchange financial 
resources; Oxfam UK, for instance, received nearly £23 million from other Oxfam sections in 
2009, and approximately £14.6 million in 2009. It also sent out a total of approximately £4.4 
million to other sections in 2009 (Oxfam Great Britain 2009, 57). Even limited sets of private 
donors may not only see their influence reduced by other donors to their particular section of the 
charity, but also any funding it receives from affiliated organizations abroad. This impact is 
reduced further still if the charity receives some form of government funding, which is usually 
larger than any individual private donations. 
Based on this argument, it is unlikely that private donors can have much, if any, impact 
on the behavior of NGOs through the withholding of donations. Given that NGOs are generally 
the result of “entrepreneurial initiatives by activists”, and are not affiliated with any individual 
constituency which can hold them to account, there is a dearth of alternative mechanisms by 
which NGOs can be held accountable (Grant and Keohane 2005, 38).  
Based on this analysis of relationship between private donors and NGOs as it relates to 
accountability, it appears that NGOs are subjected to little if any oversight by their private 
donors, particularly in the area of NGO effectiveness. Donors have little incentive to monitor 
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NGO effectiveness, and even less ability to do so or actually punish the NGO for inefficient 
operations. What little oversight there is seems to be related to the NGOs’ reputation, rather than 
operational efficacy. This contributes to a situation in which NGOs, “by creating, maintaining 
and promoting self-designed accountability structures that are largely immune to external 
interference…have produced largely indestructible brands” (Bruderlein and Dakkak 2010, 8). 
The accountability situation changes when the focus changes to the relationship between 
states and NGOs, which is the focus of the next section. 
3.5 NGOS AND PUBLIC ENTITIES 
I argue that public donors can affect the effectiveness of NGO activity through two different 
mechanisms. The first is through a greater degree of accountability for outcomes that NGOs 
encounter when their donors are primarily public donors rather than private. The second channel 
is through the additional benefits that NGOs can accrue by accepting funds from and otherwise 
cooperating with states. These two channels are discussed in the following sections. 
3.5.1 Public Donors and NGO Accountability 
I argue that public donors will be better able to hold NGOs accountable for their output than 
private donors. One reason to believe this is the case is the NGO preference for private donors on 
the basis that private donors give them more operational autonomy. Implicitly this indicates that 
NGOs feel constrained by state donors, which can only happen if the state donors, as principals, 
can exert some authority and accountability over the NGOs as their agents. If public donors were 
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as passive as private donors, then NGOs would have no reason to prefer private donors on 
functional grounds since there would be no difference between the two funding sources.  
The argument is also made more explicitly in analyses of NGOs’ operational relationship 
with states. Funding from, and cooperation with, states presents organizations with increased 
reporting requirements, so that “unit costs, quantifiable outputs, logical frameworks and detailed 
specifications of what ‘partners’ are to do, become organizational norms” (Hulme and Edwards 
1997, 8). These elements are critical to establishing accountability over outcomes, as without 
such benchmarks and it is difficult to assess if aid efforts are effective or not. However, this is 
the type of “bureaucratization” which is detailed as a threat to NGO capacity and operations 
(Edwards and Hulme 1996). For proponents of the perspective that NGOs must be flexible, this 
also suggests that increased operational accountability as a result of partnering with states is a 
real phenomenon, and something which is antithetical to NGO effectiveness. These individuals 
view NGO autonomy as a critical element of NGO function and part of what makes them unique, 
in opposition to the “limited, logically framed, measurable outcomes favored and advocated by 
donors and the aid system generally” (Fowler 1993, 335).31 
Why might states be more effective in creating the methods of accountability? Direct 
comparisons can be made between states and private donors in the areas of incentive and ability 
to monitor, as well as ability to sanction. 
As discussed previously, individuals have little incentive to monitor NGO performance 
given the motivations individuals have for giving aid. Individuals are not accountable to others 
for the content or quality of their aid, though they do possibly receive reputational or other social 
                                                 
31 In opposition to the perspective that state associations reduce NGO effectiveness, Commins (1997) 
argues that World Vision International has not apparently been overly constrained even in light of its funding from 
and other relationships with states. 
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benefits for donations to charitable organizations. States, however, are accountable to their 
citizens for the manner in which resources are spent, since the majority of these resources come 
from the citizens themselves. As Bruderlein and Dakkak (2010)argue, “government donor 
agencies are accountable to, and their monies in some degree controlled by, the legislature, and 
ultimately, to taxpayers and citizens. This involves earmarked funds for special projects and 
preset goals as part of a political accountability” (21). Therefore, donors have a greater incentive 
to impose accountability on NGOs to whom they donate funds or otherwise establish a 
relationship because the states are themselves accountable to their own citizens.32 
States are also in a much better position to monitor NGO performance since states have 
more resources at their disposal and a bureaucratic structure in place which has technical 
expertise in aid administration. Furthermore, state aid is frequently the study of academics and 
other professionals whose expertise can inform states in regards to what avenues appear to be 
effective and which are not.33 Relative to private donors, then, states have more institutional 
expertise and greater access to epistemic communities which can help them make determinations 
about aid effectiveness.  
States also have greater access to information about events in the field since, unlike 
private donors, they may have their own programs or monitors in the affected areas. Rather than 
having to rely on self-reported information from the aid organizations or reports on aid 
operations from the media, states have the capacity to independently observe and assess the 
outcome of aid efforts in the theatre of the humanitarian crisis, creating a large information 
                                                 
32 However, this is not entirely beneficial, as it also provides an incentive to states to avoid publicizing the 
results of their assessment of NGO effectiveness, since the states don’t want to be seen as having their proxies fail, 
or monies wasted (Bruderlein and Dakkak 2010). 
33 These analyses extend beyond simply develop aid to other types of state aid, such as democracy aid. See, 
for example, Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson (2007) and Savun and Tirone (2011). 
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advantage. Even if the state does not have its own monitor, it may have an operational partner 
that does, and who can convey information about the situation on the ground. For instance, the 
World Bank may have its own personnel in an area experiencing a humanitarian crisis which 
could provide information not only to its own decision makers, but those in specialized agencies 
in the United States, such as USAID. 
States also possess a greater ability to sanction NGOs than do private actors. First, state 
donations are generally several orders of magnitude larger than private donations, so the loss of 
these funds would be felt more keenly than the loss of any individual private donation. This 
importance is further reinforced by the more limited number of public donors; the constellation 
of donor states and IGOs which donate to humanitarian organizations is relatively small, which 
increases the importance of any individual entity to recipient NGOs. Furthermore, the small 
number of donors helps overcome the collective action problem to make donor coordination 
easier. This is particularly true since many states share membership in joint intergovernmental 
organizations, which can regularize contact, facilitate information transmission, and under some 
circumstances even increase the similarity of state interests over time (Bearce and Bondanella 
2007).  
A state’s ability to monitor and sanction NGOs is further facilitated by the state’s legal 
authority over NGOs headquartered or otherwise operational within its borders. NGOs which 
were found to be violating laws on charitable fundraising, as an example, could have their 
charitable status revoked or other penalties imposed. Nationals who were found to be engaged in 
malfeasance overseas as part of an aid effort could also, under certain situations, be subject to 
criminal persecution by the home country. States are in a much more empowered position to 
sanction NGOs for poor performance than are private actors. 
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With increased incentive and ability to monitor NGO performance, as well as a much 
stronger ability to sanction NGOs which are found to not be fulfilling their obligations or 
otherwise not using aid effectively, states are in a much better position to monitor and enhance 
NGO effectiveness. This is not to say that states perform this role perfectly. As shown by Alesina 
and Dollar (2000), states give aid for any number of reasons, including strategic motivations 
which may detract from aid’s effectiveness (see as an example Bearce and Tirone 2010). In the 
case of humanitarian aid, states could simply give aid in order to deflect criticism over perceived 
failures to address humanitarian crises more directly, such as through state military humanitarian 
interventions. In this way, states may achieve their intended goal simply with a publicized 
donation and not oversee the NGOs in the necessary manner. While this possibility exists, 
however, on average the multitude of advantages states have relative to private donors in their 
ability to hold NGOs accountable should mean that they perform this role more capably that their 
private counterparts.  
Accountability is not the only benefit which may be bestowed upon NGOs through their 
association with states. States also possess additional advantages which may be beneficial to 
humanitarian aid efforts, which are discussed in the following section.  
3.5.2 Public Donors and Additional Benefits to NGO Effectiveness 
In addition to the gains in effectiveness NGOs can gain from greater levels of accountability to 
public donors, these donors can also grant additional benefits to NGOs which can improve the 
effectiveness of humanitarian operations. 
The first of these benefits is coordination. Seybolt (2009) argues that the current 
humanitarian system suffers from insufficient coordination and planning, and that the system 
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could be improved through the creation of a network structure with vertical and horizontal 
linkages between states and NGOs. NGOs which choose to opt out of such a network, or 
otherwise eschew coordinating with states due to fears of politicization, detract from the overall 
effectiveness of humanitarian action and also inhibit the effectiveness of their own efforts. 
Coordination could also allow NGOs to benefit from the efforts of states and other entities, 
including in the provision of material goods and a reduction in the duplication of services, 
reducing waste and increasing the amount of resources available for distribution. 
This coordination can be particularly useful as government entities possess specific 
technical knowledge that NGOs don’t. For example, one of the reasons that USAID may choose 
to work with an NGO is that the NGO employs individuals with technical expertise in various 
health fields.  USAID, by contrast, has technical expertise in project management and evaluation. 
Therefore, there can be a mutually beneficial relationship between the two entities as they draw 
on the others’ strengths. The process of interacting with USAID through the proposal process 
can also force an organization to more critically evaluate its own plans than it might otherwise do 
without the need to formally present its plan for evaluation prior to funding.34 
The technical benefits that aid organizations can accrue from interactions with 
government agencies can extend beyond simple project management. As argued previously, the 
direct effects of aid are predominantly medical and related to resource availability and 
organizational competence in the medical field, while the negative consequences are related to 
politics, economic and social dynamics. Humanitarian NGOs may have excellent technical 
experts in the best practices regarding medical care, but states have superior information about 
the management of the political and socio-economic processes that can thwart aid efforts. 
                                                 
34 These arguments are drawn in part based on my conversation with individuals with experience working 
with NGOs funded by USAID. 
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Working with states and gaining access to this knowledge should allow NGOs to reduce their 
negative effects on a crisis through more effective planning and awareness of other dynamics. 
States can also help NGOs with their material needs as well. States can increase funding 
to NGOs not only from their own coffers, but by spearheading donation efforts which encourage 
and facilitate private donations to NGOs. One such example is the effort which encouraged 
private donors to donate to the International Committee of the Red Cross by texting “Haiti” to a 
specified number from their mobile phone in the wake of its massive earthquake. The mobile 
donation effort came about as a joint effort between the U.S. State Department, Mobile 
Accord/mGive Foundation, CTIA-The Wireless Association, and the Red Cross.35 It was highly 
successful, raising over $32 million dollars from mobile users by February 11, 2010, less than a 
month after the earthquake, $15 million of which had already reached the Red Cross.36 
Finally, NGOs’ reliance on the permission of local groups to enter a conflict opens them 
up to extortion and other forms of rent extraction by these domestic groups (Goodhand 2000; 
MacFarlane 2001). If the NGO has a powerful state benefactor, it may discourage this type of 
graft in a number of ways. The NGO may be less willing to pay rents to local actors if they know 
that the public entity will take account of how the funds are spent, while private donors are less 
likely (and able) to do so. Additionally, local actors may be leery of making too many demands 
on NGOs with loose political affiliations for fear of inviting a military presence from the NGO’s 
benefactor. 
                                                 
35 http://american.redcross.org/site/PageServer?pagename=%2Fntld_Haiti_text2help_faqs#Q17.  Accessed 
July 15, 2011. 
36 Red Cross Raises more than $32 Million via Mobile Giving Program. Available at: 
http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.94aae335470e233f6cf911df43181aa0/?vgnextoid=43ffe0
b8da8b6210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD. Accessed July 15, 2011. 
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These factors, along with the increased accountability that public donors should bring to 
bear on NGOs discussed in the prior section, have strong implications for the relative 
effectiveness of aid from publicly funded organizations versus those who received funds from 
private sources. These differences, as well as a series of hypotheses based upon these arguments, 
are discussed in the next section. 
3.6 DISCUSSION AND HYPOTHESES 
To summarize the preceding discussion about the interactions between NGOs and donors, NGOs 
have an incentive to withhold damaging information regarding their activities in order to 
maximize donations and reduce the accountability they face from their principals, the donors. 
Because of this recalcitrance on the part of the NGOs, the onus is on the donors to actively 
monitor and evaluate the performance of their agents, the NGOs, and if necessary sanction them 
through various channels. Because there are significant differences in the ability of private and 
public donors to undertake these functions, there are subsequently stark differences in the degree 
of accountability NGOs face to private versus public donors. NGOs have little to no de facto 
accountability to private donors, as these donors can generally be characterized as pursuing 
private benefits from charitable donations and have little incentive to invest future time or other 
resources into investigating how effectively the NGO is utilizing donations. For donors who do 
pursue this path, the limited amount of information available to them, along with a probable lack 
of technical expertise in interpreting the data, should make it difficult for donors to determine 
whether or not NGOs are actually generating positive change. Finally, even if these donors did 
wish to hold NGOs to account by withholding future donations, this course of action is argued to 
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have little effect upon the NGO’s behavior since the NGO has a number of possible alternative 
funding sources, reducing the significance of any individual donor.37 
The situation is different when it comes to NGOs and states. States have far greater 
institutional capacity to independently monitor NGO activities and have the technical and 
managerial expertise to undertake the analysis necessary to determine if the aid efforts are 
successful. The more limited number of public donors, combined with their greater resources, 
also gives public donors a greater capacity to influence NGOs behavior through financial means. 
Working with states also conveys other operational advantages upon NGOs, including greater 
inter-organization coordination and access to expertise in fields other than health to help 
attenuate the negative effects of aid endeavors. 
Taken together, these arguments indicate that NGOs should face greater levels of 
accountability for the outcome of their actions when they are funded by public entities rather 
than private sources. This increased accountability should translate into enhanced performance as 
the direct benefits of aid should increase while the negative externalities should also diminish. 
This leads to Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Aid from organizations which rely primarily on publicly sourced 
funding should result in greater increases in public health than aid from 
organizations which rely primarily on private funding 
 
                                                 
37 In this regard private donors may be similar to the voters studied by Guisinger (2009), who found that 
even voters for whom trade policies should be highly salient often knew little of their representative’s policy 
positions and were thus unable to hold representatives accountable for actions on trade policy. 
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The arguments relating the negative effects of humanitarian aid and civil conflict also 
suggest a conditional hypothesis. This conditional hypothesis on the relationship between aid and 
health during conflict situations is presented in Hypothesis 2: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Aid from organizations which rely primarily on publicly sourced 
funding should result in greater increases in public health than aid from 
organizations which rely primarily on private funding when given during an active 
conflict. 
 
One point to note about Hypotheses 1 and 2 is that the proposed relationship between aid 
types is purely relational to one another, and does not predict a directional coefficient relative to 
zero. That is, in each case the effect of publicly financed aid is hypothesized to be more positive 
than aid from privately funded organizations, but the hypotheses do not predict whether the 
effect of both or either types of aid will be positive or negative. As discussed in Section 3.1.1, it 
is conceptually possible for aid to have positive effects upon health, no effect, or negative 
effects. What determines the true effect of aid will be the net outcome of the proposed direct and 
indirect effects of aid. The types of effects suggested by the various perspectives are presented in 
Table 3-1. If the direct effect and positive indirect effect are more impactful than the possible 
negative externalities, then the net effect of aid upon social health will be positive. If the direct 
and indirect effects offset one another then it is possible that aid’s observed effect will be 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Finally, if the negative effects outweigh the positive, 
then it is possible that aid’s overall effect will be negative. 
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Table 3-1 Possible Relationships Between Proposed Mechanisms and Health 
Proposed Mechanism 
Relationship 
Between 
Mechanism 
and Health 
Theorized Impact 
Upon: 
Conflict Health 
Direct aid distribution to civilians Direct 0 + 
Prevention of communicable disease outbreak through aid provision Indirect 0 + 
Aid relieves material needs causing groups to engage in combat  Indirect + + 
Aid transmission to rebel groups conditional on laying down arms/ceasing combat Indirect + + 
Transmission of aid to rebel groups from aid agencies Indirect - - 
Transmission of aid from civilians to rebel groups Indirect - - 
Relieve financial pressures on rebels through aid "substitution" effect Indirect - - 
Provision of material and medical aid to combatants in refugee camps Indirect - - 
Aid reduces incentive for settling conflict by weakening material constraints/suffering of 
combatants Indirect - - 
Aid is utilized by rebel groups to compensate fighters Indirect - - 
Net Effect   ? ? 
0 denotes no effect, + denotes a beneficial effect, and - denotes a detrimental effect 
 
The proposed mechanisms linking aid and health in Table 3-1 are in many instances 
dependent upon the political, economic and social conditions at work in a civil conflict. Since 
conflicts are not the only type of humanitarian crisis, one question that could be raised is how the 
relationship between aid and health changes in other contexts. Does the difference in aid 
effectiveness between publicly and privately funded organizations persist in situations such as 
natural disasters, where the types of externalities generated by aid may be different than in 
ongoing conflicts? 
The effectiveness of aid in natural disasters is a testable proposition, and in line with the 
logic of accountability which undergirds Hypotheses 1 and 2 it could be argued that publicly 
financed organizations should be more effective in these environments than privately financed 
since overall accountability is still higher. However, if the externalities of aid are different in 
disasters rather than conflicts, it is possible that these differences may be greater, smaller, or 
something in between. Predicting this type of relationship would require theoretical mechanisms 
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tying aid to disaster and by extension health which are related to but beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. In light of the ability to test aid and natural disasters, but in the absence of proposed 
theoretical mechanisms of the indirect ways in which aid may affect health following a natural 
disaster, I offer a testable corollary which follows the logic of the earlier hypotheses. 
 
Corollary 1: Aid from organizations which rely primarily on publicly sourced 
funding should result in greater increases in public health than aid from 
organizations which rely primarily on private funding when given following natural 
disasters. 
 
Once again, aid from publicly financed organizations is expected to be more effective, 
but this is a much less defined proposition given the lack of theorizing on aid and natural 
disasters. 
This chapter has presented an argument about to the effectiveness of humanitarian NGOs. 
It began by defining a measure of effectiveness that measured the welfare of the entire 
population, rather than simply that of the group which actually received aid due to differences in 
the direct and indirect effects of aid. These indirect effects, and their potentially negative 
implications, are argued to be an outgrowth of NGO neutrality and independence, each of which 
can be affected by NGOs relationship with their donors and the degree of donor ability to hold 
NGOs accountable for the effects of their aid efforts. Private donors are argued to be less 
effective than public donors in holding NGOs accountable, which generated a series of testable 
statements indicating that aid from publicly funded organizations should be more effective than 
aid from privately funded organizations in a variety of different scenarios. These statements will 
be tested in Chapter 4.0 . 
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4.0  TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
The theory developed in Chapter 3.0 suggests that publicly funded non-governmental 
organizations should be more effective than privately funded organizations, primarily due to 
differences these groups face regarding their level of accountability to their donors. The greater 
level of accountability that publicly funded donors face under the theory should translate into 
greater performance, a proposition which is encapsulated in a series of hypotheses and corollary 
presented in the preceding chapter. These are tested in this chapter using an original dataset on 
humanitarian aid, and the results are broadly supportive of the predictions: publicly funded 
organizations exhibit better performance than their privately funded counterparts. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the efforts of the privately funded groups appear to detract from, rather than 
improve, public health, a possibility discussed in Section 3.6. 
The next section describes the construction of the dataset as well as the estimation 
technique. This is followed by a section discussing some diagnostics assessing particular 
qualities of the data itself, as well as considerations relating to possible complications relating to 
non-random selection of cases by NGOs. The results of each test of Hypotheses 1 and 2, as well 
as Corollary 1, are then presented. The final two sections discuss the results broadly and offer 
possible alternative explanations for the findings. 
 80 
4.1 DATASET CONSTRUCTION 
The analysis covers the period from 2004 through 2007, as this was the time period for which 
data for all three organizations are available. However, in some cases data for an individual 
organization are available before or after this period, and in those cases some analyses utilize 
these data in the statistical estimates.  The data are recorded in country-year format, and include 
a global sample of non-OECD countries. 38   
4.1.1 NGO Activities and Humanitarian Crisis Measures 
To date, all indications suggest that there is no existing dataset recording the activities of 
humanitarian NGOs, and therefore this analysis utilizes an entirely novel dataset on the activities 
and finances of three of the most prominent humanitarian NGOs: the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), Oxfam International, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).39 These three 
organizations possess a number of qualities which make them ideal cases for inclusion.  The first 
is that they are among the most prominent organizations in the international landscape, among a 
“handful of major players…[who] dominate the international non-governmental landscape” 
(Stoddard 2003, 25). 
Each of these organizations also employs fairly transparent reporting standards, which 
meant that the data were largely, available.  This is a significant hurdle the world of NGOs; 
many organizations either do not publish or do not themselves possess the necessary information 
                                                 
38 Given the structural differences between these countries and developing countries, including in the area 
of public health (Rudra and Tirone 2011), it would unduly bias the results to include them in the sample pool and 
they are therefore excluded. 
39 In some cases these figures may account for the activities of or support to national chapters of each 
organization. 
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on expenditures for specific country-years. As an example, two other organizations were 
contacted in attempts to obtain information on their activities. CARE International does not keep 
figures based on country-year expenditures, according to an email communication on September 
27, 2010 from Cathy Rawlinson, Constituent Services Manager for CARE USA.  Finally, Save 
The Children does not publish these types of figures and, in an email on November 4, 2010, from 
Brittan Horton, Manager, Operations Coordination & Regional Management, declined to provide 
them, instead sending regrets that senior management had determined that “at this time we are 
unable to provide the proper attention and time this request deserves”. This comports with the 
general difficulty of obtaining data on the activities of these organizations, information described 
by Dr. Peter Walker, Director of the Feinstein International Center and Irwin H. Rosenberg 
Professor of Nutrition and Human Security as “almost impossible to get” (email correspondence 
on December 10, 2009).  Even organizations whose purpose is to improve NGO accountability 
do not have this type of information.  In an email on February 11, 2010, Colin Hadkiss, an 
administrator at the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in 
Humanitarian Action (ALNAP: www.alnap.org) stated that “we do not have comprehensive data 
on activities of our member organizations: indeed with 62 Full Member and the wide variety of 
the activities…this would be a massive task”.  When ALNAP did ask their members for this type 
of information, only 22 organizations responded.  
These groups are also excellent candidates for inclusion because, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, each of the organizations represents an “ideal” type on the spectrum of public 
versus private financing.  For instance, in 2004 MSF had a total income of €458.13 million, of 
which €102.89 million came from public institutional donors, for a total of 22%.  €342.84 
million came from private individuals and institutions, composing approximately 75% of 
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revenues (Médecins Sans Frontières 2004, 11).40 The ICRC, by contrast, received total 
contributions of CHF 757.76 million in the same year, of which CHF 684.25 million came from 
governments and the European Commission (90%), CHF 44.38 million from international 
organizations, supranational organizations, national societies and public sources (5.9%), and just 
CHF  29.1 million from private sources (3.8%) (International Committee of the Red Cross 2005, 
338). Oxfam International does not give specific measures of financial contributions in their 
annual report, but one of their largest affiliates, Oxfam U.K., does.  Using Oxfam U.K. financial 
reports from 2001-2007, it was determined that on average approximately a quarter of funding 
comes from public sources, though that figure has a maximum of slightly over 50%.  Therefore, 
Oxfam’s funding profile is similar to that of MSF. 
Turning to expenditures, data for the ICRC were available for the period from 2001 
through 2009 in the Annual Reports for these years.41  I was therefore able to create ICRC Aid, 
which measures the amount of ICRC spending in billions of 2009 U.S. dollars.42   
The information for MSF was not as straightforward.  MSF only began publishing 
consolidated financial reports beginning in 2004.43 For 2003 and earlier, MSF international only 
released an “Activity Report” which detailed the nature of operations in individual countries, but 
                                                 
40 The remaining 3% of income came from sources classified as “Other”. 
41 Data are actually available for much earlier periods as well, but coding was begun in that year due to the 
limitations of the other organizations. 
42 The figures in the original reports for both the ICRC and MSF were listed in thousands of current Swiss 
Francs and thousands of current Euros, respectively.  I deflated both into constant 2009 U.S. dollars using deflators 
from the “Deflators for Resource Flows from DAC Donors” published by the OECD and available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/43/34980655.xls. These deflators were used for all conversions from current to 
constant values in the dataset. One possible alternative specification would be to deflate the measures by population 
to measure aid on a per-capita basis.  However, while this is customarily done in studies on financial flows such as 
Official Development Assistance, it seems less relevant in this case.  Civil conflicts and disasters may be highly 
localized, and therefore the actual number of citizens affected may fall short of the entire population.  Deflating the 
aid measure by population may therefore understate the true relationship of aid relative to the number of 
beneficiaries, and therefore the aid measures here reflect total expenditures rather than per-capita flows. 
43 This was communicated in a phone discussion with Scotti McLaren, International Finance Officer at 
MSF, on August 6, 2010. 
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did not always relay expenditures for the combined MSF national sections.  Therefore, the MSF 
was collected beginning in 2004; beginning in that year, MSF Aid measures the amount of MSF 
expenditures in a given country-year in billions of constant 2009 U.S. dollars.44 For 2003 and 
earlier, the activity reports on lists expenditures for projects which received €3 million or more 
(in current funds), since figures were only available for projects above these spending levels.  
However, this information did allow for identification of countries in which MSF was 
operational but received less than the €3 million threshold. 
 The final aid organization, Oxfam, made data available for Fiscal Year 2001/2002 
through 2006/2007.45  This information was entered into the dataset as Oxfam Aid, which 
measures Oxfam expenditures in billions of constant 2009 U.S. dollars. 
Each of the aid organizations only lists countries in which they were active in that year, 
meaning that only country-years for which expenditures were greater than zero are provided.  In 
order to avoid selection bias, I therefore coded all country-years included in the sample but 
which are not listed as having receiving aid from that organization in that year as having received 
zero aid. 
The fact that the NGO humanitarian responses measured above are not random, but 
deliberately chosen, presents a particular type of empirical issue which necessitates further 
information for accurate results.  Thus, in addition to information on the activities of 
humanitarian organizations, this analysis also requires information on the presence of factors 
                                                 
44 See Footnote 42. 
45 Financial information was sent in response to an emailed query by Francis Simpson on July 18, 2008.  
The figures were listed in current US dollars, and were transformed into thousands of constant 2009 U.S. dollars via 
the process outlined in Footnote 42.  To create annual measures from the Fiscal Year data, I calculated the aid 
spending for a given year as half of the current year’s spending plus half of the following year’s spending.  For 
example, spending in 2004 was calculated as one half of the 2003/2004 figure and one half of the 2004/2005 figure.  
For the first and final years of the time-series, the entire fiscal year figure was assigned as the value for the calendar 
year. 
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which contribute to humanitarian crises. Figure 4-1 presents the theorized relationship between 
crisis, NGO response and health. 
 
 
4-1 Theorized Relationship between Crisis, NGO Response and Health 
 
Within this framework, the NGO response and health outcome are both affected by the 
presence of a humanitarian crisis, while humanitarian responses are also believed to affect the 
crisis, ideally to reduce its severity and attenuate its effect on public health.  Since this 
relationship indicates that the NGO response and Health Outcome are co-determined, it is 
imperative to include measures of humanitarian crisis in the estimations. Failure to do so would 
result in a classic case of omitted variable bias, wherein both the health outcome, as dependent 
variable, and NGO response, which is the independent variable, are both correlated with the error 
term, violating the Gauss-Markov parameters and inducing bias in the estimated relationship 
between NGO response and health outcomes.46 
                                                 
46 Specifically, the degree and direction of the bias would be a reflection of the relationship between 
humanitarian crises and public health. Since crises are detrimental to health, the coefficient on NGO responses 
Humanitarian 
Crisis 
Health 
Outcome 
Humanitarian 
NGO Response 
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In this study, humanitarian crises are represented by data on conflict, both domestic and 
international, as well as natural disasters.  There are a number of variables which measure civil 
conflict.  The first is Civil Conflict (Current), a dichotomous measure which assumes a value of 
1 if there is a civil conflict which has a minimum of 25 and a maximum of 999 battle deaths in a 
given year.  Civil War (Current) is a similarly dichotomous measure which represents the 
presence of civil violence which has exceeded 1,000 battle deaths since its inception.  Conflict 
(Current) indicates whether there is any ongoing violence which exceeds 25 battle deaths in the 
country-year, including both civil conflicts and civil wars. Finally, Civil Conflict (Prior), Civil 
War (Prior), and Conflict (Prior) equal “1” if there is a positive observation for the relative 
indicator in the preceding five years.47 Each of the conflict measures are taken from the Peace 
Research Institute of Oslo’s (PRIO) Armed Conflict database, version 4-2009 (Gleditsch et al. 
2002). 
Data on natural disasters come from the Emergency Events Database, EM-DAT, 
maintained by the WHO’s Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED).48 Disasters are included if they fall into one of the following categories: drought; 
earthquake; extreme temperature; flood; mass movement (dry); mass movement (wet); storm; 
volcano; and wildfires. Disasters (Current) is a count of the number of geological disasters in the 
specified categories within the country-year, while Disasters (Prior) is a total of disasters for the 
preceding three years. 
                                                                                                                                                             
would be downward biased, since it would account for both the response as well as the empirical effect of the 
omitted crisis.  Thus, it would be possible for responses that were actually beneficial to public health to appear to be 
detrimental depending on the relative magnitude of the competing effects.  For an excellent technical discussion of 
omitted variable bias, see Wooldridge (2003). 
47 In order to construct the 5-year measure, data on conflict was obtained through 1995. Therefore, the 
observation for 2004 reflects the period from 1999-2003, the observation for 2005 the period for 2004-2004, and so 
forth. 
48 EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be, Université Catholique de 
Louvain, Brussels (Belgium).  Accessed January 23, 2011. 
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Combining the information for conflicts and disasters with the data on NGO activities 
allows for an examination of the way in which these organizations respond to these events. 
Figure 4-2 shows a basic profile of the types of situations in which the MSF and ICRC were 
operational from 2000-2009.49  One of the striking elements of the figure is that oftentimes the 
ICRC and MSF are both operational in the same countries: out of 892 operations (by country-
year), both the MSF and ICRC were present in the same country in the same year approximately 
45% of the time.  This is most true when the country in question experienced both a conflict of 
any type and a natural disaster in the same year. 
 
 
4-2 Humanitarian NGO Responses 
                                                 
49 Since Oxfam data are only available for 2001-2007, it is excluded in order to capitalize on the longer 
time period available from the ICRC and MSF. 
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Out of 178 cases of concurrent conflict and disaster, both organizations were present in 
137 country-years, or approximately 78% of the time.  Similarly, countries which were in the 
post-conflict phase, where there was a conflict in the last five years but not in the present period, 
and which also experienced a disaster were the benefit of both ICRC and MSF activities 70% of 
the time.   The two organizations were most divergent in the case of disasters without an ongoing 
conflict; of 354 observations, both organizations were present in only a quarter, while the MSF 
was the sole organization in 52% of these cases.  Additionally, cases in which there was no 
conflict or disaster constitute only 18% of the observed ICRC and MSF activities. 
Taken together, it is clear that oftentimes the MSF and ICRC may both be present in 
response to a conflict, disaster, or both, although this does not mean that they are engaged in 
joint operations. Though both may be present, they operate independently of one another.  
Furthermore, their activities are heavily oriented to responding towards humanitarian crises, with 
less than 20% of their activities occurring in countries which were not recent victims of conflict 
or a natural disaster. Given the missions of each organization and their focus on humanitarian 
action, this is to be expected, and is evidence supporting the theoretical relationship between 
humanitarian crises and NGO response presented in Figure 4-1. 
4.1.2 Dependent and Control Variables 
The primary dependent variable in the statistical tests is Life Expectancy. Life Expectancy can be 
viewed as an indicator of public health since it is a measure of “the number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same 
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throughout its life.”50  As such, it is a long-term measure which projection over time of the 
health conditions facing citizens in the current period, indicating how the current environment 
would impact individuals over time. Data for Life Expectancy come from the United Nation’s 
Human Development Reports.51  
I also utilize a second measure of public health as a robustness test, Unlike Life 
Expectancy, Infant Mortality, which represents the number of infants dying before age one (per 
1,000 live births), is a more immediate measure of public health.  Ross (2006) argues that infant 
mortality is highest among the poor, making it a good measure of the health issues facing those 
who may lack the financial resources to provide for their own healthcare needs and thus would 
be in greatest need of humanitarian assistance.  Furthermore, infant mortality is also “a sensitive 
measure of many other conditions – including access to clean water and sanitation…prenatal and 
neonatal health services, caloric intake, [and] disease”  (Ross 2006, 861), making it a good 
measure of overall health and access to needed health infrastructure which aid organizations can 
help provide.  Information for infant mortality rates comes from the World Bank’s WDI.52 
The limited time period available for analysis is the motivation for using Life Expectancy 
as the primary indicator and Infant Mortality as a secondary measure of health. It is possible that 
aid activities may have both long-run and short-run effects. With only a four-year sample, 
however, there is a limited window available to assess these effects by varying the temporal 
relationship between the delivery of aid and the corresponding health outcome. Using Life 
Expectancy, even though it is calculated in a specific year within the sample, allows for greater 
consideration of systemic level factors which may influence long-run trends in health than would 
                                                 
50 Description taken from the “Notes” section of the World Bank’s WDI, accessed April 4, 2011. 
51 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/.  Accessed June 23, 2011. 
52 Accessed April 4, 2011. 
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the more immediate measure of Infant Mortality. In other words, Life Expectancy should 
encompass a broader range of health inputs and reflect how they would impact individuals over 
time than would Infant Mortality, and it is therefore a better measure of the broad set of direct 
and indirect ways in which aid is argued to impact health detailed in Chapter 3.0 , including 
through crisis.53  
Additional regressors are drawn from other studies examining the relationship between 
civil conflict and public health, specifically Iqbal (2010) and Ghoborah et al. (2003).54  These 
variables can be loosely group in one of the three following categories: economic, demographic, 
and political. 
The first of the economic variables is the level of economic development, which is 
measured here with GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars, using data taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), from which GDP Growth, the yearly 
percentage increase in GDP, is also taken.  In addition to level of development, the openness of a 
country’s economy to international trade has also been shown to affect health (Owen and Wu 
2007; Rudra and Tirone 2011).  Therefore, in line with Iqbal (2010) a measure of the country’s 
openness to international trade, Openness, is included. Openness measures the level of imports 
and exports as a percentage of GDP in constant terms with data from the Penn World Tables 
(Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011).  This variable is also interacted with GDP per capita to 
create GDP per capita X Openness.   Finally, to capture the domestic government’s commitment 
                                                 
53 Infant Mortality is customarily one of the measures accounted for in the calculation of Life Expectancy, 
so the latter is also a reflection of the short term dynamics affecting the infant mortality rate.  
54 I adopt this model specification, in line with the studies cited, due to the ways in which the theory 
suggests aid should affect health. In the theory the externalities of aid are not primarily medical, but rather operate 
through various societal channels. Therefore, it is these social channels which are most likely to be correlated with 
both aid and health and would induce bias if omitted. This would be different if I were testing specific medical 
practices or intervention strategies. In those cases, a specification which was closer to epidemiological testing, for 
example, would be appropriate. In the absence of data which are so finely differentiated, and in light of the aid-
social phenomena-health nexus which is the focus of the theory, this specification is more statistically appropriate. 
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to health and available resources, Public Health Expenditures measures government spending on 
health as a percentage of all government expenditures.  Data for Public Health Expenditures 
come from the World Bank’s WDI.55 
Two demographic measures are also included.  The first is Population (logged), which is 
the natural log of the population and comes from the World Bank’s WDI.56  Additionally, as 
Ghoborah, Russett and Huth (2003, 191) argue, “a more knowledgeable population is likely to be 
more knowledgeable of health risk factors, to support greater investments and expenditures, and 
to utilize health-care services.”  As such, Education, a measure of the expected number of years 
of education a citizen will receive, is also included, with data from the United Nation’s Human 
Development Reports.57 
A number of studies have also highlighted the relationship between a country’s regime 
type and health (As an example, see Ross 2006; Rudra and Tirone 2011).  Therefore, the Polity 
IV project’s Polity measure, the 21-point scale running from -10 to 10, with lower values 
indicating greater levels of autocracy and higher values greater democracy, is also included 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002).58  
Table 4-1 provides descriptive statistics for the primary variables utilized in the analysis. 
  
                                                 
55 Accessed June 16, 2011. 
56 Accessed June 16, 2011. 
57 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/. Accessed June 23, 2011. 
58 Polity IV v2010. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/. Accessed June 16, 2011. 
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Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics, 2004-2007 
  N Mean Min Max 
Life Expectancy 676 66.44 41.28 82.18 
Infant Mortality 503 38.72 1.40 139.80 
ICRC Aid 734 5119.88 0 160,381.90 
MSF Aid 734 2048.62 0 61,843.30 
Oxfam Aid 770 2286.79 0 50,611.02 
Conflict (Current) 766 0.11 0 1 
Conflict (Prior) 766 0.19 0 1 
Civil Conflict (Current) 766 0.09 0 1 
Civil Conflict (Prior) 766 0.18 0 1 
Civil War (Current) 766 0.09 0 1 
Civil War (Prior) 766 0.14 0 1 
Disasters (Current) 766 1.64 0 37.00 
Disasters (Prior) 763 4.61 0 91.00 
GDP Growth 666 6.14 -6.47 46.50 
GDP per capita 655 5976.53 85.82 106,466.10 
Openness 659 95.55 1.77 441.22 
Public Health Expenditures 652 10.61 0.77 41.66 
Population (logged) 727 8.09 2.35 14.09 
Polity 542 2.40 -10.00 10.00 
Education  581 6.76 1.03 12.12 
 
  
 92 
4.2 DATA DIAGNOSTICS AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
Having outlined the data which are to be used as the basis of the analysis, this section details 
some of the pre-estimation data diagnostics the estimation techniques which are used to test the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 3.0 . 
The first diagnostic indicated that there was at least first-degree autocorrelation within the 
data, although it rejected the hypothesis that either Life Expectancy or Infant Mortality exhibited 
a unit root.  However, there is evidence that these variables may be subject to a positive time-
trend, so each of the fully specified models below include a count variable accounting for 
elapsed time to control for any trending that may be present. 
Given the continuous dependent variable, pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression would be a suitable estimator.  However, the presence of autocorrelation can present 
difficulties in the estimation of the standard errors.  Two popular alternatives for dealing with 
serial correlation include the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor and a 
technical correction via an AR(1) process. One issue with lagged dependent variables is the 
possibility that they may artificially depress the coefficients of the other regressors (Achen 
2000), which is particularly true given the high year-over-year persistence of both life 
expectancy and infant mortality.  Therefore, the use of an AR(1) correction is preferable in this 
case. 
In addition to serial-correlation, spatial correlation can also make the estimation of 
accurate standard errors problematic.  It is theoretically likely within this data, given the 
tendency for natural disasters to strike multiple countries at once or for civil conflicts in one 
country to affect a neighbor, that there would be some degree of spatial correlation present.  One 
way of correcting for this spatial correlation is the use of panel-corrected standard errors (Beck 
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and Katz 1995), and this is the option chosen for this analysis.  Therefore, the models are 
estimated via pooled OLS utilizing panel-corrected standard errors with a panel-specific AR(1) 
correction unless otherwise specified.  
Furthermore, it is important to determine whether pooling of the observations is 
appropriate, and additionally whether there are any factors which may cause responses by any of 
the aid organizations to deviate from the others.  For instance, if one organization were to 
systematically choose countries that are in greater danger than others, the structural differences 
between the organizations’ method of case selection could result in biased estimates unless these 
factors were properly controlled for. 
It is worth briefly discussing at this point the question of selection and how to properly 
control for it in the statistical models. Traditionally discussion of selection in the statistical sense 
has focused on sample selection, or the methods by which observations are included or excluded 
from the statistical sample. If observations are omitted from the sample based on a non-random 
criterion, then it is possible that results obtained from analysis of that sample could be biased due 
to failure to correct for the exclusionary factor. For example, if a study is run only on high-
achieving students, then analysis of which factors influence educational achievement may be 
biased since students who perform poorly are not part of the sample. This is the type of problem 
which the traditional Heckman selection model (1979) seeks to solve. By estimating two stages, 
the first of which calculates the likelihood of progressing into the sample evaluated in the second 
stage and including that estimated probability as an additional regressor, the Heckman model 
seeks to incorporate a measure of the factors which differentiate the censored and uncensored 
observations and reduce bias brought about by splitting the sample in a deliberate, non-random 
manner. 
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The selection issue present in the current analysis is different. Selection in this instance 
does not result in the censoring of data, but instead is realized in the non-random allocation of 
aid to particular countries based on the decision making of humanitarian organizations. It can be 
argued that this is a selection issue to the extent that organizations “select” to whom to give aid, 
but a different one than sample censoring. This type of selection doesn’t affect the probability of 
being included in the sample, but rather the correlation between other factors which influence 
both aid allocation and the outcome under analysis. It is, in other words, a case of omitted 
variable bias, which in this analysis would mean that not accounting for factors which make aid 
more or less likely (or impact aid’s effectiveness) and health outcomes could lead to biased 
estimates of aid’s efficacy. 
The reason this is the case is because simple non-random distributions of data on the right 
hand side of an econometric estimation is not selection; it is, in many, the very phenomenon an 
analyst is trying to test. If one were engaging in cancer research, for example, there would likely 
be many health issues which would be correlated with both age and cancer. Data on these factors 
would be non-randomly distributed to the extent that they would increase with age, but this is not 
a case of sample selection so long as the analyst does not limit the sample to include only elderly 
patients. Assuming the sample is appropriately distributed with respect to age and controls for 
age as a factor, however, then the researcher can reduce or even negate any bias which would 
come about from the positive correlation between a health condition, age, and the onset of 
cancer. To use an example closer to the current study, Fortna (2004) encounters a similar issue in 
her assessment of the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Without an understanding of the 
common elements between cases where peacekeepers were sent and how that affects outcomes, 
her results would likely be biased. However, by controlling for the factors which make 
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peacekeeping more or less difficult, she can account for the correlation between particular 
measures of peacekeeping, difficulty, and eventual outcome.  
Some of the factors which should impact aid’s effectiveness are included in the above 
discussion as included regressors. For example, if aid was only sent to poor countries, and being 
poor also results in lower life expectancy, then failure to control for income would downwardly 
bias the estimates of aid effectiveness. To assess other factors which could engender a similar 
result, Figure 4-3 presents diagrams detailing NGO response by health indicator and region.  
Each point shows an instance where a single aid organization was present in order to see how the 
three may differ in their response.59  If the organizations’ response profiles were similar, one 
would expect to see fairly close clustering of aid missions. However, from these diagrams it is 
clear that this is not the case.  Rather, Oxfam appears to choose particularly challenging 
environments, at least in terms of the current level of health.  For both life expectancy and infant 
mortality they tend to cluster towards the countries which exhibit poor health performance. MSF 
demonstrates similar tendencies in regards to life expectancy, but tend to operate in countries 
with average or better than average infant mortality.  Finally, ICRC appears to end up in 
countries which have higher levels of life expectancy but lower levels of infant mortality.  With 
regards to spatial dispersal, MSF and Oxfam both show tendencies to operate in Asia and Africa. 
The ICRC is less prevalent in these areas, but has a greater presence in the Middle East than 
either of the other two organizations.  These regions also tend to show some clustering of health 
performance as well, with Africa clearly having the worst life expectancies but performing better 
in the area of infant mortality. Asia is slightly better or approximately even in both categories, 
                                                 
59 Instances where two or more organizations were present in a country year were omitted. 
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while the Middle East is the top performer of the three in life expectancy but lags behind in 
infant mortality. 
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From this information two issues become apparent, which is that there are clear trends in 
specific NGO responses with regards to both health performance and regional presence, which 
suggests that two further estimation adjustments must be undertaken.  The first is that some 
accommodation of the differences in starting life expectancy must be made, or else the estimates 
may be biased by the tendency of Oxfam (and to a lesser degree MSF) to operate in countries 
whose starting life expectancy is on average lower than the countries in which the ICRC is 
present.  One way this might express itself would be by observing an upward bias on the ICRC 
coefficient and a downward bias for Oxfam and MSF, since estimation in levels would mean that 
ICRC was on average associated with higher life expectancies.  To remedy this situation, the 
dependent variables are differenced so that the measure reflects the future two-year change in life 
expectancy or infant mortality.60  This specification has a number of advantages.  The first is that 
it removes any differences in initial life expectancy, leaving the organizations on a level playing 
field.  Additionally, it accounts for the fact that the aid organizations may not have an immediate 
impact, but may it may take some time for the effects of their efforts to be realized. 
Given the general stability in life expectancy, one question about differencing the 
variable may be whether there is sufficient variation to provide useful information. Fortunately 
there does appear to be a surprising amount of difference in estimated life expectancy values 
over a two-year period. The mean change is close to zero at 0.02, but the standard deviation is 
0.05. The minimum value is -0.29, and the maximum is 0.39. These aren’t tremendously large 
figures, but it does indicate that life expectancy is more variable than may otherwise be expected. 
This dispersal of values can also be seen in Figure 4-4, which plots the two year forward change 
in life expectancy relative to its initial value in levels. 
                                                 
60 Therefore, for aid observed in year t0, the dependent variables is measured as (t2-t0) 
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4-4 Two Year Change in Life Expectancy 
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characteristics.61  The coefficients on both the regional dummies and country-dummies are 
omitted from the tables due to space considerations. 
To review, the models are therefore estimated via OLS using panel-corrected standard 
errors to account for spatial correlation, a panel-specific AR(1) correction to deal with temporal 
correlation, a time-trend, and regional and country dummies to measure regional- and country-
fixed effects. 
4.3 TESTING HYPOTHESIS 1 
Hypothesis 1 argued that aid organizations which receive a greater portion of their 
funding from public sources should be unconditionally more effective than organizations which 
receive a greater share of their funding from private sources.  Within this framework, this would 
suggest that the ICRC, as a predominantly public-funded organization, should be more effective 
in increasing life expectancy and reducing infant mortality than Oxfam and MSF, each of which 
should be somewhat to one another given the similarity in their funding.. 
Table 4-2 presents the base model estimations using Life Expectancy as the measure of 
public health.  Model 1 utilizes only the aid variables. Each of the aid measures is statistically 
significant at the 99% level; however, only the measure for ICRC aid has a positive coefficient, 
indicating increases in life expectancy.  The coefficient suggests that for every $1 million 
increase in ICRC aid, life expectancy increases by 0.00057 years. At the mean ICRC aid 
                                                 
61 The ability to include country-dummy fixed-effects is enhanced by the absence of a lagged dependent 
variable. As Nickell (1981) showed, the presence of a lagged dependent variable with fixed effects can induce a bias 
in the order of 1/T.  This is not a particularly troubling value in long time series, but can be problematic in a short 
time series such as the one utilized here. 
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allocation of $5,119,880, this would result in an increase in life expectancy of 0.003 years over 
two years.  Conversely, the negative coefficients on MSF and Oxfam aid suggest that they 
actually generate decreases in life expectancy.  The differences between coefficients were also 
statistically significant, as confirmed via an F-test.  This result is surprising, but may be a result 
of the very limited model specification.  To expand upon this result, Model 2 introduces the 
conflict and disaster variables.  Once again, ICRC aid is statistically significant and increases life 
expectancy, while MSF and Oxfam appear to be detrimental to life expectancy.  Among the 
crisis variables, only current conflicts and prior natural disasters achieve statistical significance, 
though in an unanticipated positive direction.  Once again, however, this may be a result of the 
omission of the full set of regressors. 
These regressors are introduced in Model 3, which uses the full model specification. The 
aid coefficients observed in Models 1 and 2 are robust in the presence of the additional controls; 
ICRC has a statistically significant and positive effect upon life expectancy, while MSF and 
Oxfam aid generate decreases in life expectancy.  Prior conflicts also reduce life expectancy, as 
do increases in education and time.  Higher levels of economic development, meanwhile, along 
with disasters both past and present increase life expectancy.    
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Table 4-2 Base Model Estimation, Life Expectancy 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Aid Only 
Aid and 
Crisis Full Model 
ICRC Aid 0.57*** 0.526*** 0.740*** 
  (0.0943) (0.0874) (0.14) 
MSF Aid -0.806*** -0.92*** -0.163** 
  (0.308) (0.355) (0.635) 
Oxfam Aid -3.72*** -3.64*** -2.94*** 
  (0.155) (0.164) (0.19) 
Conflict (Prior) 
 
0.00206 -0.0237*** 
  
 
(0.00369) (0.00776) 
Conflict (Current) 
 
0.0144*** 0.00874 
  
 
(0.00403) (0.00857) 
Disasters (Current) 
 
-0.000222 0.000991** 
  
 
(0.000632) (0.000409) 
Disasters (Prior) 
 
0.000476** 0.00130*** 
  
 
(0.000205) (0.000302) 
GDP Growth 
  
-0.000116 
  
  
(0.000447) 
GDP per capita 
  
7.23e-06*** 
  
  
(2.08e-06) 
Openness 
  
-0.000120 
  
  
(9.69e-05) 
GDP per capita X Openness 
  
-2.97e-09 
  
  
(3.18e-09) 
Public Health Expenditures 
  
-0.000391 
  
  
(0.000410) 
Population (logged) 
  
-0.0265 
  
  
(0.0298) 
Polity 
  
0.000800 
  
  
(0.000519) 
Education 
  
-0.0209*** 
  
  
(0.00714) 
Time Trend 
  
-0.00430*** 
  
  
(0.000987) 
Constant -0.0130 -0.00595 0.473* 
  (0.0134) (0.00660) (0.243) 
Observations 660 658 489 
R-squared 0.723 0.725 0.747 
Number of Countries 166 165 127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The next set of models utilizes a similar style of analysis, substituting infant mortality for 
life expectancy.  With this change, negative values now represent improvements in health, since 
they represent a decrease in the number of infant deaths per 1,000 births. The results of these 
estimations are presented in Table 4-3. 
Model 4 utilizes the same set of variables as Model 1, but with very different results.  
Instead of decreasing infant mortality, ICRC aid has no statistically discernible effect.  Similarly, 
MSF aid also fails to achieve statistical significance. Only Oxfam is has a statistically significant 
effect upon infant mortality, but that effect is to once again reduce public health by increasing 
infant mortality. The mean Oxfam aid allocation of $2,286,790 would increase infant mortality 
by 0.025 deaths per thousand. This effect is consistent in both magnitude and significance in 
Model 5, which also introduces the crisis variables.  MSF and ICRC aid is once again 
insignificant, but as expected prior conflicts and current and prior disasters increase infant 
mortality. Each current natural disaster increases infant mortality by 0.011 deaths per thousand 
while each disaster over the least three years generates an increase of 0.0074 deaths.  Prior 
conflicts also increase mortality by 0.11 deaths per thousand. 
The picture changes in the fully specified model in Model 6. Once the economic, 
demographic and political controls are introduced, ICRC achieves a coefficient of -3.43, 
indicating decreases in infant mortality, which is significant at the 95% level.  MSF aid and 
Oxfam aid are now detrimental to health, as in the models of life expectancy, with coefficients of 
8.38 and 7.65, respectively, both of which are statistically significant at the 95% level.  Current 
and prior disasters also increase infant mortality, as do prior conflicts and increases in 
population. Greater levels of economic development and exposure to international trade, 
meanwhile, are beneficial to public health and decrease infant mortality. 
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Table 4-3 Base Model Estimations, Infant Mortality 
  (4) (5) (6) 
  Aid Only Aid and Crisis Full Model 
        
ICRC Aid -1.80 -2.12 -3.43** 
  (1.47) (1.52) (1.39) 
MSF Aid 4.16 4.88 8.38** 
  (5.36) (5.60) (3.90) 
Oxfam Aid 10.9*** 10.85*** 7.65** 
  (3.75) (3.90) (3.25) 
Conflict (Prior) 
 
0.109*** 0.158*** 
  
 
(0.0184) (0.0251) 
Conflict (Current) 
 
0.0123 0.00952 
  
 
(0.0283) (0.0392) 
Disasters (Current) 
 
0.0112*** 0.00658*** 
  
 
(0.00341) (0.00197) 
Disasters (Prior) 
 
0.00743*** 0.00836*** 
  
 
(0.00263) (0.00281) 
GDP Growth 
  
-0.00369 
  
  
(0.00391) 
GDP per capita 
  
-6.58e-05*** 
  
  
(1.48e-05) 
Openness 
  
-0.000715* 
  
  
(0.000410) 
GDP per capita X Openness 
  
3.66e-08 
  
  
(3.14e-08) 
Public Health Expenditures 
  
-0.0123 
  
  
(0.0103) 
Population (logged) 
  
1.360*** 
  
  
(0.215) 
Polity 
  
-0.00113 
  
  
(0.00132) 
Education 
  
-0.0277 
  
  
(0.139) 
Time Trend 
  
0.00211 
  
  
(0.00716) 
Constant 0.103** -0.239* -9.25***  
  (0.05) (0.135)  (2.50) 
Observations 502 500 376 
R-squared 0.647 0.648 0.651 
Number of Countries 168 167 127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Overall, the results presented in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 are supportive of Hypothesis 1.  
As predicted, aid from the ICRC does appear to be more unconditionally effective than aid from 
the MSF and Oxfam.  ICRC aid was health enhancing and statistically significant in four of the 
six model specifications, and generated increases in life expectancy and decreases in infant 
mortality.  Surprisingly, however, MSF and Oxfam were not only less effective than the ICRC, 
but actually resulted in decreases in public health, with aid increases from both organizations 
leading to reducing life expectancy and increasing infant mortality. Most of the other variables 
were in line with conventional expectations; higher levels of economic development, for 
instance, increased health while prior conflicts lead to health reductions.  Interestingly, prior and 
current natural disasters had positive coefficients in the models of life expectancy but the 
expected detrimental effect upon infant mortality. 
One factor which may account for the coefficients which are in the opposite direction of 
what may be expected is the fact that the relationships in the models are unconditional; that is, 
they do not reflect the ability of aid to contribute to or detract from public health in various 
environments. As Hypothesis 2 and Corollary 1 argue, the ability of aid organizations to affect 
health may be affected by the presence of a crisis.  As such, the relationships observed in this 
section may change these conditional relationships are introduced into the estimations in the 
following sections. 
4.4 TESTING HYPOTHESIS 2 
While Hypothesis 1 was concerned with the unconditional effect of aid, Hypothesis 2 is 
explicitly concerned with the effectiveness of aid organizations in conflict environments. As 
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argued in Chapter 3.0 , due to the possibility of negative externalities of aid in civil conflicts, aid 
organizations which accept public funding – in this case, the ICRC – are expected to be more 
effective than organizations which receive more private funding and thus remain more politically 
independent. The counterargument is that posed by organizations such as MSF, which argue that 
this independence makes them more effective than groups which receive largely public funds. 
Like Hypothesis 1, support of Hypothesis 2 would come in the form of ICRC aid that was 
estimated to be more effective than that of Oxfam and MSF; if the latter two organizations prove 
more effective, this would be evidence against Hypothesis 2 and support their argument 
regarding the benefits of financial (and by extension political) independence. 
Table 4-4 presents the results of estimations on current conflicts, which include Conflict 
(Current), Civil Conflict (Current), and Civil War (Current).  Conflict (Current) includes both 
civil conflicts and civil wars. To test Hypothesis 2, each of these variables is also interacted with 
each of the aid variables in different model specifications.  Furthermore, to control for previous 
conflicts, the indicators for each of the variables in the last five years are also included as 
regressors, as is a variable indicating the presence of an international conflict in the last five 
years, International Conflict (Prior).62  The interactive measures are accounted for by ICRC X 
Conflict, MSF X Conflict, and Oxfam X Conflict, each of which represents the corresponding aid 
variable interacted with the indicated conflict measure for each model. For space considerations 
only the aid, conflict and interaction variables, along with the time trend, are presented.  Control 
variables are shown in Table 6-1 in APPENDIX A. 
 
  
                                                 
62 There are no active international conflicts during this period, negating the need for a current measure of 
international conflict. 
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Table 4-4 Current Conflict, Life Expectancy 
  (7) (8) (9) 
  Current Conflict 
Current Civil 
Conflict 
Current Civil 
War 
        
ICRC Aid 0.196 0.961*** 0.3.88 
  (0.672) (0.29) (0.503) 
ICRC X Conflict 0.588 -0.675* 0.741* 
  (0.713) (0.363) (0.398) 
MSF Aid -1.55 -0.205** -1.25 
  (1.104) (0.885) (0.784) 
MSF Aid X Conflict -0.172 1.24* -1.86*** 
  (0.906) (0.672) (0.603) 
Oxfam Aid -2.93*** -2.82*** -2.96*** 
  (0.422) (0.369) (0.23) 
Oxfam Aid X Conflict -0.149 0.92** -0.316 
  (0.958) (0.379) (0.437) 
Conflict (Prior) -0.0227*** 
 
  
  (0.00834) 
 
  
Conflict (Current) 0.00590 
 
  
  (0.00720) 
 
  
Civil Conflict (Prior) 
 
-0.0212** -0.0159** 
  
 
(0.00852) (0.00754) 
Civil War (Prior) 
 
0.0159* 0.0110 
  
 
(0.00823) (0.00740) 
International Conflict (Prior) 
 
-0.0191 0.0491 
  
 
(0.0618) (0.0354) 
Civil Conflict (Current) 
 
-0.00227 0.00130 
  
 
(0.00372) (0.00540) 
Civil War (Current) 
 
0.00207 0.00791 
  
 
(0.00477) (0.00801) 
Disasters (Current) 0.00101** 0.000973** 0.000916* 
  (0.000440) (0.000422) (0.000531) 
Disasters (Prior) 0.00131*** 0.00104*** 0.00101*** 
  (0.000301) (0.000228) (0.000325) 
Time Trend -0.00438*** -0.00404*** -0.00449*** 
  (0.00100) (0.000824) (0.00127) 
Constant 
 
0.600* 0.446  
  
 
(0.313)  (0.429) 
Observations 489 489 489 
R-squared 0.750 0.742 0.740 
Number of Countries 127 127 127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As detailed by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), accurate interpretation of the 
estimated interactive effect requires construction of the appropriate marginal effect and standard 
error.  Additionally, as Berry, Golder and Milton (2010) argue, true understanding of the full 
effect of either of the constituent terms in the interaction requires the calculation of not only the 
conditional coefficient which represents the direct marginal effect of the variable, but also the 
conditional effect of the variable it conditions. As an example, in the models above ICRC aid 
enters the model twice. It has its independent effect (when conflict equals zero), as well as its 
presence in the interaction.  Thus, it affects the model through its independent effect, its 
conditioned marginal effect (ICRC aid + ICRC aid X Conflict) and also its moderating effect on 
conflict (Conflict + ICRC aid X Conflict).  Thus, aid as a component of the interaction term has 
two possible pathways by which it might affect life expectancy, in addition to its effect 
independent of conflict. 
In order to fully capture these interactive effects, Table 4-5 presents the conditional 
coefficients, standard errors (for the direct marginal effect), and statistical significance of the 
conditional coefficients for each of the models in Table 4-4. Interpretation of these conditional 
coefficients is made easier by seeing them in a more standard format, with the coefficient above 
and standard error below. 
In Model 7, the marginal effect of ICRC aid, conditional on conflict, is positive and 
statistically significant at the 99% level, with a coefficient of 0.785. However, it does not have a 
statistically significant conditioning affect upon conflict, as each of the calculated marginal 
effects (at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of ICRC aid in the dataset) reaches 
statistical significance. Therefore, the only conditional effect of ICRC aid upon life expectancy 
in the model is through its positive and significant conditional marginal effect.  
 109 
 
Table 4-5 Current Conflict Conditional Coefficients, Life Expectancy 
  (7) (8) (9) 
  Current Conflict 
Current Civil 
Conflict 
Current Civil 
War 
ICRC X Conflict 0. 785*** 0.287 1.13*** 
  (0. 21) (0.176) (0.33) 
MSF X Conflict -1. 72*** -0. 812 -3.11*** 
  (0. 606) (0.64) (0.904) 
Oxfam X Conflict -3.08*** -1.9*** -3.27*** 
  (0.6) (0.537) (0.37) 
  
  
  
Conflict X ICRC 
  
  
10th Percentile 0.0069 -0.0034 0.0092 
25th Percentile 0.0078 -0.0045 0.01 
50th Percentile 0.0102 -0.0072* 0.013 
75 Percentile 0.016 -0.014** 0.021** 
90th Percentile 0.028 -0.027** 0.036** 
  
  
  
Conflict X MSF 
  
  
10th Percentile 0.0058 -0.0015 0.0068 
25th Percentile 0.0057 -0.0008 0.0057 
50th Percentile 0.0054 0.0011 0.0029 
75 Percentile 0.0047 0.0065 -0.0052 
90th Percentile 0.0036 0.014 -0.017* 
  
  
  
Conflict X Oxfam 
  
  
10th Percentile 0.0059 -0.0021 0.0078 
25th Percentile 0.0058 -0.0015 0.0077 
50th Percentile 0.0056 -0.0002 0.0072 
75 Percentile 0.0049 0.0042 0.0057 
90th Percentile 0.0043 0.0076 0.0045 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In accordance with Hypothesis 2, ICRC aid is positive and beneficial to health.  
However, while Hypothesis 2 predicted that it would be more beneficial than aid from MSF and 
ICRC, once again the estimates suggest that aid from each of the latter two organizations is 
detrimental and consequently less effective than aid from the ICRC. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficients on MSF X Conflict and Oxfam X Conflict suggest that aid 
from these organizations, in the presence of a current civil conflict or civil war, reduces life 
expectancy rather than increasing it. Neither variable has an offsetting conditional effect on 
conflict and its relationship with life expectancy.63 
Moving to Model 8, which estimates the effect of a current civil conflict (more than 25 
battle deaths in the current year but less than 1,000 in that year or cumulatively), the marginal 
effect of ICRC aid conditional on civil conflict is statistically insignificant, suggesting that ICRC 
aid has no effect upon life expectancy.64 However, it does have a statistically significant 
moderating effect on civil conflict, which is to increase conflict’s impact upon life expectancy 
from a loss of 0.0072 years at the 50th percentile of aid to 0.027 at the 90th.65 This suggests, in 
opposition to other estimates, that ICRC aid may decrease life expectancy by exacerbating the 
negative effects of conflict at high levels of aid. Among the other aid measures, MSF largely 
fails to achieve statistical significance, while Oxfam decreases life expectancy conditional on 
conflict but does not affect conflict’s relationship with life expectancy. 
Finally, in Model 9, ICRC aid is once again positive and significant, both in its estimated 
effect conditional on civil war, as well as its conditioning effect on civil war. In the presence of a 
civil war ICRC aid increases life expectancy by 1.13 years (per marginal increase in aid), while it 
                                                 
63 The full marginal effect of conflict is Conflict + (Conflict X ICRC) + (Conflict X MSF) + (Conflict X 
Oxfam), which is not tested in this table. 
64 Model 8 is estimated with a general, rather than panel-specific, AR(1) correction. 
65 An F-test confirmed that these values are statistically different from one another. 
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also increases life expectancy associated with civil war, from 0.021 years at the 75th percentile to 
aid to 0.036 years at the 90th percentile.  Therefore, ICRC aid is doubly beneficial in the case of 
civil war. Once again, MSF and Oxfam aid decrease  life expectancy, as each assumes a negative 
conditional coefficient and statistical significance at the 99% level. 
To summarize the results of Models 7 through 9, they are generally in accordance with 
Hypothesis 2 in that ICRC aid is once again more beneficial than MSF and Oxfam aid, with the 
exception of Model 8.  It appears that the estimated effects for ICRC in Model 7 are related to 
civil war rather than civil conflict, given the results of Models 8 and 9, which is mildly surprising 
given that the challenges to be overcome in a more intense civil war versus a conflict. However, 
this held for MSF as well, though again their effect was negative for health. 
These results do not hold, however, when the dependent variables switches to infant 
mortality.  Table 4-6 shows the estimated conditional coefficients for the models of current 
conflict using infant mortality as the dependent variable.  The model results showing the aid and 
disaster variables, plus interactions, are shown in Table 6-2, while the control variables are 
included in Table 6-3, both of which are included in APPENDIX A. Based on these results, each 
organization appears equally ineffectual in their ability to reduce infant mortality following a 
current civil conflict of any intensity. The one exception is Oxfam, which has a positive and 
significant coefficient for conflicts of any type as well as civil wars, suggesting that Oxfam aid 
given during these crises increases infant mortality during the following two years. 
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Table 4-6 Current Conflict Conditional Coefficients, Infant Mortality 
  (10) (11) (12) 
  Current Conflict 
Current Civil 
Conflict Current Civil War 
ICRC X Conflict -1.18 -0. 49 -0.239 
  (1.55) (2.11) (1.94) 
MSF X Conflict 2.5 2..79 -2.48 
  (3.81) (3.31) (5.98) 
Oxfam X Conflict 9.03*** 2.35 10.89*** 
  (3.49) (7.57) (2.84) 
  
  
  
Conflict X ICRC 
  
  
10th Percentile 0.046 0.07 -0.014 
25th Percentile 0.051 0.075 -0.0078 
50th Percentile 0.062 0.087 0.0087 
75 Percentile 0.093 0.12* 0.052 
90th Percentile 0.151 0.18* 0.133 
  
  
  
Conflict X MSF 
  
  
10th Percentile 0.036 0.061 -0.031 
25th Percentile 0.03 0.057 -0.041 
50th Percentile 0.017 0.049 -0.066 
75 Percentile -0.021 0.024 -0.138 
90th Percentile -0.076 -0.013 -0.242 
  
  
  
Conflict X Oxfam 
  
  
10th Percentile 0.041 0.063 -0.021 
25th Percentile 0.042 0.061 -0.018 
50th Percentile 0.044 0.055 -0.012 
75 Percentile 0.052 0.034 0.009 
90th Percentile 0.058 0.018 0.026 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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These results also provide some insight into the short- versus long-term effects discussed 
in Section 4.1.2. The statistically significant results were all found in relation to life expectancy, 
the long-run indicator, and aid appeared to have little to no effect on infant mortality, the short 
run measure. This suggests that aid’s greatest effects may be through more diffuse scope 
conditions which are also related to health, but may not affect health in a direct manner. This 
would make sense with the logic of externalities, in which the public “good” which affects a 
larger segment of the population has a greater effect upon health than does the more direct 
mechanism of actual aid delivery to specific recipients. 
Overall, Hypothesis 2 – that publicly funded organizations should be more effective than 
their privately funded counterparts during active civil violence – has some support when it comes 
to life expectancy, but little relative to infant mortality. Once again ICRC aid appears to be 
beneficial for health, while MSF and Oxfam aid reduces life expectancy, as they did in the 
unconditional aid models.  
4.5 TESTING COROLLARY 1 
Unlike Hypothesis 2, which focused on civil violence, Corollary 1 is concerned with situations 
that are arguably apolitical: natural disasters. Corollary 1 suggests, in line with the logic of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, that aid from the ICRC should be more effective in the environment of a 
natural disaster than aid from MSF and Oxfam. However, because the logic regarding possible 
externalities of aid in these situations is not addressed theoretically, it is offered as a corollary 
rather than a hypothesis. 
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To test this hypothesis, a series of interactions were constructed using the disaster 
variables, in a manner similar to conflict interactions. However, because the effects of many 
disasters can persist over time, or be multiplied if there are two or more within a limited time 
period, the effect of prior natural disasters is also examined. Two models are run for each 
dependent variable, the first analyzing current disasters, and the second analyzing prior disasters. 
The first models, which utilize life expectancy, are presented in Table 4-7, while Table 4-8 
presents the conditional coefficients. Control variables are in Table 6-4 in APPENDIX B. 
Evidence in favor of Corollary 1 would be coefficients which are similar to those 
obtained in Hypotheses 1 and 2.  In this manner support is found for Corollary 1 given that the 
conditional coefficients, estimated for each aid variable at 2, 4 and 8 conflicts, are on par with 
the earlier results.  ICRC aid is beneficial, MSF and Oxfam aid is detrimental, and MSF and 
Oxfam aid are largely similar to one another. Looking at the conditional coefficient on ICRC aid, 
the marginal benefit of ICRC aid actually increases as the number of current disasters increase: 
at 2 disasters, the marginal effect of ICRC aid is 0.46, and that increases to 1.39 at 8 disasters. 
The MSF and Oxfam results are similar to before, with negative coefficients indicating that aid 
decreases life expectancy. 
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Table 4-7 Disasters, Life Expectancy 
  (13) (14) 
  Current Disaster Prior Disaster 
ICRC Aid 0.146 0.204 
  (0.978) (0.162) 
ICRC X Disasters (Current) 0.156***   
  (0.043)   
ICRC X Disasters (Prior) 
 
0.074*** 
  
 
(0.012) 
MSF Aid -0.757 -0.769 
  (0.639) (0.586) 
MSF X Disasters (Current) -0.274*   
  (0.14)   
MSF X Disasters (Prior) 
 
-0.135*** 
  
 
(0.026) 
Oxfam Aid -3.34*** -2.62*** 
  (0.179) (0.438) 
Oxfam X Disasters (Current) 0.0691*   
  (0.04)   
Oxfam X Disasters (Prior) 
 
-0.0284 
  
 
(0.034) 
Conflict (Prior) -0.0227*** -0.0238*** 
  (0.00752) (0.00792) 
Conflict (Current) 0.00989 0.00827 
  (0.00861) (0.00881) 
Disasters (Current) -2.14e-05 0.000724** 
  (0.000635) (0.000366) 
Disasters (Prior) 0.00112*** 0.00127*** 
  (0.000308) (0.000411) 
Time Trend -0.00383*** -0.00414*** 
  (0.00107) (0.000983) 
Constant 0.509** 0.55**  
  (0.233)  (0.256) 
Observations 489 489 
R-squared 0.751 0.747 
Number of Countries 127 127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4-8 Disasters Conditional Coefficients, Life Expectancy 
  (13) (14) 
  Current Disasters Prior Disasters 
ICRC X  Disaster 
 
  
2 0.46*** 0.35** 
4 0. 77*** 0.5*** 
8 1.39*** 0.8*** 
MSF X Disaster 
  2 -1.31*** -1.04* 
4 -1.85** -1.3** 
8 -2.95*** -1.85*** 
Oxfam X Disaster 
  2 -3.2*** -2.68*** 
4 -3.06*** -2.74*** 
8 -2.79*** -2.85*** 
  
  Disaster X ICRC 
  10th Percentile 0.00025 0.0014*** 
25th Percentile 0.00049 0.0015*** 
50th Percentile 0.0011** 0.0018*** 
75 Percentile 0.0027*** 0.0026*** 
90th Percentile 0.0058*** 0.004*** 
  
  Disaster X MSF 
  10th Percentile -0.00019 0.0012*** 
25th Percentile -0.00035 0.0011*** 
50th Percentile -0.00076 0.0009** 
75 Percentile -0.002 0.00032 
90th Percentile -0.0037* -0.00054 
  
  Disaster X Oxfam 
  10th Percentile -0.0000072 0.0013*** 
25th Percentile 0.000034 0.0013*** 
50th Percentile 0.00013 0.0012*** 
75 Percentile 0.00046 0.0011*** 
90th Percentile 0.00072* 0.001*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results in the model on prior disasters is largely similar; rather than improving life 
expectancy, the coefficients on MSF and Oxfam aid become increasingly negative as the number 
of prior disasters increases, suggesting that each becomes increasingly detrimental to life 
expectancy. Furthermore, they to do little to change the estimated coefficient on the disasters 
themselves, while in both models ICRC aid has a statistically significant and beneficial effect on 
the relationship between disasters and life expectancy. 
These results do not hold when the dependent variable is switched to infant mortality, the 
results of which are presented in Table 4-9, with conditional coefficients in Table 4-10 and 
controls in Table 6-5 in APPENDIX B. Like in the models estimating conflict and infant 
mortality, each of the aid organizations appears to have little effect on infant mortality during or 
following a natural disaster. As the number of prior disasters increases there is some evidence of 
a statistically significant relationship, but again it is negative (which is beneficial for infant 
mortality) for ICRC and positive for Oxfam and MSF. Even in the conditioning effect on 
disasters current and prior, greater amounts of MSF and Oxfam aid serve to increase the negative 
effects of disasters on infant mortality, rather than providing a beneficial effect. 
These results are predominantly in line with the expectations of Corollary 3. The earlier 
trends observed in Hypotheses 1 and 2 hold: ICRC aid has a beneficial effect, in opposition to 
the effects observed from both MSF and Oxfam.  Also consistent with earlier results, each 
organization had a more statistically discernable effect upon life expectancy than infant 
mortality. Based upon these results, there is evidence that the publicly funded ICRC is more 
effective than MSF and Oxfam in instances of civil violence as well as natural disasters. 
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Table 4-9 Disasters, Infant Mortality 
  (15) (16) 
  Current Disaster Prior Disaster 
ICRC Aid -1.39 -1.48 
  (1.35) (2.13) 
ICRC X Disasters (Current) -0.493   
  (0.353)   
ICRC X Disasters (Prior) 
 
-0.3003*** 
  
 
(0.104) 
MSF Aid 5.88 1.09 
  (6.88) (4.87) 
MSF X Disasters (Current) 0.132   
  (1.41)   
MSF X Disasters (Prior) 
 
0.756*** 
  
 
(0.201) 
Oxfam Aid 18.37** 3.97 
  (7.48) (5.32) 
Oxfam X Disasters (Current) -2.55***   
  (0.924)   
Oxfam X Disasters (Prior) 
 
2.78 
  
 
(0.349) 
Conflict (Prior) 0.142*** 0.149*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0318) 
Conflict (Current) -0.0252 -0.0195 
  (0.0473) (0.0451) 
Disasters (Current) 0.0225*** 0.0111*** 
  (0.00353) (0.00180) 
Disasters (Prior) 0.00360* 0.00771*** 
  (0.00187) (0.00298) 
Time Trend 0.00398 0.00125 
  (0.00738) (0.00672) 
Constant -12.55***  
 (2.94)  
Observations 376 376 
R-squared 0.652 0.651 
Number of Countries 127 127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4-10 Disasters Conditional Coefficients, Infant Mortality 
  (15) (16) 
  Current Disasters Prior Disasters 
ICRC X  Disaster 
 
  
2 -2.38 -2.08 
4 -3.37 -2.68 
8 -5.34 -3.89*** 
MSF X Disaster 
 
  
2 6.14 2.6 
4 6.41 4.11 
8 6.94 7.14** 
Oxfam X Disaster 
 
  
2 13.28** 4.53 
4 8.19** 5.08 
8 -2.0 6.19* 
  
 
  
Disaster X ICRC 
 
  
10th Percentile 0.022*** 0.0072** 
25th Percentile 0.021*** 0.0067** 
50th Percentile 0.019*** 0.0056** 
75 Percentile 0.014* 0.0024 
90th Percentile 0.004 -0.0035 
  
 
  
Disaster X MSF 
 
  
10th Percentile 0.023*** 0.0082*** 
25th Percentile 0.023** 0.0086*** 
50th Percentile 0.023*** 0.0097*** 
75 Percentile 0.023** 0.013*** 
90th Percentile 0.024 0.018*** 
  
 
  
Disaster X Oxfam 
 
  
10th Percentile 0.022*** 0.0079*** 
25th Percentile 0.02*** 0.0083*** 
50th Percentile 0.017*** 0.0094*** 
75 Percentile 0.0047 0.013*** 
90th Percentile -0.005 0.016*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.6 DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presented a number of statistical assessments to test the validity of each of the 
hypotheses presented in chapter 3.0 . The main caveat to the test results is that the sample is 
limited; a four-year sample, although global, is a small cross-section of time on which to assess 
the effect of these organizations.  However, as the best sample currently available, it is 
informative to begin to empirically testing these arguments, and careful selection of the 
estimation method and model specification helps to garner as much accurate information and 
unbiased results as possible. 
To test Hypothesis 1, which asserted that aid from organizations which receive a greater 
share of their funding from public sources should be unconditionally more effective than aid 
from institutions which receive a greater share of private funding, models were estimated using 
only the aid terms, aid terms and humanitarian crisis variables, and then a fully-specified model 
using those variables as well as the full set of controls. The results of these tests unambiguously 
supported Hypothesis 1, as ICRC aid was beneficial to health for both life expectancy and infant 
mortality.  The surprising result from these estimations was the aid from MSF and Oxfam was 
detrimental to health, a result that would persist through the following models. 
For Hypothesis 2, which suggested that aid from public organizations would be more 
effective than aid from privately funded organizations in active conflicts, estimates using 
interactions of each of the aid variables with each of the conflict measures were utilized. The 
evidence here was in support of Hypothesis 2 in that the ICRC was indeed more effective at 
various levels of civil violence. As with the results obtained for Hypothesis 1, MSF and Oxfam 
aid, when it was statistically significant, was again in opposition to improvements in public 
health. Therefore, there was strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. 
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Corollary 1 was similarly supported. Using interactions of aid with current and prior 
disasters, the ICRC coefficients showed a positive relationship with life expectancy, though little 
statistically significant relationship with infant mortality. MSF and Oxfam was once again 
negative, decreasing life expectancy, but also largely statistically indistinguishable from zero in 
estimations using infant mortality as the dependent variable.  
Looking at the model results collectively, the strongest result is that ICRC aid appears to 
be generally and unconditionally beneficial for recipient countries.  Whether it was in the current 
conflict environment, or during or following a natural disaster, it generally elicited positive 
changes in public health. They were not large changes, but they were consistent across models. 
The most surprising result was that MSF and Oxfam aid was detrimental to health. There 
may be some question as to whether this result was somehow an artifact of the tendency of each 
organization to choose “hard cases”, as seen in Figure 4-3. However, careful methodological 
considerations in the construction of the models argue against this. First, by accounting for the 
organizations’ tendencies to operate independently in Africa and Asia, which have on average 
lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality, via the use of the regional dummies controlled 
for the effects these regional characteristics and presence might have had on the data. Second, 
the use of the country-fixed effects accounts for any consistent characteristics of individual 
countries that may cause them to have both low life expectancies and smaller increases in health 
measures, reducing the effect that the non-random selection of cases will have on the results. 
Finally, differencing the dependent variable removes the initial difference in life expectancy and 
infant mortality from the estimations, focusing instead on changes following the activities of the 
aid organizations. In this specification, MSF and Oxfam may actually be thought to benefit from 
a positive bias.  As seen in Figure 4-4, life expectancy and infant mortality both experience lower 
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variability overall as overall health improves – that is, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
additional improvements when health is already robust. This suggests that having a strong 
presence in countries with low starting levels of heath should make it easier to see larger 
increases, particularly when controlling for the unobserved factors leading to the low beginning 
point through the fixed effects. This attenuation bias should also work against the ICRC, which 
makes its strong positive showing all that much more impressive. 
Absent a methodological explanation for the negative effect of MSF and Oxfam aid on 
health, the question turns to theoretical explanations for the relationship. One may be found in 
the theory presented in the previous chapter; given the lower levels of accountability facing MSF 
and Oxfam due to their reliance on private donations, their outside oversight diminished relative 
to the ICRC.  Additionally, their independence from states may make them more vulnerable to 
exploitation and expropriation within conflict zones, in the fears of those who advocate a 
“Humanitarian Dilemma”, as discussed previously. In this framework, the argument that reliance 
on private financing gives MSF – and additionally Oxfam, whose funding profile is similar to 
MSF’s as is their performance in the models – falls flat. Quite the opposite dynamic actually 
appears to be at work.  Rather than making them more responsive and effective, this 
independence, if the accountability and cooperation arguments are to be believed, is detrimental 
to their overall effectiveness. This is not to say that they are engaged in any organizational 
malfeasance; rather, it is an assessment of the micro- versus macro-level effects their aid efforts 
may entail. If they deliver much needed benefits to individuals directly, but the costs and 
negative externalities associated with their aid efforts reduce overall social health and welfare, 
how does one weigh the effectiveness of their efforts? 
 123 
I argue that the proper way to evaluate the effect is based on the aggregated social 
outcome, rather than the effect on individuals who receive aid, for the reasons outlined in Section 
3.1.1. Adopting this social welfare approach, the negative coefficients, though surprising, were 
one of the possible outcomes predicted in Section 3.6. The direct effect of aid, as argued above, 
is almost definitely positive. It is hard to envision how feeding the hungry or providing medical 
attention to the sick could make those individuals worse off. If this were the only outcome of aid, 
it would still be possible that publicly funded organizations could be more efficient due to 
enhanced accountability, but the coefficients on both publicly and privately funded organizations 
would be positive. The numerous claims on the possible externalities of aid, however, suggest 
that aid’s impact isn’t limited to those who receive it, but also to those extends who are not direct 
beneficiaries. These individuals but may be affected by other means, such as the prevention of 
epidemics or the transfer of aid from agencies or civilians to rebel groups. How these potentially 
positive and negative externalities work together with the direct effect is not a priori clear: as 
Table 3-1 demonstrated, it is possible that the net effect could be positive, negative, or 
statistically indistinguishable from zero depending on the relative weight of each effect. 
The positive coefficient on ICRC aid therefore doesn’t mean that aid from that 
organization is free from negative consequences; indeed, it is entirely possible (and perhaps even 
likely) that some aid is diverted or transferred from its intended beneficiaries and this serves to 
detract from aid’s overall effectiveness. What it does suggest is that the direct and positive 
externalities which result in increases in public health are greater than the negative externalities 
associated with ICRC aid, yielding a beneficial net effect. The negative coefficients on MSF and 
Oxfam aid, by contrast, don’t mean that aid from these organizations is entirely bereft of positive 
impacts. Undoubtedly those who actually receive assistance see their situations improve. In the 
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aggregate, however, the coefficient is an indicator that the negative externalities of aid from 
these organizations exceed the positive benefits enjoyed by aid recipients.    
The one outstanding issue is the general lack of a relationship between aid efforts and 
improvements in infant mortality. As indicated in the discussion of the infant mortality variable, 
Ross (2006) and others have argued that it is a good indicator of the health of the poorest 
members of a society for a number of reasons. If aid organizations are more effective in 
increasing life expectancy, which covers broader swathes of society, including those in more 
economically privileged positions, but generally fail to assist those in greatest need of their 
services – the poor – then it may call into question how effectively they are able to target and 
deliver services to this segment of society.  
4.7 POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
The statistical results presented in this chapter show that there are indeed statistically discernible 
differences in the effects of aid from publicly and privately funded organizations. These 
differences are consistent with the expectations of the arguments relating to NGOs and donor 
accountability upon which the hypotheses are based. However, these results do not test the 
accountability mechanism directly, creating the possibility that the observed outcome is in fact 
due to other factors besides accountability. 
One possible explanation could be differences in the types of cases in which the 
organizations are present. As discussed in Section 4.2, if MSF and Oxfam were systematically 
involved in more difficult cases than the ICRC, it is possible that the aid values for these 
organizations would also serve to serve as a proxy measure for the severity of a crisis, for 
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example. The solution adopted in the current analysis is to attempt to statistically control for 
those factors which might make crises more or less detrimental to life expectancy and infant 
mortality and in so doing remove the omitted variable bias which would cause the estimates for 
MSF and Oxfam to appear smaller than they otherwise would and possibly inflate the estimated 
benefits of ICRC activity. If there are still factors present which are not accounted for in these 
statistical controls, this bias may still be present and could be causing a portion of the difference 
between the estimated coefficients for each organization. 
It is also possible that for reasons outside of the current analysis ICRC is simply more 
effective than MSF and Oxfam, whether it be due to institutional expertise, better methods, or 
efficiency gains unrelated to accountability. These advantages of the ICRC could cause the type 
of differences observed in the statistical estimates and would not necessarily rely upon 
accountability. As discussed earlier in this chapter, it is unlikely that any of the three 
organizations is wholly ineffective, although this does not mean that they are each comparably 
efficient. There are two potential factors which help suggest that even if this is a factor, it does 
not obviate the accountability argument. First, the separation between the aid organizations 
correlates with their funding patterns. If Oxfam were similar to the ICRC but different from 
MSF, for example, then it would be less likely that funding was a factor given that under the 
typology presented here MSF and Oxfam are comparable institutions. Since the results do reflect 
this similarity, it suggests that the observed differences are correlated with funding even if the 
public versus private divide may not be the sole causal factor behind the differences between 
each organization’s effectiveness. 
Furthermore, if the ICRC is more effective as an institution because it adopts different 
strategies due to the fact that it is more willing to accept with or accept funding from states, then 
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this is still in line with the argument that organizations which engage in this type of relationship 
enjoy benefits denied to their privately funded counterparts. 
Finally, in a similar vein it is possible that the ICRC is simply a unique case. It may be 
granted particular capabilities due to its prominence and legally defined rights within the Geneva 
Convention that are denied to MSF and Oxfam, and which could serve to make it more effective. 
The ICRC may also engage in more legalistic practices, such as pointing to human rights 
violations and holding governments to account more than MSF and Oxfam do, which could 
reduce negative externalities or simply be more effective tactics. Unfortunately the aggregated 
nature of the data used to generate the estimates (which are also the best available at the current 
time) do not allow for testing specific practices or techniques, so if these differences are in fact 
contributing to some of the estimated differences it is possible organization type is a proxy for 
these types of effects. Once again, though, if it is the ICRC’s willingness to perform this role and 
its capability to do so is bolstered through its relationship with state benefactors, then the public 
and private divide is still salient.  
It is also possible that all four of these factors – differences in accountability, structural 
differences in cases, more effective ICRC practices or general ICRC uniqueness – could be 
influencing the results. In an attempt to try to get a better sense of whether accountability is in 
fact a motivating factor, the next chapter begins to assess if donors actually behave in the ways 
anticipated by the theory. It does so using a pilot study of private donors, and the methods and 
results are presented in Chapter 5.0 .  
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5.0  MATCHING THEORY TO BEHAVIOR 
Chapter 4.0 presented the result of large scale quantitative analyses showing evidence 
that the publicly funded humanitarian NGO appears to outperform the two which receive funding 
largely from private sources. These results are predicted by the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 
3.0 , even if the negative coefficients on the privately funded organizations were a bit surprising. 
This correspondence between the hypotheses and empirical results is positive evidence in favor 
of the outcome anticipated by the theory, but it is not a test of the underlying process by which 
those outcomes are achieved. That process is predicated on anticipated behavior by donors which 
is not reflected in the macro-level results: the large-n results show one organization is more 
effective than another, but not why. The donor behavior argued to cause this disparity may be 
evaluated by more micro-level examination, which in this analysis is undertaken in the form of a 
pilot survey assessing how private donors actually behave. Questions focused on factors such as 
how much time donors spent engaging in research, how much they knew about the organizations 
to which they donated, and the likelihood that they would try to sanction an organization by 
withholding donations. The results of the survey broadly support the argument that private 
donors are not inclined to spend much time engaging in research or otherwise informing 
themselves about organizations, and they may be permissive of particular types of behaviors 
which may detract from institutional performance. This chapter presents and discusses these 
results, beginning with the next section’s discussion of the survey sample and methodology. 
 128 
5.1  SURVEY CHARACTERISTICS 
The survey queried individuals about their behavior and beliefs regarding donations they had 
made or were likely to make to any non-profit organization, and was administered by a 
professional web-based survey firm during a one week period in late May of 2012.66 
Respondents were solicited in two ways. One group responded to a request to complete the 
survey which was disseminated using social media, including Twitter and Facebook. The other 
group was contacted by the survey firm and invited to participate. 50 responses were obtained 
using the social media process, and 264 were collected using the survey firm’s efforts, for a total 
of 314. Of the 314 surveys which were started 281 were completed, for a completion rate of 
almost 90%. All responses were obtained online, and respondents’ anonymity was maintained  
Demographically the sample was predominantly white (88.1%), male (57.3%), and well-
educated – 67.8% had a college education, and 30.3% had completed graduate school. The two 
most frequently represented age groups were individuals aged 50-59 (27.1%) and 30-39 (25.8%). 
Another 20.4% were aged 60 or older. Nearly half of the sample had a household income 
between $25,000 and $74,999 (a combined 43.4%) and 14.6% earned $150,000 or greater. Only 
4.5% were not U.S. citizens or resident aliens, and 35.4% had at one point in their lives been 
employed by a non-profit organization. Figure 5-1 presents some descriptive information about 
the survey sample. 
 
  
                                                 
66 For the purposes of this project political campaigns and committees, as well as labor union dues, were 
excluded from consideration. In order to increase sample size the potential number of charitable organizations was 
expanded beyond simply humanitarian aid organizations, but since many of the predictions regarding donor 
behavior should be applicable to different types of non-governmental organizations the sample should still provide 
empirical evidence for or against the arguments broadly applied. 
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5-1 Selected Sample Characteristics 
18-20 
4% 21-29 
8% 
30-39 
26% 
40-49 
15% 
50-59 
27% 
60 or 
older 
20% 
Which category below includes your age? 
$0-$24,999 
8% 
$25,000-$49,999 
23% 
$50,000-$74,999 
20% 
$75,000-
$99,999 
19% 
$100,000-$124,999 
8% 
$125,000-$149,999 
7% 
$150,000-
$174,999 
5% 
$175,000-$199,999 
3% 
$200,000 and up 
7% 
What is your approximate average 
household income? 
Some high school 
1% 
Graduated from 
high school 
8% 
Some college 
23% 
Graduated from 
college 
27% 
Some graduate 
school 
11% 
Graduated from 
graduate school 
30% 
What is the highest level of education you 
have completed? 
 130 
After survey takers had provided their demographic information, they were then sorted 
into one of three groups. Individuals in Group I were those who had given a donation to a non-
profit organization within the last five years (not including political campaigns, political 
committees or labor union dues). Individuals in Group II had not made a donation in the last five 
years but rated themselves as “Very Likely” or “Somewhat Likely” to make a donation in the 
next two years, and were asked questions about their prospective behavior and preferences.67 
Individuals in Groups I and II were also presented with a number of different scenarios and 
asked to determine their most likely response. Individuals in Group III were those who had not 
made a donation in the last five years and who also thought themselves unlikely to make a 
donation in the next two. This group was not asked any questions but was thanked for 
participating. 
An overwhelming majority of respondents had given a donation within the prior five 
years – 268, or approximately 86%. When asked for their approximate number of donations over 
this period, the most frequent response was 1-4 donations, at 39%. There was a tie for the second 
highest frequency between 5-9 donations and 20+, each of which comprised 22.5%. The average 
reported amount of each donation was also relatively modest: 25% of the donations were less 
than $50, while another 20% fell between $50 and $99. Figure 5-2 provides some additional 
information about the frequency and amounts of the donation profiles for Group I. 
Group II contained 19 members, 16 of whom provided an anticipated average donation 
amount. The average expected value was well below $100; 43.8% anticipated giving less than 
$50, 12.5% $50-$99, and 25% $100-$199.  
                                                 
67 Group II also included individuals who indicated that they did not remember whether or not they had 
made a donation in the prior five years. 
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5-2 Group I Donation Characteristics 
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One of the first things to note is the large number of donations as well as their relatively 
modest amounts. Each is consistent with profile of private donors discussed in Chapter 3.0 , and 
additionally corresponds with the proposed collective action problem facing private donors when 
they wish to sanction an organization by withholding future funds. When 86% of the sample 
gives a donation of some amount, there are a large number of potential substitutes for any lost 
revenue and the impact of any single is minimal. Furthermore, 78% of actual donations were less 
than $1,000, and only 7% were greater than $5,000. These figures once again support the 
argument that private donors are poorly situated to hold organizations to which they donate 
accountable by withholding funding, since each individual donation is relatively small and its 
loss will not be keenly felt by most organizations. 
The early evidence thus suggests that the argument regarding the collective action 
problem in sanctioning donors has some empirical support. What of the argument regarding 
donors’ incentives to invest time and effort into researching the organizations to which they 
donate? This question is the focus of the next section. 
5.2 PRIVATE DONORS’ PRE- AND POST-DONATION BEHAVIOR 
In Section 3.4.1 I argued that private donors have little incentive to invest large amounts of time 
and effort into researching and learning about the behavior of the organizations to which they 
donate. Part of this can be explained by the fact that some donors receive personal benefits with 
their donation, which could be material –a free gift, for example – or less tangible, such as a 
sense of well-being from having made a contribution. If it is true that this type of private benefit, 
which is bestowed upon the donor at the time of the donation itself, drives a large portion of 
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charitable giving, then on average one should observe that donors spend little time investigating 
to which group to make a donation, and similarly little time following up on the donation after it 
has been made. 
To begin assessing the validity of this argument, Group I members were asked to 
estimate how much time they spent, on average, researching the groups to which they made a 
donation prior to their contribution. The most frequent response was that they spent no time 
engaging in any research, at 26.8%. 22% of respondents did some research but no more than 15 
minutes, and another 19.6% spent between 15 and 29 minutes. Less than one-fifth (19.2%) spent 
more than an hour doing research before making a donation.  
The amount of research did increase with participant education, but only slightly. 
Individuals with only a high school education were the least likely to do any pre-donation 
research, with 47.1% reporting that they spent no-time learning about the organization prior to 
donating. That percentage dropped to 28.8% for individuals with a college education, but was 
still the most frequent answer among the group. Those holding graduate degrees engaged in 
more research than the other two groups, but even the clear majority did 30 minutes or less; 
25.3% did 15 to 29 minutes, 24.1% 1 minute to 14 minutes, and 22.9% made no effort at all. 
Figure 5-3 shows the full response profile broken down by level of education. 
The most frequently utilized sources of information donors used in their decision making 
process was personal experience with an organization or its activities, followed by materials 
provided by the organizations, and then internet searches. Even though personal contact was the 
most frequently cited information source, 84.9% of the respondents had never been a beneficiary 
of the group’s activities. Interestingly for humanitarian aid donors, the opportunity to deal with 
these organizations directly is frequently quite limited due to the fact that they work overseas, as 
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argued above. This means that for many donors the most preferred means of acquiring 
information may be unavailable, and the second most popular avenue is provided directly by the 
organizations themselves, which can be problematic given the incentives they have to selectively 
provide information. 
 
5-3Time Spent On Pre-Donation Research, by Level of Education 
 
Most donors also didn’t avail themselves of the opportunity to learn more about their 
organization by visiting organizations or websites specifically dedicated to evaluating non-
profits. Respondents across all three education levels in Group 1 consistently indicated that they 
had not visited a site such as CharityNavigator.org, with percentages at 58.8, 57.6, and 60.2 for 
high school, college, and graduate school graduates, respectively. 
Personal contact with the organization was also the exception, rather than the rule, when 
it came time to actually make a donation. Across all three education groups the most popular 
donation method was online, although high school graduates did show a preference (47.1%) for 
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donations by physical mail relative to the other two groups. However, nearly half of those 
holding graduate degrees submitted their donation online (48.2%), while slightly over a third 
(36.2%) of college graduates did the same. 
The picture which emerges from the data is consistent with the expectations relative to 
how donors will behave established in Chapter 3.0 . Donors do not spend a great deal of time 
researching the groups to which they contribute, with the clear majority spending less than 30 
minutes and a good number doing no research at all. As might be expected those who have 
achieved a higher level of educational attainment do slightly more research, but even in this 
group the preponderance of donors do modest amounts of information gathering. Since these 
donors are the most likely to possess the type of analytical skills necessary to assess an 
organization’s performance, this lack of information does not speak favorably for private donor 
accountability. What information these donors do obtain primarily comes from personal 
experience with an organization or materials it provides, which in and of itself is problematic. 
There also appears to be some dissonance between the amount of time spent and donors’ 
perceived knowledge about these organizations. Despite the small amount of time most donors 
spend engaging in research most feel they are relatively well-informed about the group to which 
they contributed. Table 5-1 shows the donor responses when asked to self-report their level of 
knowledge regarding the activities of the organizations to which they contributed, with the data 
cross-tabulated by the amount of time the respondent indicated he or she spent doing research on 
the organization. 
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Table 5-1 Donors' Self-Assessment of Their Knowledge Level 
How informed do you feel about the activities of the organization to which you donated? 
  
I did no 
research prior 
to making my 
donation 
1 minute to 14 
minutes 
15 minutes to 
29 minutes 
30 minutes to 
59 minutes 
1 hour 
to 1 
hour 
and 59 
minutes 
Extremely 
informed 31.80% 20.80% 16.30% 19.40% 13.30% 
Very informed 37.90% 64.20% 71.40% 64.50% 73.30% 
Slightly 
informed 25.80% 15.10% 12.20% 12.90% 6.70% 
Not at all 
informed 4.50% 0.00% 0.00% 3.20% 6.70% 
   
As can be seen from the table, the majority of donors consider themselves to be very 
informed about the activities of their organization, even if they have done no research 
whatsoever. As may be expected, donors who do any research at all generally report that they 
feel more informed about the organization’s activities. What is surprising about this is that there 
is less variation between one’s self-professed knowledge level and amount of time spent engaged 
in research than might be anticipated. Individuals who engaged in 1 minute to 14 minutes of 
research seemed to feel as informed, on average, as individuals who spent 30 minutes to 59 
minutes. There was also a similar result for individuals who spent 15 to 29 minutes and 1 hour to 
nearly 2 hours. Overall there seems to be little difference in one’s self-reported level of 
knowledge as a function of time spent actually researching the organization, which suggests that 
donors perhaps have an innate confidence that they know more than they really do. Reinforcing 
this idea is the fact that only 38% of donors recalled receiving a financial or annual report from 
the organization, and 56% didn’t read any financial statements, tax filings, annual reports, or 
other documents issued by the organization after they made their donation (Figure 5-4). 
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5-4 Donor Familiarity with Annual Reports and Other Documents 
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Overall, donors appear to have great faith in their knowledge of the organizations’ 
activities, a belief that may have little basis in actual fact. They similarly may have unfounded 
confidence in the group’s ability to be effective, which will be addressed in the next section. 
5.3 DONORS’ BELIEFS ABOUT ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
Donors, as a matter of course, should feel that the organizations to which they contribute are 
effective in pursuing their appointed goals. Given the multitude of alternative organizations,  
donors who did not believe their chosen group was effective they could divert these funds to a 
competitor. This is also the basis of the need for organizations to ensure that they are portrayed 
in the best light possible. As was seen in the previous section, donors believe they are well 
informed about the activities of their chosen organization despite engaging in little research. This 
section focuses on what donors believe they know, particularly in relation to the effectiveness of 
their chosen beneficiary. 
 
5-5 Donors' Confidence in Organizational Effectiveness 
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 139 
When it comes to effectiveness, donors rated their organizations highly: 85% described 
themselves as very or extremely confident that their chosen organization was having a beneficial 
effect (Figure 5-5). They rated the organization as having a beneficial effect despite the fact that 
when asked how much time they personally spent researching how the organization used their 
donation after it was given, 38.1% did no research and another 30.4% did between 1 minute and 
29 minutes.  
Perhaps as a result of so little research, donors were largely unable to answer questions 
about many of the characteristics organizations use to define effectiveness in their own 
promotional materials. As an example, 38% of donors did not know how much of each dollar 
went to benefit program recipients rather than to administrative expenses (Figure 5-6). 
 
5-6 Donors' Knowledge of Administrative Versus Programmatic Costs 
Donors were similarly uninformed on questions relating to other markers of institutional 
performance, including total annual expenditures, revenues, and number of individuals assisted 
(Figure 5-7). 
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5-7 Donors' Knowledge Of Performance Metrics 
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Around three quarters of donors were not familiar with an organization’s performance on 
many of the most-easily identifiable and measurable indicators of organizational activities, and 
yet as seen before many donors consider themselves to be highly knowledgeable about the group 
to which they donate and as largely certain that this group is also effective. What might explain 
this seeming disconnect between donors’ confidence that they are well-informed about an 
organization and their lack of knowledge of the organization’s actual operations? The answer 
appears to be that donors are relying heavily on an organization’s reputation when assessing 
which organization they’d like to contribute to and also when determining the effectiveness of 
their preferred organization. 
Many scholars have highlighted the importance of an organization’s reputation, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.0 . Reputation can be a heuristic tool donors can use to bypass having to 
do their own research by relying on the opinions of others regarding individual organizations. If 
an organization is reputed to be effective and use donations wisely, then that is a signal to other 
donors that it is a worthy target for future donations. Conversely, an organization with a poor 
reputation may have a hard time soliciting donations. For this reason, many organizations seek to 
maximize their reputations by adopting strategies targeted at enhancing public perceptions of 
their performance, including the aforementioned preference for avoiding the dissemination of 
potentially damaging information and focusing on measures of institutional performance which 
are easily collected and intuitively understood but may not actually convey much information 
about outcomes. 
Table 5-2 provides donors’ responses to a question asking them to rank factors 
influencing their decision regarding their decision to make a donation. They were asked to rank 
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each factor which factored into their decision, with one indicating the most important and eleven 
the least important. 
Table 5-2 Factors Impacting Donors' Decision Making 
Which factors were most important to you when deciding to make your donation? (Please rank all which 
apply on a scale of 1-11, with 1 being the most important and 11 the least important)  
Answer Options Response Average Response Count 
The organization's reputation 2.82 241 
Wanting to support individuals in need of assistance 3.54 235 
Personal experience with the organization 3.57 230 
The organization's focus on a particular disease/medical 
issue 4.03 223 
Recommendations by family or friends 5.22 213 
Honoring the memory of a loved one 5.96 211 
The organization's religious affiliation 6.74 212 
Obtaining personal tax benefits 7.55 211 
Advertising campaigns or in person solicitations by the 
organization 7.83 212 
Other 8.34 135 
Endorsements or appeals by public figures 8.72 201 
 
Of the listed alternatives an organization’s reputation came in as the most important, 
garnering the most responses and the highest ranking. The “warming glow” alternative, which 
reflects the desire to assist others, came in second place, while personal experience with an 
organization was third. From this it would seem that the arguments about the importance of 
reputation are not overstated; it does appear to be an important factor in the donation process. 
Reliance on reputation is detrimental to donors’ ability to hold organizations accountable. 
The fact that organizations actively attempt to manipulate their reputations is one reason, since it 
may mean that reputation may not reflect actual performance but may be instead be a function of 
prowess in public relations. Furthermore, reputations may take on their own self-reinforcing 
attributes and can be slow to change, meaning that organizations which do in fact achieve a 
favorable reputation may have a high degree of insulation from criticism and further evaluation 
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(Grant and Keohane 2005). Perhaps the most signifcant issue is that by evaluating organizations 
on reputation, donors are simply adding further distance between themselves and the information 
necessary to determine whether groups are actually effective, decreasing accountability. 
5.4 SANCTIONING NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
Section 5.1 discussed a number of structural issues with private donors’ ability to sanction 
organizations by withholding funds, including the large number of donors and the relatively 
modest amount of each individual donation. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 were in some ways 
examinations of private donors’ incentives to sanction; sanctioning would be more likely if 
donors were dissatisfied with the performance of the organization to which they donated. The 
generally rosy picture that donors painted of the organizations to which they contributed, 
combined with the overall lack of in-depth analysis conducted by donors, would suggest that 
they have little incentive to engage in sanctioning, and in fact this appears to be borne out 
empirically. 
Only 19% of donors contacted their organization with a question or comment after their 
donation, and only 17% contacted an organization after donating with a concern. Furthermore, 
83% classified themselves as “Extremely likely” or “Very likely” to make another donation to 
the organization to which they had already donated (Figure 5-8). 
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5-8 Donor Interaction With Organizations After Donating 
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Just because donors haven’t for the most part contacted organizations doesn’t mean they 
wouldn’t, particularly since there is so little seeming dissatisfaction on the part of donors with 
the organizations benefiting from their donations. What happens, however, if donors come across 
information that reflects negatively on the organization? Would they then have an interest in 
attempting to contact the organization or possibly withhold future funds? 
There is some evidence that donors would in fact be in favor of more sanctioning type 
behavior under these circumstances. Survey respondents in Groups I and II were presented with 
the following statement: 
 
On March 9, 2010, the NY Times reported on a United Nations Security Council report that up to 50% of 
food aid sent to Somalia by the World Food program was diverted to a "web of corrupt contractors, radical 
Islamist militants and local United Nations staff members" ("Somalia Food Aid Bypasses Needy, U.N. 
Study Says"). Please answer the following questions relating to this report.68 
 
The respondents were evenly split between those who were already familiar with reports 
of this nature on the diversion of food aid and those who were not: 51.8% reported that they were 
previously unaware of this type of diversion, while 48.2% had some prior familiarity with this 
type of information.  
 After reading this blurb, respondents were then asked to characterize their reaction to the 
information. A portion of the respondents, 45.2%, were permissive of the aid diversion. Some 
(7.8%) were not concerned with food diversion and assumed that it was a part of normal 
operations, while 37.4% found it regrettable but thought that the need to continue delivering aid 
                                                 
68 New York Times. “Somalia Food Aid Bypasses Needy, U.N. Study Says”. March 9, 2010. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/world/africa/10somalia.html. Accessed May 15, 2012. 
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was more important. The rest of the donors were less tolerant; 33.1% felt that if the food 
diversion could not be stopped then aid organizations should consider suspending operations, 
while 21.8% indicated that they found the idea of food diversion completely unacceptable and 
advocated the immediate cessation of aid operations (Figure 5-9). 
 
5-9 Response to U.N. Food Aid Diversion Report 
   
It is the latter two categories of responses that would be most troubling to aid 
organizations, and much of the reason why they try to prevent this type of information from 
being publicized. Their fears may be well-founded: respondents were subsequently asked how 
this type of information may affect their likelihood of making a donation to a group which 
provides food aid to Somalia, such as the World Food Program, operating under the assumption 
that they were initially inclined to make a contribution. More than half of the respondents – 54% 
- indicated that this information would mean that they would be very unlikely to make a donation 
or would absolutely not make a donation. Slightly less than one-third responded that they would 
8% 
37% 
33% 
22% 
How would you best describe your feelings 
about the findings of the UN report? 
These types of diversions are to be
expected
Food diversion is regrettable but it is
more important to continue delivering
aid to those in need
If the food diversion cannot be
stopped, the organizations should
consider suspending operations
Food diversion is completely
unacceptable and the organizations
should stop their operations
immediately
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be slightly less likely to make a donation, while the remaining individuals said that it would have 
no impact on their decision (Figure 5-10). 
 
5-10 Change in Likelihood of Making A Donation Due to Information on Food Diversion 
  
Under this scenario, donors would in fact attempt to stem negative outcomes from aid – 
in this case, food diversion – if they had the necessary information available to them. Reports of 
this nature can also help overcome the collective action problem, since widespread media reports 
can by a type of systemic shock which can lead to collective outcomes from uncoordinated 
responses if each person reacts similarly to the report. In this case, there is some indication that 
possibly half of the aid donors might withhold their donation if they knew of the aid diversion 
which was occurring as part of the relief effort in Somalia. This reinforces two points: the first is 
that donors, if they have the necessary information, may in fact be motivated to engage in 
sanctioning behavior. However, due to the lack of incentives to procure this information and the 
way donors heuristically rely on organizations’ reputation means that they don’t expend the 
efforts necessary to inform themselves. 
It would have 
no impact on 
my decision 
14% 
I would be 
slightly less 
likely to make a 
donation 
32% 
I would be very 
unlikely to 
make a 
donation 
27% 
I would not 
make a 
donation 
27% 
Assuming that you were considering making a donation, 
how would this information change, if at all, the 
likelihood that you would make a donation to a group 
which delivers food aid to Somalia, such as the World 
Food Program?  
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Secondly, this explains the premium organizations place on avoiding these types of 
negative reports. Their first preference should be to avoid having this information come out at 
all, but if it must come out, then it would be best to be limited to limited groups of individuals. 
These limited groups will have a difficult time organizing a larger response due to collective 
action issues. If, however, the reports are widely disseminated, then these coordination problems 
become less important and it becomes more likely that donors will seek to punish the offending 
groups.  
5.5 PUBLIC DONORS AND NGO ACCOUNTABILITY 
While the previous sections contain evidence that private donors exhibit many of the tendencies 
predicted in Chapter 3.0 and which should decrease their ability to provide oversight and 
accountability to the NGOs to which they donate, it does not touch upon similar attributes of 
public donors. This is one area which I intend to address more in-depth in future research 
through interviews with personnel at government agencies as well as NGOs to delve into the 
intricacies of the relationship between the two entities. In the interim, some information about 
how public donors behave may be obtained through a cursory look at the materials published by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the primary agency charged with 
handling U.S. aid and grants. 
One of the ways in which public donors are argued to have an advantage relative to 
private donors is in the former’s institutional and bureaucratic capabilities. Agencies such as 
USAID should be better able to both obtain and process information on NGO behavior in order 
to evaluate their effectiveness and provide oversight. This expectation does appear to be borne 
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out based on USAID’s own description of the process. In detailing the process by which grant 
and contract proposals are evaluated, three key criteria are identified: past performance, cost, and 
responsibility. Each of these should help to increase accountability of the NGOs who work with 
USAID, and the process by which they are evaluated is formally laid out in the Federal Awardee 
Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS).69 By having formally recognized and 
defined standards available to both donors and NGOs, the expectations of NGO behavior should 
be clear. Furthermore, the benchmarks by which NGOs will be evaluated should be similarly 
transparent. Even if these benchmarks aren’t formally related to particular outcomes, they should 
afford better accountability than the vague expectations of private donors. 
USAID also has a dedicated Compliance and Oversight Division for Partner 
Performance, which lists its tasks as:70 
• Tracking trends in partner performance; 
• Tracking compliance with U.S. Federal regulations; 
• Taking suspension or debarment actions against partners, if necessary; 
• Evaluate partner self-reports of organizational and compliance issues; 
• Ensure registration and completion of past performance reports and “encourage 
substantive narratives that properly coordinate to appropriate ratings”; 
• Analyze final termination paperwork 
All of these should help to provide the oversight necessary to privilege public donors as 
laid out in Chapter 3.0 .  
                                                 
69 Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/get-grant-or-contract/grant-and-contract-process. 
Accessed July 23, 2012. 
70 Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/compliance/. Accessed July 23, 2012. 
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There is also evidence that USAID performs this task fairly capably. In an interview with 
Robert Northrup, a physician who has done work in the past with Project Hope, he described 
USAID as a rather effective evaluation organization: 
 AID does provide a tremendous amount of oversight, they do it in a variety of ways. It’s 
done by different people, either people in Washington or people out in the field, and you 
work hard to satisfy the group that gives the money, and make sure that they’re happy 
with what you’re doing, and they get you from the beginning to the end… I have a very 
healthy understanding and appreciation of how AID has worked on that, and how they’ve 
grown over the years. When I first got to know AID back in the sixties, they were a lot of 
people who didn’t really have much public health experience. They were docs, mostly, 
they had very little, almost no experience in the types of things we’re talking about now. 
Evaluations were very casual, sort of trusted you to spend the money usefully and 
hopefully you did. Not anymore; it’s really very carefully run and highly effective. 
 
Dr. Northrup also detailed some of the specific ways in which USAID provided oversight 
in the field, each of which were processes that private donors were either unlikely to engage in or 
would simply be beyond their capabilities. 
Finally, there is also evidence that USAID engages in the type of sanctioning behavior 
proposed in the development of the theory. In addition to the federal government’s “Excluded 
Parties List System”, USAID maintains its own system of “Red Alerts”. The system allows for 
“notifying the acquisition and assistance community when a suspension or debarment action has 
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been taken against and individual or entity.”71 On July 23, 2012, the system listed 75 individuals 
or entities which had been suspended, debarred, or proposed for debarment. 
This information is very preliminary, and in and of itself does not guarantee that USAID 
is effective in holding NGOs accountable. However, when compared to the survey results 
presented earlier in the chapter, it would appear that the mechanisms of accountability are far 
more readily available to USAID than private donors. Furthermore, there is evidence from at 
least one perspective in the field that USAID is performing this task adequately, even if the 
information is anecdotal in nature. Taken together, it does appear that it is at least plausible that 
USAID, at least, functions in the manner outlined in Chapter 3.0 , although this is an area which 
will benefit from further data gathering and analysis. 
5.6 SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY 
The small sample size and other components of the current survey mean that it is not an 
authoritative assessment of the behavior of private donors. However, it can serve as a plausibility 
probe of the arguments regarding the preferences and behavior of private donors in Chapter 3.0 .  
Overall the survey results are largely supportive of the assumptions undergirding the arguments 
as to why private donors have a difficult time holding the groups to which they make donations 
accountable for their actions. Many donors spend little time engaging in research about the 
organization or its activities, both before and after making a donation. What information they do 
obtain generally comes from personal observation or is provided to them by the organization, 
                                                 
71 Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/compliance/red-alerts/. Accessed July 23, 2012. 
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both avenues which can lead to informational problems, particularly when the group operates 
primarily outside of the donor’s home country. Furthermore, donors appear to place a great 
degree of importance on an organization’s reputation, and tend to hold beliefs which may not be 
in line with reality since most donors do not know key information about their preferred 
organizations. 
If they did have this information there is some evidence that private donors would 
actually engage in a more active oversight role, including possibly withholding future funding. 
This reinforces the belief held by these organizations that information and reputation 
management is critical to their success. Those organizations which do the most effective job of 
promoting their brand through the media, maximizing their reputation while keeping negative 
information to a minimum, should be those groups which can maximize their donations. The 
need to actually create a positive outcome using the donations provided by private sources is not 
a necessary part of the equation. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
Is humanitarian aid effective? This question motivates this examination of the effects of 
humanitarian interventions on recipient populations. Though to many it may seem self-evident 
that humanitarian activities which distribute medical care to the sick and wounded, or food to the 
starving, are inherently beneficial, the literature on humanitarian aid is rife with arguments and 
case studies detailing how in fact humanitarian aid may negatively impact crises. In light of these 
arguments, a key question is whether these negative impacts may outweigh the positive benefits 
to aid recipients or otherwise reduce the beneficial aspects of aid provision. The manner in which 
I constructed my argument regarding how to accurately assess the effectiveness of humanitarian 
aid and how aid may actually impact recipient populations, along with the means by which I 
tested this theory, is the focus of the next section. Section 6.2 discusses the policy implications of 
this argument and empirical results, while the third section identifies avenues for future study 
and concludes the dissertation. 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The first step in assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian aid is to identify the appropriate 
metric by which to measure aid’s effects. Based on the literature identifying numerous ways in 
way aid could potentially generate negative externalities which could detrimentally affect public 
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health, I argued that there were two important considerations in measuring aid effectiveness. The 
first of these is the direct effect of aid, or the benefit derived from aid by those who actually 
receive food, medical assistance, and so forth. The second is the indirect effects of aid, those 
costs potentially imposed upon societies from the negative externalities associated with 
humanitarian activities. Simply measuring the former without acknowledgement of the latter 
would bias the results in favor of finding aid to be effective and miss the important fact that 
humanitarian interventions are political and economic endeavors, even if aid organizations are 
professedly neutral in their approach.  These dual mechanisms mean that the true measure of 
aid’s effects is an aggregate measure which reflects the net of the direct and indirect effects. For 
the purposes of this study, I therefore utilized aggregate measures of public health: life 
expectancy and, to a lesser degree, infant mortality. 
I then presented a theory of aid effectiveness predicated upon differences in the ways in 
which humanitarian NGOs are funded. The critical distinction within this framework was 
whether the NGO received its funding primarily from public or private sources. Since the donor-
NGO relationship shares similarities with the principal-agent framework, I argued that NGOs 
always possess an innate preference to maintain as much autonomy from their principal-donor as 
possible, placing the onus upon the donor to actively monitor the NGO-agent. Private and public 
donors do not share a similar ability to perform this function, however, with private donors being 
at a distinct disadvantage relative to public donors.. Private donors face obstacles in their 
incentive to monitor the organizations to which they donate, and similar hurdles in their ability to 
do so. Even if they overcame these impediments, private donor oversight of NGOs is further 
hampered by their inability to jointly punish the NGOs in a substantively meaningful way. 
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Public donors, by contrast, enjoy advantages relative to private donors in each of these 
areas. They have greater incentives to monitor NGOs, enhanced ability to follow through on 
these incentives, and also possess far greater ability to punish NGOs who are found to be 
underperforming or otherwise not representing the interests of the donor.  Even though public 
donors are not perfect principles, I argue that on average they should be more effective than 
private donors, and thus NGOs who are predominantly publicly funded should be held to a 
greater level of accountability than organizations which rely on private donors to a great degree. 
These differences in accountability are posited to translate into differences in aid effectiveness, 
with aid coming from publicly funded organizations demonstrating a greater level of 
effectiveness than aid from privately funded organizations. This was represented by two different 
hypotheses reflecting the relative effectiveness of aid from teach type of organization, including 
during active civil conflicts, and also a related corollary examining aid effectiveness during 
natural disasters. 
These hypotheses were tested in Chapter 4.0 on an original dataset on humanitarian 
activities. Covering the years from 2004-2007, the dataset includes information on the activities 
of three of the largest humanitarian NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Médecins sans Frontières, and Oxfam International. Regression analysis indicated that in every 
scenario, aid from the ICRC, the publicly funded NGO, was in fact more effective than aid from 
the other two organizations, each of which are privately funded, in line with the hypothesized 
relationship. What was surprising was the estimated effect of aid from MSF and Oxfam. In many 
of the estimations it was found that aid from these organizations was not simply less effective 
than aid from the ICRC, but in fact aid activities by these groups were actually detrimental to 
public health. These effects were robust to a number of different estimations, indicating that the 
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results are not simple statistical artifact but actually represent the effect these organizations have 
on recipient countries. One possible explanation for this finding, as discussed in Section 3.6, is 
that the negative consequences of aid are overwhelming its positive benefits. This is not to say 
that aid has no benefit for those who actually receive it, but rather that from a societal 
perspective outcomes such as arming rebel groups or prolonging conflicts generate a negative 
public consequence which exceed the private benefits enjoyed by recipients.  
The quantitative results in Chapter 4.0 tested the predictions regarding differences in aid 
effectiveness, but were not able to speak to the process by which those differences were 
achieved. To begin to assess whether the argument about the way private donors act has 
empirical plausibility, Chapter 5.0 presented the results of a pilot survey administered to assess 
private donor behavior. The results were in line with what was posited in Chapter 3.0 : private 
donors did not engage in much effort to actively research the activities of the organizations to 
which they donated, either prior to or after their contribution. Furthermore, they appeared to feel 
better informed about these activities than they really were, and reputation was found to play a 
large role in the donation and evaluation process overall. Questions posed to donors about aid 
diversion in Somalia and the effect it would have on donors’ willingness to contribute suggested 
that donors would in fact be more judicious in their behavior and actively seek to avoid 
organizations which could not avoid these diversions, indicating that informational deficiencies 
overall are a key factor impacting private donors’ ability to provide oversight of their preferred 
organizations.  
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6.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given the stark disparity between the empirical effects of aid from the ICRC, MSF and Oxfam, it 
would be possible to interpret these results as a motivation for shifting of donations away from 
the latter two organizations in favor of the ICRC. After all, if MSF and Oxfam are in fact 
reducing life expectancy, the argument about donor accountability would suggest that both 
public and private donors should withhold funds from these organizations in order to force them 
to change the aspects of their behavior which are detracting from their missions of saving lives 
and providing relief to those in need. I would not suggest that funding deflection from MSF and 
Oxfam to ICRC is a policy implication of this project, but it could be one tool by which the 
necessary policy adjustments could be enforced. However, to truly make a difference the policy 
adjustments must come from the NGOs themselves, rather than from donors. 
It is the NGOS who must enact these changes because ultimately is the NGOs who 
engage in behaviors, born out of policies and principles at the heart of their individual 
organization, which make their aid efforts more or less effective. Specifically, NGOs which have 
avoided working with states due to their principled stand that state funding infringes on their 
neutrality and independence must relax this position. If these principles and policies are the 
reasons why NGOs are creating negative externalities which are causing them to make crises 
worse and detract from their ability to positively impact aid recipients, then these policies must 
be altered if positive changes are to be realized. 
There are strong reasons to believe that these principles and policies are in fact the causal 
explanation for why we observe differences between the three organizations contained in this 
analysis. First, there is no reason to believe and I do not argue that there is any organizational 
malfeasance occurring with any of these aid organizations. Even the most strident aid critics 
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likely would not go so far as to suggest that these operations intend to inflict harm upon those 
who they serve. It seems a safe assumption that aid organizations of these types broadly mean to 
do well, and even if there are limited exceptions, they should not be so prevalent as to indicate a 
systemic problem within the aid community. Adopting this blanket assumption, the motivation 
for aid giving cannot then explain differences in outcomes among aid groups since the 
motivations for each group are the same. 
Second, it is possible that differences in operational competence may explain variation in 
ability to deliver aid effectively from one organization to another. This may certainly be true of 
the “MONGOs” discussed by Polman (2010), who may set out with good intentions and high 
expectations but little expertise in how to actually provide assistance. It is likely not applicable 
however to the three organizations studied in this project. Each of the three aid organizations 
included in the analysis are highly professionalized and recognized experts in their field. There is 
little a priori reason to believe that MSF, for example, does not possess the necessary medical 
expertise to address the physical needs of those individuals whom they assist in the field, or that 
the physicians associated with ICRC should be more capable than those of MSF. 
Indeed, the theory presented here is in complete agreement with what can be understood 
as a paradox of humanitarian activities: entirely well-meaning organizations staffed with 
competent and knowledgeable individuals can in fact do more than good. If it’s not due to skill 
or intention, then what can explain this paradox? My argument is that the remaining element is 
principles and policies. The principles of humanitarian action, and the different ways in which 
organizations have altered their behavior in order to meet these principles, explains why some 
organizations can minimize negative consequences while for others they appear to be 
exacerbated. 
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It is because these policies are so deeply held and the way organizations emphasize their 
importance that will make the necessary policy adjustments implied by this theory difficult to 
enact. The theory and results here suggest that in order to become more effective organizations 
which have eschewed funding from states, as well as other types of assistance or associations, 
should relax this organizational opposition to state participation and avail themselves of the 
opportunities that states offer. This finding is antithetical to the beliefs of many organizations, 
and in fact counter-intuitive to their own understanding of what makes them effective. As 
discussed in Section 3.2, organizations such as MSF argue that it is independence from states 
which makes them more effective than NGOs which accept state funds. The policy prescription 
presented here is therefore not only in opposition to their own beliefs regarding effectiveness, but 
also anathema to the manner in which they conceptualize their relationship with states. 
  The ultimate question will be which principles these NGOs will prioritize. If the 
ultimate principle of saving lives and providing care for those in need takes precedence, then it 
may be more palatable to NGOs which have traditionally avoided collaborating with states to 
change their position. After all, this reluctance has been predicated on a principle that the 
empirics presented here suggest may in fact reflect a false belief: that this differentiation makes 
their aid more effective. If, however, these organizations continue to subscribe to the idea that 
independence from state funding makes them more effective, even at the risk of potentially 
inducing negative outcomes, then this may be the realm in which donors can attempt to sway 
NGO behavior through the manipulation of donations. It would require overcoming the many 
obstacles that the private donors face in taking this type of coordinated action, but it may be 
worth the efforts if it can in fact make aid more effective. 
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Maximizing aid effectiveness benefits everyone, and so while privately funded 
organizations may be asked to undertake some significant changes in the ways in which they 
conduct their operations, organizations which currently work with the state may also be asked to 
engage in proactive change. The estimated effects of ICRC aid, while positive, would suggest 
that there is additional room for improvement. Even though public donors are better positioned 
to hold the NGOs to which they supply funding accountable, this accountability is still to some 
degree diffuse and states too have limitations on both their incentive and ability to monitor these 
organizations. States are by no means perfect principals, but are argued to simply be better than 
private donors overall. 
How can accountability therefore be improved for the NGOs who already work with 
states? One solution which would apply to both NGOs who already work with states, as well as 
those which do not, would be the creation of an international organization charged with 
overseeing and coordinating humanitarian activities. As Seybolt (2009) has argued, greater 
coordination is one area of dire need in the realm of contemporary humanitarian action. Vesting 
one organization with the primary responsibility of directing funding among agencies, and also 
overseeing their operations, could minimize the inefficiencies that arise from spreading these 
responsibilities over various donors and also allow the institution to provide better structure and 
coordination among humanitarian actors. 
This solution certainly is not a panacea for humanitarian aid. The organizations which 
maintain that working with states compromises their neutrality would only be slightly comforted 
by the multinational nature of the international institution. Certainly this level of coordination 
and oversight would also be seen by all actors as an additional constraint on their autonomy, and 
may also be seen as antithetical to their competitive interests in fundraising as it may limit their 
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ability to differentiate themselves from their competition for the purposes of increasing 
donations. 
 While these concerns contain some element of truth, the fact that the evidence suggests 
that under the current arrangement humanitarian NGOs exhibit an ability to actually harm public 
welfare, in expectations with the fears of aid critics, indicates that something must change in the 
manner in which these organizations are monitored and held accountable. Given the deficiencies 
in the way other NGOs provide monitoring and the obstacles facing private donors, the best 
solution would seem to lie in the realm of public entities such as intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs). It may not be a perfect solution, but it may be better than the available alternatives. 
6.3 FURTHER RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation, as one of the first empirical studies of the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, is 
an important contribution in advancing the understanding of which factors impact upon 
humanitarian NGOs’ ability to effectively deliver services. It is only a first step, however, along 
a path that numerous future opportunities to study similar phenomena. 
One promising area of future research is the study of which factors determine how 
organizations respond to particular types of crises, or crises in specific regions of the world. As 
shown in Chapter 4.0 there are differences in the response patterns of the ICRC and MSF, for 
example, which suggests that there are structural factors which influence organizational 
responses. Within this study these factors have been controlled for as best as possible to ensure 
that they do not impact the estimated results of organizational efficacy, treating them as a 
statistical nuisance. Understanding of these factors can lend substantial benefits to our 
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understanding of humanitarian aid overall, much as understanding the factors influencing why 
countries give foreign aid for particular reasons – as Alesina and Dollar (2000) and others have 
endeavored to do – helps in our understanding of the circumstances in which aid should be 
expected to be effective in inducing economic growth. By understanding which types of 
organizations respond to particular crises, we may further understand how the response of these 
organizations can be enhanced to yield the greatest benefits to aid recipients. 
The accountability mechanism discussed in this dissertation may also be applied to other 
types of NGOs, expanding the potential types of organizations which may be studied. 
Development organizations, as an example, may be expected to be subject to a similar type of 
mechanism in which organizations which are held more accountable by donors should be better 
able to deliver aid which improves the lives of recipients. The potential pitfalls of development 
aid from NGOs are likely to be different than those afflicting humanitarian aid, which is why 
development organizations are not included in this analysis, and means that further theorizing is 
required. Given the increasing importance of development NGOs among the development 
milieu, increasing the effectiveness of these organizations may be just as impactful for 
individuals such as those residing in the “bottom billion” of development, so termed by Paul 
Collier (2007), who lack even the very basic necessities of life. 
Finally, there exists a class of private donor who may in fact bridge the differences 
between private and public entities. Large philanthropic institutions such as the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation control financial resources which far exceed those of the great majority of any 
private individuals, and these institutions have the additional benefit of being able to acquire 
institutional expertise which further sets them apart from the their private peers. In many ways 
these institutions share more in common with states than with individual donors, and so present 
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an interesting category of analysis in their relationship with NGOs. Lacking some of the 
compulsory power of states, such as the ability to collect tax filings and other financial 
information from states headquartered in their territory, organizations such as the Gates 
Foundation should likely fall somewhere in between public and private donors in their ability to 
hold NGOs accountable for their actions and outcomes. This is an empirical question, however, 
the study of which may raise interesting questions about how these types of organizations affect 
the international NGO landscape, and are themselves affected by their own need for fundraising. 
In light of the ever increasing reach of these organizations as they integrate into public policy 
decisions on the domestic and international level, they should be a fruitful avenue of research for 
scholars and policy makers interested in the nexus of private efforts on public governance. 
In some ways, this dissertation may also be seen as its own test of the argument regarding 
the impediments facing private donors in their ability to hold NGOs accountable. The data 
gathering process necessary to construct the dataset has strong parallels to the type of data 
gathering any private donor would have to undertake in order to assess how their donations are 
actually translated into outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 4.0 in many cases such data were 
either not made available by NGOs or not kept by the organization. If these data are not available 
after great personal efforts aimed at obtaining them, how likely is it that any single private donor 
would be able to get the information necessary to perform their role as NGO principal, much less 
then be able to analyze these data in a systematic way? The difficulties encountered in preparing 
and analyzing these data can in some ways therefore be seen as evidence in favor of this 
component of the argument.  
The most important element of any and all of these avenues of research, and the current 
dissertation, is that the benefits of the analysis extend well beyond the realm of the academic and 
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have significant real world implications. Rather than increasing knowledge for knowledge’s 
sake, or being “academic” in the most pejorative sense of the term, these processes impact 
individuals in a meaningful way. This includes individuals interested in the way in which aid 
works, as well as those who earn their living trying to improve the lives of others, often at great 
personal cost to themselves. Each of these individuals benefits from more effective aid delivery 
systems, but none benefit as much as aid recipients. Whether they are threatened by civil 
conflict, natural disaster, or some other calamity, the millions of individuals each year who face 
existential threats to their lives and well-being desperately rely on the efficient and effective 
functioning of the humanitarian aid apparatus. Increasing aid effectiveness through increased 
accountability may infringe on the principles by which some aid organizations operate, but it is 
an infringement that may translate into tangible benefits for untold individuals and save 
innumerable lives. That is a trade-off well worth investing in. 
 165 
APPENDIX A 
CONFLICT MODELS SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
Table 6-1 Current Conflict Control Variables, Life Expectancy 
  (7) (8) (9) 
  
Current 
Conflict 
Current Civil 
Conflict 
Current Civil 
War 
GDP Growth -0.000134 -7.93e-06 -0.000409 
  (0.000453) (0.000505) (0.000486) 
GDP per capita 7.12e-06*** 7.74e-06*** 7.72e-06*** 
  (2.04e-06) (2.12e-06) (2.16e-06) 
Openness -0.000120 -9.30e-05 -5.17e-05 
  (9.79e-05) (9.15e-05) (6.94e-05) 
GDP per capita X Openness -2.99e-09 -4.18e-09 -4.03e-09 
  (3.01e-09) (3.90e-09) (4.10e-09) 
Public Health Expenditures -0.000415 -0.000329 -0.000391 
  (0.000400) (0.000432) (0.000417) 
Population (logged) -0.0235 -0.0354 -0.0250 
  (0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0335) 
Polity 0.000822* 0.000672 0.000857 
  (0.000495) (0.000493) (0.000549) 
Education -0.0198** -0.0214*** -0.0212*** 
  (0.00819) (0.00626) (0.00672) 
 
 
 
 
 166 
Table 6-2 Current Conflicts, Infant Mortality 
  (10) (11) (12) 
  
Current 
Conflict 
Current Civil 
Conflict Current Civil War 
        
ICRC Aid -4.74*** -3.66*** -4.38* 
  (1.45) (0.967) (2.33) 
ICRC X Conflict 2.96 3.17** 4.14 
  (2.23) (1.58) (3.47) 
MSF Aid 11.3** 8.53 14.02** 
  (4.74) (5.47) (6.63) 
MSF X Conflict -8.77*** -5.73* -16.5* 
  (2.18) (3.29) (8.67) 
Oxfam Aid 7.43* 6.64** 6.50** 
  (4.36) (3.19) (3.24) 
Oxfam X Conflict 1.60 -4.29 4.40 
  (5.78) (9.37) (3.53) 
Conflict (Prior) 0.177*** 
 
  
  (0.0329) 
 
  
Conflict (Current) 0.0408 
 
  
  (0.0630) 
 
  
Civil Conflict (Prior) 
 
0.116** 0.128*** 
  
 
(0.0518) (0.0296) 
Civil War (Prior) 
 
0.0421 0.00838 
  
 
(0.0422) (0.0384) 
International Conflict (Prior) 
 
1.060*** -8.239*** 
  
 
(0.319) (1.027) 
Civil Conflict (Current) 
 
0.0642 0.0427 
  
 
(0.0631) (0.0581) 
Civil War (Current) 
 
-0.0105 -0.0215 
  
 
(0.0364) (0.0627) 
Disasters (Current) 0.00571** 0.00566*** 0.00603** 
  (0.00232) (0.00186) (0.00271) 
Disasters (Prior) 0.00828*** 0.00813** 0.00744** 
  (0.00296) (0.00316) (0.00336) 
Time Trend 0.00239 0.00359 0.00270 
  (0.00662) (0.00899) (0.00739) 
Constant 
 
-14.47***   
  
 
 (3.98)   
Observations 376 376 376 
R-squared 0.651 0.650 0.650 
Number of Countries 127 127 127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-3 Current Conflicts Control Variables, Infant Mortality 
  (10) (11) (12) 
  
Current 
Conflict 
Current Civil 
Conflict Current Civil War 
GDP Growth -0.00430 -0.00398 -0.00503 
  (0.00360) (0.00352) (0.00427) 
GDP per capita -6.85e-05*** -6.93e-05*** -6.27e-05*** 
  (1.38e-05) (1.71e-05) (1.48e-05) 
Openness -0.000692* -0.000854* -0.000658 
  (0.000416) (0.000486) (0.000423) 
GDP per capita X Openness 3.60e-08 4.47e-08* 2.68e-08 
  (2.71e-08) (2.60e-08) (2.83e-08) 
Public Health Expenditures -0.0125 -0.0125 -0.0119 
  (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0101) 
Population (logged) 1.462*** 1.421*** 1.385*** 
  (0.228) (0.249) (0.234) 
Polity -0.000650 -0.00157 -0.000940 
  (0.00136) (0.00117) (0.000941) 
Education -0.0375 -0.0516 -0.0485 
  (0.149) (0.126) (0.149) 
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APPENDIX B 
DISASTERS MODELS 
Table 6-4 Disasters Control Variables, Life Expectancy 
  (13) (14) 
  Current Disaster Prior Disaster 
GDP Growth -0.000170 -6.73e-05 
  (0.000427) (0.000435) 
GDP per capita 7.36e-06*** 7.85e-06*** 
  (2.02e-06) (2.01e-06) 
Openness -0.000144* -0.000123 
  (8.24e-05) (9.42e-05) 
GDP per capita X Openness -2.97e-09 -3.77e-09 
  (2.97e-09) (2.99e-09) 
Public Health Expenditures -0.000698 -0.000549 
  (0.000537) (0.000397) 
Population (logged) -0.0254 -0.0332 
  (0.0269) (0.0302) 
Polity 0.000911* 0.000808* 
  (0.000485) (0.000466) 
Education -0.0245*** -0.0223*** 
  (0.00733) (0.00719) 
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Table 6-5 Disasters Control Variables, Infant Mortality 
  (15) (16) 
  Current Disaster Prior Disaster 
GDP Growth -0.00435 -0.00417 
  (0.00431) (0.00424) 
GDP per capita -5.29e-05*** -6.18e-05*** 
  (1.49e-05) (1.75e-05) 
Openness -0.000461 -0.000609 
  (0.000473) (0.000452) 
GDP per capita X Openness 1.91e-08 2.90e-08 
  (2.67e-08) (3.23e-08) 
Public Health Expenditures -0.0132 -0.0124 
  (0.00931) (0.0104) 
Population (logged) 1.044*** 1.281*** 
  (0.209) (0.261) 
Polity -0.00126 -0.00225 
  (0.00110) (0.00151) 
Education -0.00318 -0.00777 
  (0.140) (0.143) 
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